It is trite and well settled as rightly argued by the said counsel that:- the person claiming should establish his entitlement to that type of damages by credible evidence of such a character as would suggest that he indeed is entitled to an award under that head… See the cases of Oladehin v. Continental ile Mills Ltd (1978) NSCC, page 88 and also Imana v. Robinson (1979) NSCC page 1.
— C.B. Ogunbiyi, JSC. Ibrahim v. Obaje (2017) – SC.60/2006
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To sue for specific performance is to assume that a contract is still subsisting and therefore to insist that it should be performed. That will mean that the plaintiff will not want it repudiated unless for any other reason the court was unable to aid him to enforce specific performance of it. He may then fall back for remedy at common law for damages. Specific performance is a discretionary remedy. This does not mean that it will be granted or withheld arbitrarily; the discretion is a judicial discretion and is exercised on well settled principles. It means that in an action for the specific performance of a contract of the class usually enforced, the court may take into account circumstances which could not be taken into account in an action for damages for breach of contract, such as the conduct of the plaintiff, or the hardship which an order for specific performance will inflict on the defendant.
– Ba’Aba JCA. Enejo v. Nasir (2006)
Damages are awarded at the discretion of the trial Court, and so an appeal Court is reluctant to interfere with how the trial Court exercises its discretion unless: a) The exercise is tainted within illegality or substantial irregularity. b) If it is in the interest of justice of interfere. c) The discretion is wrongly exercised. See C.B.N vs. Okojie (supra) and University of Lagos vs. Aigoro (1985) 1 NWLR (part 1) 43 and Salu Vs Egeibon (1994) 6 NWLR (part 349) 23. An appellate Court would also interfere when it is satisfied That: a) The trial Court acted under a mistake of law; or b) The trial Court acted in disregard to some principles of law; or c) The trial Court acted under a misapprehension of facts; or d) The trial Court took into account irrelevant matters or failed to take into account relevant maters, or e) Injustice would result if the appellate Court does not interfere, or f) The amount awarded is ether ridiculously low or ridiculously high, that it must have been a wholly erroneous estimate of the damages – British Airways vs. Atoyebi (2014) 13 NWLR (part 1424) 253 at 265 266; African Newspapers (Nig.) Plc vs. Useni (2015) 3 NWLR (part 1447) 464 at 475 476 and Guardian Newspapers Ltd vs. Ajeh (2011) 10 NWLR (part 1256) 574.
Para. 43: “In the case of Chief Ebrimah Manneh v. Republic of The Gambia, supra, decided on 5th June 2008, this court set out some principles that will guide it in the award of damages. Though by no means exhaustive, the principles set out in that decision are relevant to this case. Principally the object of an award in human rights violation is to vindicate the injured feelings of the victim and to restore his rights and human dignity. Monetary compensation may also be awarded in appropriate cases but the objective of such an award must not be punitive. The following cases decided by the European Court of Human Rights are of relevance to this discussion on damages: Ahmed Selmouni v. State of France (2005) CHR 237; and Miroslav Cenbauer v. Republic of Croatia (2005) CBR 424 , where the court awarded damages in circumstances similar to the present case, wherein the plaintiff was tortured.”
— Saidykhan v GAMBIA (2010) – ECW/CCJ/JUD/08/10
It is no longer a matter for contention that the principle in regard to the assessment and award of special damages is different from that of general damages: see Ijebu-Ode Local Govemment v.Adedeji Balogun & Co (1991) 1NWLR(Pt.166) 136 at p. 158; Eseigbe v.Agholor (1993) 9 NWLR (Pt.316) 128 at p. 145. In the former, damages are specially pleaded, strictly proved and accordingly awarded; in the latter, they are averred, if necessary under specific heads of claim, presumed in law to be the direct and natural consequence of the act complained of and awarded at large as a jury question.
— Uwaifo, JSC. Rockonoh v. NTP (2001) – SC.71/1995
As such is the position, there is now no need for this court or the Court of Appeal to look at an issue of damages as if it were a sacred cow reserved for the court of trial. The correct approach ought to be that unless an issue of credibility of witnesses as to damages arises in the proceedings, the appellate court ought, on entering or affirming a judgment in favour of the plaintiff, to assess and award damages to which he is entitled.
– Pats-Acholonu, JSC. C & C Constr. v. Okhai (2003) – SC.8/1999
The law is settled that an appellate Court will not ordinarily interfere with an award of damages made by a trial Court unless it is shown that in the assessment and award of damages, the trial Court applied a wrong principle of law or misapprehended the facts or that the award is so high or so low.
— M.O. Bolaji-Yusuff, JCA. CCB v Nwankwo (2018) – CA/E/141/2017
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