Damages are always in issue and so failure to deny them is not fatal: Re The Nigerian Produce Marketing Board v. Adewunmi (1972) 11 S.C. 111.
— Edozie, JCA. British American v. Ekeoma & Anor. (1994) – CA/E/60/88
Damages are always in issue and so failure to deny them is not fatal: Re The Nigerian Produce Marketing Board v. Adewunmi (1972) 11 S.C. 111.
— Edozie, JCA. British American v. Ekeoma & Anor. (1994) – CA/E/60/88
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[A]s far back as 1854 in the case of Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 9 Ex (Ch. 341, where at p. 354 of the Report, Alderson, B. expressed the law as follows: “Now we think the proper rule in such a case as the present is this: Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such a breach of contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it.”
The law is settled that an appellate Court will not ordinarily interfere with an award of damages made by a trial Court unless it is shown that in the assessment and award of damages, the trial Court applied a wrong principle of law or misapprehended the facts or that the award is so high or so low.
— M.O. Bolaji-Yusuff, JCA. CCB v Nwankwo (2018) – CA/E/141/2017
The primary object of an award of damages is to compensate the plaintiff for the harm done to him or a possible secondary object is to punish the defendant for his conduct in inflicting that harm. The rationale behind the compensatory theory for the award of damages is found in the maxim restitutio in integrum. In other words, to restore the injured party to the position he or she was in prior to the injury.
– Kekere-Ekun JSC. British v. Atoyebi (2014) – SC.332/2010
The appellant’s learned senior counsel had submitted that it had shown reasons for this Court to interfere with the award of damages. An appellate Court does not usually interfere with award of damages unless: (a) the trial Court acted under a mistake of law; or (b) where the trial Court acted in disregard of some principles of law: or (c) where the trial Court acted under misapprehension of facts; or (d) where it has taken into account irrelevant matters or failed to take into account relevant matters; or (e) where injustice would result if the appellate Court does not interfere; or (f) where the amount awarded is ridiculously low or high that it must have been a wholly erroneous estimate of the damages, see SPDCN v. Tiebo VII (supra); Cameroon Airlines v. Otutuizu (supra); British Airways v. Atoyebi (2014) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1424) 253; Agu v. General Oil Ltd. (2015) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1488) 327.
— O.F. Ogbuinya JCA. Stanbic IBTC Bank Plc v. Longterm Global Cap. Ltd. & Ors. (September 20 2021, ca/l/1093/2017)
To sue for specific performance is to assume that a contract is still subsisting and therefore to insist that it should be performed. That will mean that the plaintiff will not want it repudiated unless for any other reason the court was unable to aid him to enforce specific performance of it. He may then fall back for remedy at common law for damages. Specific performance is a discretionary remedy. This does not mean that it will be granted or withheld arbitrarily; the discretion is a judicial discretion and is exercised on well settled principles. It means that in an action for the specific performance of a contract of the class usually enforced, the court may take into account circumstances which could not be taken into account in an action for damages for breach of contract, such as the conduct of the plaintiff, or the hardship which an order for specific performance will inflict on the defendant.
– Ba’Aba JCA. Enejo v. Nasir (2006)
In Mertens v. Home Freeholds Company (1921),2 K.B. 526, where the Court approved the law on this point as stated in an earlier edition of Hudson. In that case the contractor had undertaken to build to the roofing and the Court held:- The proper measure of damages was what it cost the plaintiff to complete the house substantially as it was originally intended and in a reasonable manner at the earliest moment he was allowed to proceed with the work, less any amount which would have been due and payable by the defendant to the plaintiff, had the defendant completed the house to the roofing at the time agreed by the terms of the contract.
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