Judiciary-Poetry-Logo
JPoetry

INTENTION TO ESCAPE FROM BRUTALITY

Dictum

The Respondent admitted that he intended to escape when he was been beaten by the police. Investigation by the police does not include beating. Therefore if the respondent intended to escape from such brutality which constituted violation of his fundamental right, he committed no wrong.

— P.A. Galinje, JSC. State v Masiga (2017) – SC

Was this dictum helpful?

SHARE ON

ARTICLE 19 – 24 AFRICAN CHARTER ARE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE RATHER THAN INDIVIDUAL

Para. 24: In Kemi Penheiro SAN V. Republic of Ghana, ECW/CCJ/JUD/11/12 (2012) (unreported), where the Applicant alleged the violation of Articles 20 and 22 of the African Charter, the Court stressed that it is opinio juris communis that the rights referred to in Articles 19-24 of the African Charter are rights of (all) “peoples” in contrast to the rights of “every individual”, “every human being”, or “every citizen” proclaimed in Article 2-17.

Was this dictum helpful?

A FAMILY AS A UNIT CANNOT COMMENCE FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS APPLICATION

In the case of OKECHUKWU v ETUKOKWU (1998) 8 NWLR 23 (2018) LPELR 45183 (CA) PART 562, PAGE 511, it was held amongst others per Niki Tobi, JCA (as he then was) that: “As I indicated above, the Umunwanne family is the centre of the whole matter. A family as a unit cannot commence an action on infringement or contravention of Fundamental Rights. To be specific, no Nigeria family or any foreign family has the locus to commence action under Chapter IV of the Constitution or by virtue of the 1979 Rules. The provisions of Chapter 4 cover individuals and not a group or collection of individuals. The expression ‘every individual’, ‘every person’, ‘any person’, ‘every citizen’ are so clear that a family unit is never anticipated or contemplated”.

Was this dictum helpful?

MERE ALLEGATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION TRIGGERS THE COURT JURISDICTION

Para. 27: “This Court has held in many of its flourishing jurisprudence that mere allegation of violation of human rights is sufficient to trigger the jurisdiction of this Court and the Court will assume jurisdiction without necessarily examining the veracity of the allegation. In Kareem Meissa Wade v. Republic of Senegal, ECW/CCJ/JUD/19/13, at pg. 259 Para. 95 (3), this court held that: “Nevertheless, that simply invoking human rights violation in a case suffices to establish the jurisdiction of the Court over that case.” Similarly, In BAKARE SARRE V MALI (2011) CCJELR pg. 57, the court stressed that: “Once human rights violations which involves international or community obligations of a member state is alleged, it will exercise its jurisdiction over the case.” This position is further supported by the decision of the Court in SERAP V. FRN & 4 ORS, (2014) ECW/CCJ/JUD/16/14 where this court held that: “the mere allegation that there has been a violation of human rights in the territory of a member state is sufficient prima facie to justify the jurisdiction of this court on the dispute, surely without any prejudice to the substance and merits of the complaint which has to be determined only after the parties have been given the opportunity to present their case, with full guarantees of fair trial.” See also the case of His Excellency Vice-President Alhaji Samuel Sam-Sumana v. Republic of Sierra Leone.-SUIT NO: ECW/CCJ/APP/38/16 and JUD NO: ECW/CCJ/JUD/19/17 (At page 14 of the judgment) and Mamadou Tandja (2010) CCJELR pg. 109 & Bakare Sarre & 28 Ors v. Mali (2011) (CCJELR) pg. 57.”

— Boley v Liberia & Ors. (2019) – ECW/CCJ/JUD/24/19

Was this dictum helpful?

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS SUIT CANNOT BE FILED JOINTLY

The earlier position of this Court is that fundamental rights accrue to citizens individually and by lumping the applications together, the Respondents rendered their application incompetent.

— J.O.K. Oyewole, JCA. Udo v Robson (2018) – CA/C/302/2013

Was this dictum helpful?

ONLY FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS CAN COME THROUGH THE FUNDAMENTAL PROCEDURE RULES

It is also settled law that for an action to be properly brought under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009, (as was done by the Applicants at the trial Court), it must relate to infringement of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Chapter IV of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). See: UNIVERSITY OF ILORIN and ORS v. IDOWU OLUWADARE (2006) 14 NWLR (Pt.100) 751; ACHEBE v. NWOSU (2003) 7 NWLR (Pt. 818) 103; ADEYANJU v. WAEC (2002) 13 NWLR (Pt.785) 479; and DIRECTOR, SSS v. AGBAKOBA (1999) 3 NWLR (Pt. 595) 314. In other words, for an action to be cognizable under the fundamental rights procedure, the infringement of any of the rights under Chapter IV of CFRN, 1999 must be the primary wrong forming the basis of the claim.

— A.B. Mohammed, JCA. ITDRLI v NIMC (2021) – CA/IB/291/2020

Was this dictum helpful?

FREEDOM OF CHOICE IS CONSTITUTIONAL – ONE CANNOT BE FORCED TO ASSOCIATE

Nobody can be compelled to associate with other persons against his will. Our Constitution guarantees every citizen that freedom of choice. Accordingly any purported drafting of any person into an association against his will even if by operation of customary law is in conflict with the provisions of Section 26(1) of the Constitution, 1963 and is void.

– Karibe-Whyte JSC.Agbai v. Okogbue (1991) – SC 104/1989

Was this dictum helpful?

No more related dictum to show.