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PURPORT OF SECTION 34 OF CFRN – RIGHT TO DIGNITY

Dictum

The purport of Section 34(1)(a) of the Constitution is that no one should be inflicted with intense pain on his body or mind nor subjected to physical or mental cruelty so severe that it endangers his life or health. Anything amounting to brutalization is synonymous to torture or inhuman treatment and is actionable under the claim for Fundamental Human Rights as provided for by the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended). KALU V. THE STATE (1998) 13 NNLR (PT. 583) @ 531.

— U. Onyemenam, JCA. Iheme v Chief of Defence Staff (2018) – CA/J/264/2017

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BREACH OF CHAPTER IV RIGHTS CAN COME BEFORE THE FHC OR HIGH COURT

Anyone whose “Chapter IV Rights” have been, are being or likely to be contravened has unfettered access to a High Court for redress “High Court” is defined in Section 46(3) of the 1999 Constitution (the 1979) Constitution had the same Provisions to mean “the Federal High Court” or “the High Court of a State”.

– Ngwuta JSC. Ihim v. Maduagwu (2021)

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TO USE THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS RULES, THE MAIN CLAIM MUST BE ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

It is also settled law that for a matter to be instituted under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979 to enforce the constitutionally guaranteed rights under Chapter IV of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended, the enforcement of such right(s) must be the main/substantive claim before the Court – not ancillary.

— Onnoghen, CJN. Nwachukwu v Nwachukwu (2018) – SC.601/2013

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ONLY BREACH OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS CAN BE ENFORCED THROUGH FREP

It is trite that it is only actions founded on a breach of the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution that can be enforced under the Rules. The facts relied upon by an applicant must therefore disclose a breach of his fundamental right as the basis for his claim. Where the facts relied upon discloses a breach of the fundamental right of the Applicant as the basis of the claim, there exists a redress through the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure. Where the alleged breach of right is ancillary or incidental to the main grievance or complaint, it is incompetent to proceed under the rules. See SEA TRUCKS NIGERIA LIMITED v. ANIGBORO (2001) 2 NWLR (PT. 696) 189; WEST AFRICAN EXAMINATIONS COUNCIL v. AKINKUMI (2008) 9 NWLR (PT. 1091) 151; NWACHUKWU v. NWACHUKWU (2018) 17 NWLR (PT. 1648) 357.

— F.A. Ojo, JCA. ITDRLI v NIMC (2021) – CA/IB/291/2020

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ONLY FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS CAN COME THROUGH THE FUNDAMENTAL PROCEDURE RULES

It is also settled law that for an action to be properly brought under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009, (as was done by the Applicants at the trial Court), it must relate to infringement of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Chapter IV of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). See: UNIVERSITY OF ILORIN and ORS v. IDOWU OLUWADARE (2006) 14 NWLR (Pt.100) 751; ACHEBE v. NWOSU (2003) 7 NWLR (Pt. 818) 103; ADEYANJU v. WAEC (2002) 13 NWLR (Pt.785) 479; and DIRECTOR, SSS v. AGBAKOBA (1999) 3 NWLR (Pt. 595) 314. In other words, for an action to be cognizable under the fundamental rights procedure, the infringement of any of the rights under Chapter IV of CFRN, 1999 must be the primary wrong forming the basis of the claim.

— A.B. Mohammed, JCA. ITDRLI v NIMC (2021) – CA/IB/291/2020

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MERE LETTER OF INVITATION FROM EFCC DOES NOT CONSTITUTE ABUSE OF LAW/FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT

Upon a critical consideration of the entirety of the submission of Learned counsel in this case vis-a-vis the facts and circumstances of the case, I hold the view that there is no doubt that a mere letter of invitation from the 3rd Respondent to the 1st and 2nd Respondents did not constitute abuse of the process of law, and/or breach of fundamental right.

— S.D. Bage JSC. Diamond Bank Plc V. H.R.H. Eze (Dr) Peter Opara & Ors. (SC.375/2012, 9 March 2018)

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INTENTION TO ESCAPE FROM BRUTALITY

The Respondent admitted that he intended to escape when he was been beaten by the police. Investigation by the police does not include beating. Therefore if the respondent intended to escape from such brutality which constituted violation of his fundamental right, he committed no wrong.

— P.A. Galinje, JSC. State v Masiga (2017) – SC

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