It is settled law that the character of an appointment is determined by the legal character of the contract of employment. Where the contract of appointment is determinable by the agreement of the parties, there is no question of the contract having a statutory flavour. It is immaterial that the other contracting party is a creation of a statute.
– Muhammad JCA. Osumah v. EBS (2004)
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In Heyman v. Darwins Ltd. (1949) AC. 356, 361 Viscount Simon L.C. said, “But repudiation by one party standing alone does not terminate the contract. It takes two to end it, by repudiation on the one side, and acceptance of the repudiation on the other.” The proposition is founded on the elementary principles of the formation and discharge of contractual obligations. Where there is a unilateral repudiation of a contract, this is treated as an officer by the guilty part to the innocent party of the termination of the contract. It is the acceptance of the officer by the innocent party which acts as a discharge of the contract. – See Hochster H v. De La Tour (1853) 2 F& B. 678; Johnstone v. Milling (1886) 16 QBD 460. It is then open to the innocent party to sue only for damages since by his acceptance of the repudiation the contract comes to an end. Hence where the innocent party refuses to accept the repudiation the contract remains in existence.
Where an officer holds his office “at pleasure,” like was the case in Brown v. Dagenham Urban District Council (1929) 1 K.B. 737 at p.742 he can be dismissed at will in complete disregard of any purported contract whether verbal, or written or even under seal, because such contract will be incompatible with his status and therefore destitute of legal value. Thus Servants of the Crown, civil as well as military, except in special cases, where it is otherwise provided by law, hold their office only during the pleasure of the Crown and can be dismissed at any time in spite of a contract for a period of Service:- Dunn v. Reginam (1896)1 Q.B. 116. In fact the employing authority will lack the power, the vires to “enter into a contract” inconsistent with the wording of the Statute which gave it power in the public interest to remove the Servant at its pleasure:- Nicholson v. Whitstable Urban District Council (1925) 89 J. P. Newsp 480 at p.508. An officer holding his office at pleasure has also no right to be heard before he is removed because there need not be anything against him to warrant his removal. If there is nothing against him, no reason need be given for there is nothing to defend since he held his office durante bene placito: See Reg v. Dartington School Governors (1844) 6 Q.B.682.
— A. Oputa, JSC. Olaniyan & Ors. v. University of Lagos (1985) – SC.53/1985
Ondo State University v. Folayan (1994) 7 NWLR (Pt. 667) page 34 at page 61, the university had appointed Dr. Folayan for a probationary period of three years. Without extending the tenure of Dr. Folayan, they continued to use his services and pay him his salaries for three years. The Supreme Court held that the university was estopped from contending that the employment had come to an end at the end of the three years probationary period.
It is the well settled position of law that a contract of employment is the bedrock upon which all employment relationships are formed and an aggrieved employee bears the evidential burden to place before the court his contract of employment and show in what way the terms and conditions were breached by the defendant. See F.M.C. Ido-Ekiti & Ors. v Alabi (2011) LPELR 4148 (CA).
— Adewemimo J. Afariogun v FUTA (2020) – NICN/AK/41/2017
The master can relieve the employee of his job with or without a reason. Motive for so doing is not relevant, see Geidam v. NEPA (2001) 2 NWLR (Pt. 696) 45. Be that as it may, if the determination is in breach of a term of the contract of employment, the court cannot, by its order, compel the employer to keep in its employment an employee whose service it no longer desires or requires. See Opuo v. NNPC (2000) 14 NWLR (Pt. 734) 552.
– NGWUTA, JCA. Osumah v. EBS (2004)
When the employing authority wants to remove its servant on grounds permitted by Statute, then as Lord Campbell, C. J., observed in Exparte Ramshay (1852) 18 Q.B. 173 at p.190 “the principles of eternal justice” will dictate that the servant cannot be lawfully dismissed without first telling him what is alleged against him and hearing his defence or explanation. Even where the servant had, aliunde, personal knowledge of the offence or reason for his removal that was held to be no substitute for hearing the officer’s explanation:- Reg v. Smith (1844) 5 Q.B. 614.
— A. Oputa, JSC. Olaniyan & Ors. v. University of Lagos (1985) – SC.53/1985
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