JUDGES SHOULD SET OUT HOW THEY ARRIVE AT QUANTUM OF DAMAGES

OBJECT OF AWARD OF DAMAGES IN HUMAN RIGHTS CASES

Para. 43: “In the case of Chief Ebrimah Manneh v. Republic of The Gambia, supra, decided on 5th June 2008, this court set out some principles that will guide it in the award of damages. Though by no means exhaustive, the principles set out in that decision are relevant to this case. Principally the object of an award in human rights violation is to vindicate the injured feelings of the victim and to restore his rights and human dignity. Monetary compensation may also be awarded in appropriate cases but the objective of such an award must not be punitive. The following cases decided by the European Court of Human Rights are of relevance to this discussion on damages: Ahmed Selmouni v. State of France (2005) CHR 237; and Miroslav Cenbauer v. Republic of Croatia (2005) CBR 424 , where the court awarded damages in circumstances similar to the present case, wherein the plaintiff was tortured.”

— Saidykhan v GAMBIA (2010) – ECW/CCJ/JUD/08/10

DAMAGES – WHEN APPELLATE COURT WILL INTERFERE WITH DAMAGES AWARDED

Damages are awarded at the discretion of the trial Court, and so an appeal Court is reluctant to interfere with how the trial Court exercises its discretion unless: a) The exercise is tainted within illegality or substantial irregularity. b) If it is in the interest of justice of interfere. c) The discretion is wrongly exercised. See C.B.N vs. Okojie (supra) and University of Lagos vs. Aigoro (1985) 1 NWLR (part 1) 43 and Salu Vs Egeibon (1994) 6 NWLR (part 349) 23. An appellate Court would also interfere when it is satisfied That: a) The trial Court acted under a mistake of law; or b) The trial Court acted in disregard to some principles of law; or c) The trial Court acted under a misapprehension of facts; or d) The trial Court took into account irrelevant matters or failed to take into account relevant maters, or e) Injustice would result if the appellate Court does not interfere, or f) The amount awarded is ether ridiculously low or ridiculously high, that it must have been a wholly erroneous estimate of the damages – British Airways vs. Atoyebi (2014) 13 NWLR (part 1424) 253 at 265 266; African Newspapers (Nig.) Plc vs. Useni (2015) 3 NWLR (part 1447) 464 at 475 476 and Guardian Newspapers Ltd vs. Ajeh (2011) 10 NWLR (part 1256) 574.

DAMAGES FOR SUFFERING, PAIN, ANXIETY SHOULD BE ASSESSED ON REASONABLE BASIS

Sellers, L. J. in Wise v. Kaye (1962) 1 All ER 257 and which states thus: “It has always been accepted that physical injury and the personal experience of pain, and also of suffering, including worry and anxiety for the future and apprehension of an operation, or of nursing or deprivation of activity owing to disablement or embarrassment or limitation felt by reason of disfigurement, cannot in any true sense be measured in money… Damages for such injuries, originally almost invariably assessed by juries, were said to be ‘at large’, and had to be assessed on a reasonable and fair basis between party and party. There can be no restitution for the loss of a limb or loss of faculty but the law requires adequate compensation to be assessed.”