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STATUTES SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED TO TAKE AWAY RIGHTS PRIOR EXTANT

Dictum

In Re Cuno (1889) 43 Ch D 12, 17, Bowen, LJ. said: “In the construction of statutes, you must not construe the words so as to take away rights which already existed before the statute was passed unless you have plain words which indicate that such was the intention of the legislature in order to take away away, it is not sufficient to show that the thing sanctioned
by the Act, if done, will of sheer physical necessity put an end to the right; it must also be shown that the legislature have authorized the thing to be done at all events, and irrespective of its possible interference with existing rights.”

– Cited in Abioye v. Yakubu (1991) – SC.169/1987

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INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 82 CFRN 1999

In my view their power under the section is further circumscribed and limited by sub-section (2) of section 82. They can only invite members of the public when they want to gather facts for the purpose of enabling them make law or amend existing laws in respect of any matter within their legislative competence or as witnesses in a properly constituted inquiry under section 82(1)(b). Their power to expose corruption, inefficiency, or waste is also limited to government departments, authorities, and functionaries.

– Oguntade, JCA. El-Rufai v. House of Representatives (2003)

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INTENTION CAN BE ASCERTAINABLE FROM THE DOCUMENT

The learned trial Judge considered the somewhat exclusive character of the occupation of the petrol station by the respondent and gave weight to some expressions used in the agreement as words indicating that a tenancy as distinct from a licence is the subject matter of the agreement. I have not the slightest doubt he was right in considering these expressions: he was right in considering the character of the occupation; but it appears to me it was his duty to do more than this. It was also his duty to consider the conduct of the parties as well as their intention, particularly when such intention is ascertainable from the document or agreement as a whole.

– Ademola, CJF. Mobil v. Johnson (1961)

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WHEN INTERPRETING A CONTRACTUAL DOCUMENT THE WHOLE DOCUMENT SHOULD BE TAKEN CONSIDERATION OF

I am in full support of the submission of appellant’s counsel that it was a misdirection for the lower court in consideration of whether the land, the subject matter in controversy, was bare land or included the structures thereon to have relied on only clauses 3 and 6 in the entire lease agreement to arrive at its conclusion. The learned Justices of the lower court were clearly in error because it is a fundamental rule of construction of instruments that its several clauses, must be interpreted harmoniously so that the various parts of the instrument are not brought in conflict to their natural meaning. Emphasising the same point, the learned authors of Halsbury’s Laws of England. Vo1.12, (4th ed.) para. 1469) stated tersely but pointedly: “The best construction of deeds is to make one part of the deed expound the other, and so make all the parts agree. Effect must, so far as possible, be given to every word and every clause.” The same principle was approved by this Court in Lamikoro Ojokolobo & Ors. v. Lapade Alamu & Anor. (1987) 7 SCNJ 98, (1987) 3 NWLR (pt.61) 339. Surely, a fragmentary interpretation of the various clause of the lease agreement without recourse to the entire Lease Agreement would do violence to the content in which the controversial terms “premises” and “land” were employed and therefore the ascertainment of the parties’ intention in relation to these two terms was bound to be distorted and erroneous and consequently unacceptable.

— Achike, JSC. Unilife v. Adeshigbin (2001) 4 NWLR (Pt.704) 609

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LEAN TO BROADER INTERPRETATION IN STATUTES; INTERPRETATION SHOULD NOT DEFEAT PURPOSE OF STATUTE

In Rabiu v. State (1980) 8-11 SC. 130 at 148-149; Udoma JSC opined: In my view, this Court should whenever possible, and in response to the demands of justice, lean to the broader interpretation; unless there is something in the text or in the rest of the Constitution to indicate that the narrower interpretation will best carry out the objects and purposes of the Constitution…I do not conceive it to be the duty of this Court to construe any of the provisions of the Constitution as to defeat the obvious ends the Constitution was designed to serve where another construction equally in accord and consistent with the words and sense of such provisions will serve to enforce and protect such ends.”

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GENERAL PROVISION VS SPECIFIC PROVISION: SPECIFIC TAKES PRECEDENCE

There is also the related issue and it is that where a Court of law is exposed to two provisions; one general and the other specific, the Court will fall upon the specific provision, in the event of an apparent conflict.

– T.N. Orji-Abadua, JCA. Kabau v. Rilwanu (2013) – CA/K/179/2001

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THE WORD “MAY” SYNONYMOUS WITH “SHALL”

In Ushie v. Agbalu (2013) JELR 51127 (CA), the court relied on: Iyoho v. Effiong where the Supreme Court per A. M. Mukthar, JSC (as she then was) said: “Although the word ‘may’ is used in the provision, it does not necessarily mean that it means permissible. ‘May’ in ‘Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition, page 1000, has been defined inter alia as ‘loosely, is required to; shall; must…In dozens of cases, courts have held may to be synonymous with shall or must, usually in an effort to effectuate legislative intent.”

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