Although an appellate Court admittedly can disturb an award of damages if such award is excessively high or unreasonably low, it is settled that a Court of Appeal will not disturb an award of damages made by the lower Court merely because it would have come to a different figure if it had heard the case itself. See Per NNAMANI, JSC in DUYILE & ANOR V. KELLY OGUNBAYO & SONS LTD (1988) LPELR-975(SC) (P. 17, PARAS. D-G).
— U.M. Abba Aji, JSC. Cappa v NDIC (2021) – SC.147/2006
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I have to commence my reasoning in this issue by laying emphasis on the notorious fact that the award of damages is essentially the duty of a trial court and will not be interfered with except unless certain circumstances exist:- a. Where the trial court acted under a misapprehension of facts or law b. where it failed to take into account relevant matter c. Where the amount awarded is too low or too high d. where failure to interfere would amount to injustice.
– Adekeye JSC. Harka v. Keazor (2011) – SC.262/2005
In the American case of Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Wright 54 SW 2nd it was held that where pain is claimed as an element of damages the impossibility of definitely measuring the damages by a money standard is no ground for denying pecuniary relief.
It is no longer a matter for contention that the principle in regard to the assessment and award of special damages is different from that of general damages: see Ijebu-Ode Local Govemment v.Adedeji Balogun & Co (1991) 1NWLR(Pt.166) 136 at p. 158; Eseigbe v.Agholor (1993) 9 NWLR (Pt.316) 128 at p. 145. In the former, damages are specially pleaded, strictly proved and accordingly awarded; in the latter, they are averred, if necessary under specific heads of claim, presumed in law to be the direct and natural consequence of the act complained of and awarded at large as a jury question.
— Uwaifo, JSC. Rockonoh v. NTP (2001) – SC.71/1995
Damages are awarded at the discretion of the trial Court, and so an appeal Court is reluctant to interfere with how the trial Court exercises its discretion unless: a) The exercise is tainted within illegality or substantial irregularity. b) If it is in the interest of justice of interfere. c) The discretion is wrongly exercised. See C.B.N vs. Okojie (supra) and University of Lagos vs. Aigoro (1985) 1 NWLR (part 1) 43 and Salu Vs Egeibon (1994) 6 NWLR (part 349) 23. An appellate Court would also interfere when it is satisfied That: a) The trial Court acted under a mistake of law; or b) The trial Court acted in disregard to some principles of law; or c) The trial Court acted under a misapprehension of facts; or d) The trial Court took into account irrelevant matters or failed to take into account relevant maters, or e) Injustice would result if the appellate Court does not interfere, or f) The amount awarded is ether ridiculously low or ridiculously high, that it must have been a wholly erroneous estimate of the damages – British Airways vs. Atoyebi (2014) 13 NWLR (part 1424) 253 at 265 266; African Newspapers (Nig.) Plc vs. Useni (2015) 3 NWLR (part 1447) 464 at 475 476 and Guardian Newspapers Ltd vs. Ajeh (2011) 10 NWLR (part 1256) 574.
The quantum of damages does not now arise for consideration. We would only point out that the Judge did not record a finding as to the extent of the annual financial loss suffered by those whom he held to have been dependants of the deceased woman, or say how he arrived at the total sum awarded. It Is easier for an appeal court to decide whether the damages awarded can be upheld H it knows how they were assessed, and we hope that in cases of this kind judges will set out the reasoning by which they arrive at their final estimates.
— Brett JSC. Benson v. Ashiru (1967) – SC. 405/1965
The tort of negligence is a civil wrong consisting of breach of a legal duty to care which results in damage. Thus, three things must be proved before the liability to pay damages for tort of negligence and these are:- (a) That the defendant owned the plaintiff a duty to exercise due care. (b) That the defendant failed to exercise due care, and (c) That the defendant’s failure was the cause of the injury in the proper sense of that term.
– Shuaibu JCA. Diamond Bank v. Mocok (2019)
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