It is also settled law that for a matter to be instituted under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979 to enforce the constitutionally guaranteed rights under Chapter IV of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended, the enforcement of such right(s) must be the main/substantive claim before the Court – not ancillary.
— Onnoghen, CJN. Nwachukwu v Nwachukwu (2018) – SC.601/2013
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A community reading of Section 46 of the 1999 Constitution and Order 1(2) of the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules would reveal undisputedly that both the Federal High Court and the High Court of a State have concurrent jurisdiction on matters of breach or likely breach of any of the fundamental rights enshrined in Chapter IV of the Constitution. This has been the consistent position of this Court upheld in an avalanche of cases, some of which are Grace Jack v. University of Agriculture, Makurdi (2004) 17 NSCQR 90 at 100; (2004) 5 NWLR (Pt. 865) 208; Olutola v. University of Ilorin (2004) 18 NWLR (Pt. 905) 416, Ogugu v. The State (1994) 9 NWLR (Pt. 366) 1.
– J.I. Okoro JSC. Ihim v. Maduagwu (2021)
I will reiterate that a fundamental right is a right guaranteed in the Nigerian Constitution. It is a right which every citizen is entitled to by reason of being a human being unless when a person suffers any of the disabilities set out in the Constitution. ODOGU V. A.G. FEDERATION (2000) 2 HRLRA 82 AT 102; FAJEMIROKUN V. COMM. BANK (NIG.) LTD. (2009) 21 WRN 1. Fundamental rights stand above the ordinary laws of the land. RANSOME KUTI V. A.G. FEDERATION (1985) 2 NWLR (PT. 6) 211. These rights are so jealously guarded that no citizen can be shut out from seeking redress when his fundamental right has been allegedly breached unless he suffers any constitutional disability like when he is sentenced to flogging or hard labour by a Court of competent jurisdiction.
— U. Onyemenam, JCA. Iheme v Chief of Defence Staff (2018) – CA/J/264/2017
Upon a critical consideration of the entirety of the submission of Learned counsel in this case vis-a-vis the facts and circumstances of the case, I hold the view that there is no doubt that a mere letter of invitation from the 3rd Respondent to the 1st and 2nd Respondents did not constitute abuse of the process of law, and/or breach of fundamental right.
— S.D. Bage JSC. Diamond Bank Plc V. H.R.H. Eze (Dr) Peter Opara & Ors. (SC.375/2012, 9 March 2018)
It is also settled law that for an action to be properly brought under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009, (as was done by the Applicants at the trial Court), it must relate to infringement of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Chapter IV of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). See: UNIVERSITY OF ILORIN and ORS v. IDOWU OLUWADARE (2006) 14 NWLR (Pt.100) 751; ACHEBE v. NWOSU (2003) 7 NWLR (Pt. 818) 103; ADEYANJU v. WAEC (2002) 13 NWLR (Pt.785) 479; and DIRECTOR, SSS v. AGBAKOBA (1999) 3 NWLR (Pt. 595) 314. In other words, for an action to be cognizable under the fundamental rights procedure, the infringement of any of the rights under Chapter IV of CFRN, 1999 must be the primary wrong forming the basis of the claim.
— A.B. Mohammed, JCA. ITDRLI v NIMC (2021) – CA/IB/291/2020
The purport of Section 34(1)(a) of the Constitution is that no one should be inflicted with intense pain on his body or mind nor subjected to physical or mental cruelty so severe that it endangers his life or health. Anything amounting to brutalization is synonymous to torture or inhuman treatment and is actionable under the claim for Fundamental Human Rights as provided for by the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended). KALU V. THE STATE (1998) 13 NNLR (PT. 583) @ 531.
— U. Onyemenam, JCA. Iheme v Chief of Defence Staff (2018) – CA/J/264/2017
Under section 30(1) of the Constitution, therefore, the right to life, although fully guaranteed is nevertheless subject to the execution of a death sentence of a court of law in respect of a criminal offence of which one has been found guilty in Nigeria. The qualifying word, save, used in section 30(1) seems to me to be the unmistakable key to the construction of that provision. In my view it is plain that the 1979 Constitution can by no stretch of the imagination be said to have proscribed or outlawed the death penalty. On the contrary, section 30(1) of the Constitution permits it in the clearest possible terms, so long as it is inflicted pursuant to the sentence of a court of law in Nigeria in a criminal offence. In other words, section 30(1) of the Constitution recognises the death penalty as a form of punishment but only on the condition that it is in execution of the sentence of a court of law in a criminal offence of which an accused person has been found guilty in Nigeria. The plain meaning of this section of the Constitution cannot be derogated from in the absence of any ambiguity whatsoever. It simply guarantees and protects the right to life. But it also recognises deprivation of life so long as it is pursuant to the execution of the sentence of a court in a criminal offence of which the accused has been found guilty in Nigeria.
— Iguh JSC. Onuoha v State (1998) – SC. 24/1996
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