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SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE DISTINGUISHED FROM DAMAGES

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To sue for specific performance is to assume that a contract is still subsisting and therefore to insist that it should be performed. That will mean that the plaintiff will not want it repudiated unless for any other reason the court was unable to aid him to enforce specific performance of it. He may then fall back for remedy at common law for damages. Specific performance is a discretionary remedy. This does not mean that it will be granted or withheld arbitrarily; the discretion is a judicial discretion and is exercised on well settled principles. It means that in an action for the specific performance of a contract of the class usually enforced, the court may take into account circumstances which could not be taken into account in an action for damages for breach of contract, such as the conduct of the plaintiff, or the hardship which an order for specific performance will inflict on the defendant.

– Ba’Aba JCA. Enejo v. Nasir (2006)

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damages, specific performance

NATURE OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND WHEN IT WILL BE GRANTED

The appellant, with the above position as depicted, desires to have specific performance of the agreement between it and the 1st respondent ordered by the court in its favour. Specific performance has been defined in Black’s Law Dictionary Ninth Edition at page 1529 as ‘the rendering, as nearly as practicable, of a promised performance through a judgment or decree; a court ordered remedy that requires precise fulfilment of a legal or contractual obligation when monetary damages are inappropriate or inadequate, as when sale of real estate or a rare article is involved. Specific performance is an equitable remedy that lies within the court’s discretion to award whenever the common law remedy is insufficient.’ In making an order for specific performance, the court must exercise its discretion judicially and judiciously as well. The Judge has to be discreet and balance the interest of both sides properly in his bid to do justice to the contending parties. See: (University of Lagos v. Olaniyan (1985) 16 NSCC (Pt. 1) 98, 113; Eronini v. Iheuko (1989) 2 NSCC (Pt.1) 503, 513; (1980) 3 SC (Pt.1) 30.

— Fabiyi, JSC. Best Ltd. v. Blackwood Hodge (2011) – SC

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APPELLATE COURT WILL NOT DISTURB DAMAGES OF LOWER COURT SIMPLY BECAUSE IT WOULD HAVE AWARDED A DIFFERENT FIGURE

Although an appellate Court admittedly can disturb an award of damages if such award is excessively high or unreasonably low, it is settled that a Court of Appeal will not disturb an award of damages made by the lower Court merely because it would have come to a different figure if it had heard the case itself. See Per NNAMANI, JSC in DUYILE & ANOR V. KELLY OGUNBAYO & SONS LTD (1988) LPELR-975(SC) (P. 17, PARAS. D-G).

— U.M. Abba Aji, JSC. Cappa v NDIC (2021) – SC.147/2006

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COURT OF APPEAL CAN ASSESS DAMAGES

As such is the position, there is now no need for this court or the Court of Appeal to look at an issue of damages as if it were a sacred cow reserved for the court of trial. The correct approach ought to be that unless an issue of credibility of witnesses as to damages arises in the proceedings, the appellate court ought, on entering or affirming a judgment in favour of the plaintiff, to assess and award damages to which he is entitled.

– Pats-Acholonu, JSC. C & C Constr. v. Okhai (2003) – SC.8/1999

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ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES IN BREACH OF CONTRACT

[A]s far back as 1854 in the case of Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 9 Ex (Ch. 341, where at p. 354 of the Report, Alderson, B. expressed the law as follows: “Now we think the proper rule in such a case as the present is this: Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such a breach of contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it.”

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OBJECT OF AWARD OF DAMAGES IN HUMAN RIGHTS CASES

Para. 43: “In the case of Chief Ebrimah Manneh v. Republic of The Gambia, supra, decided on 5th June 2008, this court set out some principles that will guide it in the award of damages. Though by no means exhaustive, the principles set out in that decision are relevant to this case. Principally the object of an award in human rights violation is to vindicate the injured feelings of the victim and to restore his rights and human dignity. Monetary compensation may also be awarded in appropriate cases but the objective of such an award must not be punitive. The following cases decided by the European Court of Human Rights are of relevance to this discussion on damages: Ahmed Selmouni v. State of France (2005) CHR 237; and Miroslav Cenbauer v. Republic of Croatia (2005) CBR 424 , where the court awarded damages in circumstances similar to the present case, wherein the plaintiff was tortured.”

— Saidykhan v GAMBIA (2010) – ECW/CCJ/JUD/08/10

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RATIONALE FOR DAMAGES AWARD

The primary object of an award of damages is to compensate the plaintiff for the harm done to him or a possible secondary object is to punish the defendant for his conduct in inflicting that harm. The rationale behind the compensatory theory for the award of damages is found in the maxim restitutio in integrum. In other words, to restore the injured party to the position he or she was in prior to the injury.

– Kekere-Ekun JSC. British v. Atoyebi (2014) – SC.332/2010

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