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JUDGES SHOULD SET OUT HOW THEY ARRIVE AT QUANTUM OF DAMAGES

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Dictum

The quantum of damages does not now arise for consideration. We would only point out that the Judge did not record a finding as to the extent of the annual financial loss suffered by those whom he held to have been dependants of the deceased woman, or say how he arrived at the total sum awarded. It Is easier for an appeal court to decide whether the damages awarded can be upheld H it knows how they were assessed, and we hope that in cases of this kind judges will set out the reasoning by which they arrive at their final estimates.

— Brett JSC. Benson v. Ashiru (1967) – SC. 405/1965

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APPELLATE COURT WILL NOT DISTURB DAMAGES OF LOWER COURT SIMPLY BECAUSE IT WOULD HAVE AWARDED A DIFFERENT FIGURE

Although an appellate Court admittedly can disturb an award of damages if such award is excessively high or unreasonably low, it is settled that a Court of Appeal will not disturb an award of damages made by the lower Court merely because it would have come to a different figure if it had heard the case itself. See Per NNAMANI, JSC in DUYILE & ANOR V. KELLY OGUNBAYO & SONS LTD (1988) LPELR-975(SC) (P. 17, PARAS. D-G).

— U.M. Abba Aji, JSC. Cappa v NDIC (2021) – SC.147/2006

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RATIONALE FOR DAMAGES AWARD

The primary object of an award of damages is to compensate the plaintiff for the harm done to him or a possible secondary object is to punish the defendant for his conduct in inflicting that harm. The rationale behind the compensatory theory for the award of damages is found in the maxim restitutio in integrum. In other words, to restore the injured party to the position he or she was in prior to the injury.

– Kekere-Ekun JSC. British v. Atoyebi (2014) – SC.332/2010

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THE CONCEPT OF GENERAL DAMAGES & SPECIAL DAMAGES

In the legal parlance. General damages are regarded those damages that the law presumes to be direct, natural or probable consequence of the act complained of. On the other hand special damages’ are simply’ such damages which the law will not infer from the natural consequences of the act complained of. They must always be proved, of course, after it was specifically pleaded. In otherwords, in general damages a Court can make an award when it can not point out any measure of assessment except what it can hold, in the yardstick of measurement by a reasonable man. But on the other hand, specific damages must be specifically pleaded item by item and each item duly and specifically proved in order to succeed in the award of such item. See Adekunle v Rockview Hotel Ltd (2004) 1 NWLR (pt 853)161 at 173/174; Adedo vs Ismaila (1969) NCLR 253. Ijebu- Ode Local Government vs Adedeji Balogun & Co Ltd (1991)1 NWLR (pt 166) 135.

— A. Sanusi, JSC. Ibrahim v. Obaje (2017) – SC.60/2006

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DAMAGES FOR PAIN (WHICH CANNOT BE MEASURED) SHOULD NOT BE DENIED

In the American case of Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Wright 54 SW 2nd it was held that where pain is claimed as an element of damages the impossibility of definitely measuring the damages by a money standard is no ground for denying pecuniary relief.

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DAMAGES IN BUILDING CONTRACT

In Mertens v. Home Freeholds Company (1921),2 K.B. 526, where the Court approved the law on this point as stated in an earlier edition of Hudson. In that case the contractor had undertaken to build to the roofing and the Court held:- The proper measure of damages was what it cost the plaintiff to complete the house substantially as it was originally intended and in a reasonable manner at the earliest moment he was allowed to proceed with the work, less any amount which would have been due and payable by the defendant to the plaintiff, had the defendant completed the house to the roofing at the time agreed by the terms of the contract.

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ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES IN BREACH OF CONTRACT

[A]s far back as 1854 in the case of Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 9 Ex (Ch. 341, where at p. 354 of the Report, Alderson, B. expressed the law as follows: “Now we think the proper rule in such a case as the present is this: Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such a breach of contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it.”

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