According to the canons of interpretation of statutes, it is a cardinal principle that, where the ordinary and plain meaning of words used are clear and unambiguous, effect must be given to those words in their natural and ordinary meaning or literal sense without resorting to any intrinsic aid.
– Tijjani Abubakar, JSC. Nwobike v. FRN (2021)
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Furthermore, it is the law that in construing any provision of a statute, a court ought, and is indeed bound, to consider any other parts of the statute which throw light upon the intention of the legislature and which may serve to show that the particular provision ought not to be construed as it would if considered alone without reference to such other parts of the statute.
– Katsina-Alu, JSC. Dantsoho v. Mohammed (2003)
In Attorney-General of the Federation v Attorney-General of Imo State (1993) 4 NCLR 178 where Bello, JSC (as he then was of blessed memory) defined the word “Federation” in his judgment at pages 193-194 where he said:- “It now remains to consider the crucial question, which has never been decided by this Court, as to what is ‘Federation’ and ‘State’ within the ambit of section 212 of the Constitution . . . ‘State’ when used otherwise than in relation to one of the component parts of the Federation includes government . . . ‘government’ includes the Government of the Federation, or of any State or of a Local Government Council or any person who exercises power or authority on its behalf . . . The meaning of the word ‘Federation’ presents no difficulty. It is clear from the provisions of section 2 of the Constitution that the words ‘Nigeria’, ‘Sovereign State’, ‘Federal Republic of Nigeria’ and ‘Federation’ are synonymous. I hold that ‘Federation’ in section 212(1) of the Constitution bears the same meaning as the Federal Republic of Nigeria.” (Relied on in AG Kano State v AG Federation (2007) – SC 26/2006)
In ADESOLA V. ABIDOYE (1999) 14 NWLR (Pt. 637) 28 @ p. 56, where the Supreme Court per Karibi-Whyte J.S.C., “The construction of the word “may” in provisions of statutes has always raised difficulties. This is not because of the impression of the word … because the word “may” assumes a technical meaning depending upon the intendment of the statutory provision in which it is used. Although the etymological meaning of “may” is permissive and facultative and seldom can mean “must” and imperative it assumes this last-mentioned character; when there is anything in the provision that makes it the duty on the person on whom the power is conferred to exercise that power. When the exercise of the power is coupled with a duty on the person to whom it is given to exercise it, then it is imperative. In the instant case, there is a duty on the aggrieved who desires to set aside the decision of the prescribed authority to make his representation to the Commissioner for Chieftaincy Affairs within twenty-one days of the decision. The use of the expression ‘may’ in this situation is not merely facultative, but mandatory. There is no alternative.The aggrieved has no choice of action in the remedy provided for him….Accordingly, the word ‘may’ in Section 22(5) of the Chiefs Law of Oyo State, 1978 should be construed as imperative; the exercise of the right not being optional.”
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE FEDERATION VS. THE GUARDIAN NEWSPAPER (1999) 9 N.W.L.R. (PART. 618), page 187 wherein IGU, JSC at page 264, paragraph G – H of the report had this to say – : “…And where the words used or the provision of any section the law are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their ordinary meaning unless, of course, this would lead to absurdity or be in conflict with other provisions of the law.”
Under the literal rule of interpretation of statute, words and phrases in enactments are to be given their ordinary, original or grammatical meanings even if it will create hardship, inconvenience or injustice to the parties in so far as it will not result to absurdity. See, B.A.J (NIG) LTD. v. OGUNSEYE (2010) 4 NWLR (1184) 343, AMAECHI v. INEC (2007) 9 NWLR (PT. 1080) 504, UWAGBA v. FRN (2009) 15 NWLR (P. 1163) 91, OWENA BANK v. STOCK EXCHANGE (1997) 7 SCNJ 160.
— A.O. Obaseki-Adejumo, JCA. FRSC v Ehikaam (2023) – CA/AS/276/2019
In Re Cuno (1889) 43 Ch D 12, 17, Bowen, LJ. said: “In the construction of statutes, you must not construe the words so as to take away rights which already existed before the statute was passed unless you have plain words which indicate that such was the intention of the legislature in order to take away away, it is not sufficient to show that the thing sanctioned
by the Act, if done, will of sheer physical necessity put an end to the right; it must also be shown that the legislature have authorized the thing to be done at all events, and irrespective of its possible interference with existing rights.”
– Cited in Abioye v. Yakubu (1991) – SC.169/1987
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