SERVANT WRONGFULLY TERMINATED HAS HIS REMEDY IN DAMAGES

AN EMPLOYEE IS ENTITLED TO KNOW THE REASON FOR HIS DISMISSAL

The ILO Termination of Employment Convention 1982 (No 158) is yet to be ratified by Nigeria. It is however evidence of international labour standards, and international best practice in termination of employment which this Court is obligated to apply; and its recommendations that an employee is entitled to be informed of the reason for the termination of his employment. Section 7 (6) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 empowers the Court to have due regard to good or international best practices in labour or industrial relations, and what amounts to good or international best practices in labour is a question of fact. Section 254C of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) has empowered this Court to determine whether the Claimant was terminated for a valid reason or for no reason. It is not globally acceptable in industrial relations and practice to terminate the employee’s employment without adducing any reason for doing so, see Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria v Schlumberger Anadrill Nig Ltd [2008] 11 NLLR (Pt 29) 164, Aloysius v Diamond Bank Plc [2015] 58 NLLR 52, Uzo Ejekwumadu v Blue Arrow TSW Ltd (unreported) Suit No: NICN/LA/242/2016 judgement delivered March 18, 2021. It is contrary to international labour standards and international best practices for an employer to terminate the employment of its employee without any reason or justifiable reason that is connected with the performance of the employee’s work. This is also contrary to the International Labour Organisation (ILO) decent work agenda with the four strategic objectives of the promotion of rights at work, employment, social protection, and social dialogue.

— O.A. Obaseki-Osaghae, J. Ejiro Peter Amratefa v. Access Bank (NICN/ABJ/106/2022, November 2, 2023)

REPUDIATION BY ONE PARTY DOES NOT TERMINATE THE CONTRACT EXCEPT WHERE ACCEPTED

In Heyman v. Darwins Ltd. (1949) AC. 356, 361 Viscount Simon L.C. said, “But repudiation by one party standing alone does not terminate the contract. It takes two to end it, by repudiation on the one side, and acceptance of the repudiation on the other.” The proposition is founded on the elementary principles of the formation and discharge of contractual obligations. Where there is a unilateral repudiation of a contract, this is treated as an officer by the guilty part to the innocent party of the termination of the contract. It is the acceptance of the officer by the innocent party which acts as a discharge of the contract. – See Hochster H v. De La Tour (1853) 2 F& B. 678; Johnstone v. Milling (1886) 16 QBD 460. It is then open to the innocent party to sue only for damages since by his acceptance of the repudiation the contract comes to an end. Hence where the innocent party refuses to accept the repudiation the contract remains in existence.

WORKER AND EMPLOYEE UNDER THE LABOUR ACT

As can be seen, the definition of worker under section 91(1) is restrictive given the persons exempted in terms of paragraphs (a) to (f) of the definition. The point is that section 91(1) defines a worker only for the purposes of the Labour Act; as such, not all employees are workers for purposes of the Labour Act. The category of persons under paragraphs (a) to (f) of the definition of a worker may thus be employees but not workers for purposes of the Labour Act. Section 91(1) of the Labour Act defines a worker by reference to an employer i.e. as one who entered into or works under a contract with an employer. So, who is an employer? The same section 91(1) defines an “employer” to mean “any person who has entered into a contract of employment to employ any other person as a worker either for himself or for the service of any other person, and includes the agent, manager or factor of the first-mentioned person and the personal representatives of a deceased employer”. The common denominator in the definition of a worker and an employer is the contract of employment. A “contract of employment” is thus defined by same section 91(1) to mean “any agreement, whether oral or written, express or implied, whereby one person agrees to employ another as a worker and that other personagrees to serve the employer as a worker”.

— B.B. Kanyip, J. Olatunji v UBER (2018) – NICN/LA/546/2017

CONCEPT OF EQUAL SALARY FOR EQUAL WORK

Para. 27: “In labour law, the concept of equal work for equal salary implies that two or several persons who carry out the same job occupy the same position in an organisation must earn the same remuneration and have the same prospects for promotion, except where the employer justifies a difference in treatment by objective factors not related to any form of discrimination. We hold that the objective of the principle of equal work for equal salary is to prohibit every form of discrimination between individuals who find themselves under the same condition.”

— Essien v. The Gambia (2007) – ECW/CCJ/JUD/05/07