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DATE OF COMMENCEMENT: IF STATUTE IS TO HAVE AN EARLIER APPLICATION, IT IS TO BE STATED EXPLICITLY

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The date of commencement of the Decree, as stated in the marginal note in it, was 20th June, 1991. The date of commencement of a statute is the date that it comes into operation. In the circumstance, the date on which the Decree itself, which included section 11 thereof, came into operation was the 20th June, 1991. There was nothing in the Decree to the effect that the Decree or any part or section thereof shall be deemed to have come into operation on a date earlier than the date of commencement stated in the Decree. Also, there was no provision in the Decree that actions or proceedings on matters to which the provision of section 11 of the Decree applied, which were pending in courts on the date of commencement of the decree, should abate or be discontinued. If it is intended by the lawmaker that any part or section of a statute should come into operation on a date earlier than the date of commencement of the statute itself provision to that effect will be made in clear term.

— Y.O. Adio. Kotoye v. Saraki (1994) – S.C. 147/1993

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MEANING OF SUBJECT TO ANY CUSTOMARY LAW IN WILLS LAW

The introductory phrase “subject to any customary law relating thereto” necessarily makes the power given to a testator under the subsection dependent upon the particular customary law permitting it. In effect, the power of the testator to devise his real and personal estates by Will is limited by the extent, if any, to which its exercise is permissible under the relevant customary law.

– Bello CJN. Idehen v. Idehen (1991) – SC. 271/1989

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MISCHIEF RULE IN INTERPRETATION

It is well settled that the object of all interpretation is to discover the intention of the legislature from the language used in the statute and to give effect to it. One of the most useful guides to interpretation is the mischief rule which considers the state of the law before the enactment, the defect which the legislation sets out to remedy or/and prevent, the remedy adopted by the legislature to cure the mischief and the true reason of the remedy. The duty of the court therefore is to adopt such interpretation that will enable the suppression of the mischief and to promote the remedy within the true intent of the legislation.

– Karibe-Whyte, JSC. Savannah v. Ajilo (1989)

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STRICT PRINCIPLES ARE INAPPLICABLE TO NATIVE COURT PROCEEDINGS

The procedure of a Native Court should not be subjected to strict principles of law as done, in the regular courts of record. Greater latitude and broader interpretation should be accorded to decisions of native courts.

– Fabiyi JSC. Ogundele v. Agiri (2009)

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GENERAL PROVISION MUST GIVE WAY FOR SPECIFIC PROVISION

The law is trite that where there is a specific legislation on a matter, the general principle of law must give way and cannot override the specific provisions of law on the subject. See Orubu v. INEC (1988) 12 SCN) 256 at 349, Unity Bank Plc. v. Kay Plastic Nig. Limited & anor (2011) LPELR 8839 (CA).

– T. Akomolafe-Wilson, JCA. Onnoghen v. FRN (2019) – CA/A/44C/2019

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INTERPRETATION OF THE WORD “SHALL”

When the word “shall” is used in a statute it connotes the intendment of the legislator that what is contained therein must be done or complied with. It does not give room for manoeuvre of some sort, or evasiveness. Whatever the provision requires to be done must be done, and it is not at all negotiable. In interpreting the word ‘shall’ as used in enactments, Uwais, CJN in the case of Captain E.C.C. Amadi v Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (2000) 10 NWLR (Part 674) 76 reiterated the interpretation in earlier authorities thus:– “It is settled that the word ‘shall’ when used in an enactment is capable of bearing many meanings. It may be implying a mandate or direction or giving permission. (See Ifezue v Mbadugha (1984) 1 SCNLR 427 at 456–7). In this present case we are concerned with whether it has been used in a mandatory sense or directory sense. If used in a mandatory sense then the action to be taken must obey or fulfill the mandate exactly; but if used in a directory sense then the action to be taken is to obey or fulfill the directive substantially. See Woodward v Sersons (1875) L.R. 10 CP 733 at page 746; Pope v Clarke (1953), Julius v Lord Bishop of Oxford (1880) 5 A.C. (H.L.) 215 at page 222 and 235 and State v Ilori (1983) 1 SCNL 94 at 110 …”

— Mukhtar, JSC. Buhari v. INEC (2008) – SC 51/2008

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COURT IS TO INTERPRETE STATUTE AS DICTATED BY THE STATUTE

The duty of the court is to interpret the words contained in the statute and not go outside the words in search of an interpretation which is convenient to the court or to the parties or one of the parties. Even where the provisions of a statute are hard in the sense that they will do some inconvenience to the parties, the court is bound to interpret the provisions once they are clear and unambiguous. It is not the duty of the court to remove the chaff from the grain in the process of interpretation of a statute to arrive at favourable terms for the parties outside the contemplation of the lawmaker. That will be tantamount to traveling outside the statute on a voyage of discovery. This court cannot embark upon such a journey. – Tobi JSC. Araka v. Egbue (2003) – SC.167/1999

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