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ONLY BREACH OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS CAN BE ENFORCED THROUGH FREP

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It is trite that it is only actions founded on a breach of the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution that can be enforced under the Rules. The facts relied upon by an applicant must therefore disclose a breach of his fundamental right as the basis for his claim. Where the facts relied upon discloses a breach of the fundamental right of the Applicant as the basis of the claim, there exists a redress through the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure. Where the alleged breach of right is ancillary or incidental to the main grievance or complaint, it is incompetent to proceed under the rules. See SEA TRUCKS NIGERIA LIMITED v. ANIGBORO (2001) 2 NWLR (PT. 696) 189; WEST AFRICAN EXAMINATIONS COUNCIL v. AKINKUMI (2008) 9 NWLR (PT. 1091) 151; NWACHUKWU v. NWACHUKWU (2018) 17 NWLR (PT. 1648) 357.

— F.A. Ojo, JCA. ITDRLI v NIMC (2021) – CA/IB/291/2020

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FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS SUIT CANNOT BE FILED JOINTLY

The earlier position of this Court is that fundamental rights accrue to citizens individually and by lumping the applications together, the Respondents rendered their application incompetent.

— J.O.K. Oyewole, JCA. Udo v Robson (2018) – CA/C/302/2013

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TO USE THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS RULES, THE MAIN CLAIM MUST BE ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

It is also settled law that for a matter to be instituted under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979 to enforce the constitutionally guaranteed rights under Chapter IV of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended, the enforcement of such right(s) must be the main/substantive claim before the Court – not ancillary.

— Onnoghen, CJN. Nwachukwu v Nwachukwu (2018) – SC.601/2013

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MERE LETTER OF INVITATION FROM EFCC DOES NOT CONSTITUTE ABUSE OF LAW/FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT

Upon a critical consideration of the entirety of the submission of Learned counsel in this case vis-a-vis the facts and circumstances of the case, I hold the view that there is no doubt that a mere letter of invitation from the 3rd Respondent to the 1st and 2nd Respondents did not constitute abuse of the process of law, and/or breach of fundamental right.

— S.D. Bage JSC. Diamond Bank Plc V. H.R.H. Eze (Dr) Peter Opara & Ors. (SC.375/2012, 9 March 2018)

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PRINCIPAL RELIEF MUST BE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN ORDER TO COME UNDER FREP RULES

The position of the law is that for a claim to qualify as falling under fundamental rights, it must be clear that the principal relief sought is for the enforcement or for securing the enforcement of a fundamental right and not, from the nature of the claim, to redress a grievance that is ancillary to the principal relief which itself is not ipso facto a claim for the enforcement of fundamental right. Thus, where the alleged breach of a fundamental right is ancillary or incidental to the substantive claim of the ordinary civil or common law nature, it will be incompetent to constitute the claim as one for the enforcement of a fundamental right: See Federal Republic of Nigeria & Anor v. Ifegwu (2003) 15 NWI.R (Pt. 842) 113, at 180; Tukor v. Government of Taraba State (1997) 6 NWLR (Pt. 510) 549; and Sea Trucks (Nig) Ltd v. Anigboro (2001) 2 NWLR) Pt. 696) 159.

– S.A. Akintan, JSC. Abdulhamid v Akar & Anor. (2006) – S.C. 240/2001

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BREACH OF CHAPTER IV RIGHTS CAN COME BEFORE THE FHC OR HIGH COURT

Anyone whose “Chapter IV Rights” have been, are being or likely to be contravened has unfettered access to a High Court for redress “High Court” is defined in Section 46(3) of the 1999 Constitution (the 1979) Constitution had the same Provisions to mean “the Federal High Court” or “the High Court of a State”.

– Ngwuta JSC. Ihim v. Maduagwu (2021)

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SUBJECTION OF THE RIGHT TO LIFE – EXECUTION OF THE SENTENCE OF THE COURT

Under section 30(1) of the Constitution, therefore, the right to life, although fully guaranteed is nevertheless subject to the execution of a death sentence of a court of law in respect of a criminal offence of which one has been found guilty in Nigeria. The qualifying word, save, used in section 30(1) seems to me to be the unmistakable key to the construction of that provision. In my view it is plain that the 1979 Constitution can by no stretch of the imagination be said to have proscribed or outlawed the death penalty. On the contrary, section 30(1) of the Constitution permits it in the clearest possible terms, so long as it is inflicted pursuant to the sentence of a court of law in Nigeria in a criminal offence. In other words, section 30(1) of the Constitution recognises the death penalty as a form of punishment but only on the condition that it is in execution of the sentence of a court of law in a criminal offence of which an accused person has been found guilty in Nigeria. The plain meaning of this section of the Constitution cannot be derogated from in the absence of any ambiguity whatsoever. It simply guarantees and protects the right to life. But it also recognises deprivation of life so long as it is pursuant to the execution of the sentence of a court in a criminal offence of which the accused has been found guilty in Nigeria.

— Iguh JSC. Onuoha v State (1998) – SC. 24/1996

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