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COURT CANNOT READ INTO THE CONSTITUTION WHAT IS NOT THERE

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Courts of law, in interpreting the Constitution or a statute have no jurisdiction to read into the Constitution or statute what the legislators did not provide for, and a fortiori read out of the Constitution or statute what is provided for by the legislators. In either way, the courts are abandoning their constitutional functions and straying into those of the Legislature by interfering or interloping with them. As that will make nonsense of the separation of powers provided for in sections 4 and 6 of the Constitution, courts of law will not do such a thing, whatever is the pressure by Counsel.

— Niki Tobi, JSC. Buhari v. INEC (2008) – SC 51/2008

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LEGISLATION WITH RETROSPECTIVE EFFECT

Thus, the effect of making Exhibit 7, a subsidiary legislation with retrospective effect, to take care of the appointment process of the Emirship of Suleja, which as I earlier pointed out, has the force of law and now over-rides customary law. This is the moreso, in the instant case where confusion characterising the kingmaker’s body charged with the selection process and which was not helped by declaring what role the customary law vis-a-vis Exhibit 10 (the chronicle of Abuja) played in that process needed to be formalised and codified.

— Onu JSC. Ibrahim v Barde (1996) – SC.74/1995

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PROVISIONS OF STATUTE MUST BE GIVEN THEIR SIMPLE & PLAIN MEANING

The cardinal principle of law of interpretation is that a court when interpreting a provision of a statute must give the words and the language used their simple and ordinary meaning, and not to venture outside it by introducing extraneous matters that may lead to circumventing or giving the provision an entirely different interpretation to what the law maker intended it to be. – A.M. Mukhtar, JSC. Unipetrol v. Edo State Internal Revenue (2006) – S.C. 286/2001

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INTERPRETATION OF THE WORD “SHALL”

I return to section 146(1) of the Electoral Act. The third word in the section is “shall”. It is an obligatory and mandatory word conveying a command and compulsion. It is peremptory in nature and content. It is a word of authority imposing a duty mostly on an unnamed person. Courts of law mostly interpret the word in the above context of authority and command; bereft of discretion. (See Achineku v Ishagba (1988) 4 NWLR (Part 89) 411; UNTHBM v Nnoli (1994) 8 NWLR (Part 363) 376; Lt.-Gen Bamaiyi (Rtd) v Attorney-General of the Federation (2001) 12 NWLR (Part 727) 468; Ogidi v The State (2005) 5 NWLR (Part 918) 286). Although the word could, at times, convey a permissive meaning, like “may” it is my view that it conveys its usual and ordinary meaning of obligation and command in section 146(1).

— Niki Tobi, JSC. Buhari v. INEC (2008) – SC 51/2008

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THE PHRASE “IN LIEU OF NOTICE”

I consider it necessary to say something about the phrase “in lieu of notice” which is liable to be misunderstood, in this connection. The phrase has been defined in the Concise Oxford Dictionary of English Language 4th Ed. page 687 as “in the place, instead of “. Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Ed. P.787, also defines the phrase as “instead of, in place of, in substitution of….Thus when the condition of termination of the contract of service is the giving of two months’ notice or the payment of two months’ salary in lieu of notice, it can only mean the payment of two months’ salary instead of, in place, in substitution of the giving of two months notice.

– Karibe-Whyte, JSC. Chukwumah v. SPDC (1993)

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PREAMBLE MUST BE HAD IN MIND WHILE APPLYING SECTIONS OF THE LAND USE ACT

The preambles to the Land Use Act, If looked at carefully and relating it to the case at hand, would reveal that the provision for consent of the Governor must not be applied to transfer of title or alienation of rights between private individuals where there is no overriding public interest or conflict between the parties. The application of the various Sections and provisions of the Land Use Act must be done with a view to the intendment of the drafters of the law, which is expressed often in the preamble.

— C.B. Ogunbiyi, JSC. Ibrahim v. Obaje (2017) – SC.60/2006

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STATUTES ARE TO BE GIVEN THE ORDINARY MEANING

It is a settled cardinal principle of statutory interpretation that where, in their ordinary meaning the provisions are clear and unambiguous effect should be given to them without resorting to external aid. The duty of the court is to interpret the words of the statute as used. Those words may be ambiguous, but even if they are the power and duty of the court to travel outside them on a voyage of discovery are strictly limited (see for example Attorney-General of Bendel State v. Attorney-General of ‘the Federation (1981) 10S.C. 1; Abioyev.Yakubu(1991)5 NWLR (Pt. 190) 130, Lawal v. G.B. Ollivant (1972) 2 S.C. 124, Aya v. Henshaw (1972) 5 S.C. 87.

— I.L. Kutigi, JSC. Kotoye v. Saraki (1994) – S.C. 147/1993

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