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SEVERAL PARTS OF A WRITTEN INSTRUMENT MUST BE INTERPRETED TOGETHER TO GET THE INTENTION

Dictum

I agree with Mr. Sofola, S.A.N., in his submission that the court below was in error to have relied on clauses 3 and 6 of the lease agreement only and limited itself in the construction of the lease agreement to the construction of these clauses alone. The approach adopted by the court below is in violation of one of the fundamental and hallowed principles in the construction of document and written instruments, that the several parts, where there are more than one, must be interpreted together to avoid conflicts in the natural meaning in the various parts of the written document or instrument. This rule of construction was approved by this court in Ojokolobo & Ors. v.Alamu & Anor. (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 61)377,(1987)7 SCNJ 98.

— Karibi-Whyte, JSC. Unilife v. Adeshigbin (2001) 4 NWLR (Pt.704) 609

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INTERPRETATION: SPECIFIC THINGS MENTIONED

It is note worthy that where a Statute mentions specific things, those things not mentioned are not intended to be included. – Nwaoma Uwa, JCA. NOGA v. NICON (2007)

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COURT IS TO INTERPRETE STATUTE AS DICTATED BY THE STATUTE

The duty of the court is to interpret the words contained in the statute and not go outside the words in search of an interpretation which is convenient to the court or to the parties or one of the parties. Even where the provisions of a statute are hard in the sense that they will do some inconvenience to the parties, the court is bound to interpret the provisions once they are clear and unambiguous. It is not the duty of the court to remove the chaff from the grain in the process of interpretation of a statute to arrive at favourable terms for the parties outside the contemplation of the lawmaker. That will be tantamount to traveling outside the statute on a voyage of discovery. This court cannot embark upon such a journey. – Tobi JSC. Araka v. Egbue (2003) – SC.167/1999

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COURT WILL CONSIDER ALL DOCUMENTS BEFORE IT WHOLLY

It is settled that in the consideration of an agreement where there are series of correspondences between the Parties, it is the duty of the Court to consider all the correspondences in order to decipher what they are saying with regards to the arrangement see Udeagu V. Benue Cement Co. Plc. (2006) 2 NWLR (Pt. 965) 600.

— A.A. Augie, JSC. Berger v Toki Rainbow (2019) – SC.332/2009

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INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 82 CFRN 1999

In my view their power under the section is further circumscribed and limited by sub-section (2) of section 82. They can only invite members of the public when they want to gather facts for the purpose of enabling them make law or amend existing laws in respect of any matter within their legislative competence or as witnesses in a properly constituted inquiry under section 82(1)(b). Their power to expose corruption, inefficiency, or waste is also limited to government departments, authorities, and functionaries.

– Oguntade, JCA. El-Rufai v. House of Representatives (2003)

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WHERE INTERPRETATION IS NEEDED ORIGINATING SUMMONS IS APPROPRIATE

KEYAMO VS. HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY, LAGOS STATE (2000) 11 W.R.N. 29 at 40, (2000) 12 NWLR (Pt. 680) 796 at 213 stated as follows: “I must state that the correct position of the law is that originating summons is used to commence an action where the issue involved is one of the construction of a written law or of any instrument made under a written law, or of any deed, contract or other document or some other question of law or where there is unlikely to be any substantial dispute of fact. This is the provision of Order 3 Rule 2 (2) of the Lagos State Civil Procedure (supra)”

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INTERPRETATION OF S.22 LAND USE ACT

Firstly, the position of section 22 of the Act, is undoubtedly, that a holder of a right of occupancy, may enter into an agreement or contract, with a view to alienating his said right of occupancy. In entering into such an agreement or contract, he does not need the consent of the Governor. He merely operates within the first leg/stage of a “transfer on sale of an estate in land” which leg/stage ends with the formation of a binding contract for a sale constituting an estate contract at best. However, when he comes to embark on the next leg/stage of alienating or transferring his right of occupancy which is done or effected, by a conveyance or deed, which culminates in the vesting of the said right in the particular “purchaser”, he must obtain the consent of the Governor in order to make the transaction valid. If he fails to do so, then the transaction, is null and void under Section 22 of the Act.

– Ogbuagu, JSC. Brossette v. Ilemobola (2007)

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