The law is settled that in the interpretation of statutes, special things derogate from general things (generalibus specialia derogat). Where there is a conflict between two legislations one of which is special on a subject and the other legislation is general in nature, the legislation that is special in nature shall supersede.
– H.M. Ogunwumiju, JCA. ITV v. Edo Internal Revenue (2014) – CA/B/20/2013
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I agree with Mr. Sofola, S.A.N., in his submission that the court below was in error to have relied on clauses 3 and 6 of the lease agreement only and limited itself in the construction of the lease agreement to the construction of these clauses alone. The approach adopted by the court below is in violation of one of the fundamental and hallowed principles in the construction of document and written instruments, that the several parts, where there are more than one, must be interpreted together to avoid conflicts in the natural meaning in the various parts of the written document or instrument. This rule of construction was approved by this court in Ojokolobo & Ors. v.Alamu & Anor. (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 61)377,(1987)7 SCNJ 98.
— Karibi-Whyte, JSC. Unilife v. Adeshigbin (2001) 4 NWLR (Pt.704) 609
It is that the provisions of the Constitution are to be given liberal construction so as to best carry out the intention of the founding fathers. Their construction is not to be guided by the construction of other constitutions in other common law jurisdictions unless similar provisions in pari materia were in question. This Court will not give to any provision of the Constitution a construction, which will defeat its obvious intention. – Andrews Otutu Obaseki, JSC. Garba & Ors. v. The University Of Maiduguri (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt.18) 550
The introductory phrase “subject to any customary law relating thereto” necessarily makes the power given to a testator under the subsection dependent upon the particular customary law permitting it. In effect, the power of the testator to devise his real and personal estates by Will is limited by the extent, if any, to which its exercise is permissible under the relevant customary law.
– Bello CJN. Idehen v. Idehen (1991) – SC. 271/1989
Megarry J in Clerk Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners (1973) 2 All E.R.513 at 520: “The phrase ‘subject to’ is a simple provision which merely subjects the provisions of the subject subsection to the provisions of the master subsections. Where there is no clash, the phrase does nothing; if there is collision the phrase shows what is to prevail.”
Crais on Statute Law 7th edition, the statement of the law reads at pages 121 to 122. “To alter any clearly established principle of law a distinct and positive legislative enactment is necessary. “Statutes” said the Court of Common Pleas in Arthur v. Bokenham are not presumed to make any alteration in the common law further or otherwise than the Act does expressly declare”.
– Cited in Abioye v. Yakubu (1991) – SC.169/1987
In Ushie v. Agbalu (2013) JELR 51127 (CA), the court relied on: Iyoho v. Effiong where the Supreme Court per A. M. Mukthar, JSC (as she then was) said: “Although the word ‘may’ is used in the provision, it does not necessarily mean that it means permissible. ‘May’ in ‘Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition, page 1000, has been defined inter alia as ‘loosely, is required to; shall; must…In dozens of cases, courts have held may to be synonymous with shall or must, usually in an effort to effectuate legislative intent.”
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