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INTERPRETATION OF THE WORD “SHALL”

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Dictum

I return to section 146(1) of the Electoral Act. The third word in the section is “shall”. It is an obligatory and mandatory word conveying a command and compulsion. It is peremptory in nature and content. It is a word of authority imposing a duty mostly on an unnamed person. Courts of law mostly interpret the word in the above context of authority and command; bereft of discretion. (See Achineku v Ishagba (1988) 4 NWLR (Part 89) 411; UNTHBM v Nnoli (1994) 8 NWLR (Part 363) 376; Lt.-Gen Bamaiyi (Rtd) v Attorney-General of the Federation (2001) 12 NWLR (Part 727) 468; Ogidi v The State (2005) 5 NWLR (Part 918) 286). Although the word could, at times, convey a permissive meaning, like “may” it is my view that it conveys its usual and ordinary meaning of obligation and command in section 146(1).

— Niki Tobi, JSC. Buhari v. INEC (2008) – SC 51/2008

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MARGINAL NOTE IS HELPFUL IN CONSTRUCTION OF A SECTION

Although the marginal note in a section is not part of the section, it is helpful even if occasionally misleading to construction, as a sign post to what the section sets out to provide.

– Karibi-whyte JSC. Idehen v. Idehen (1991) – SC. 271/1989

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THE WORDS OF THE STATUTES BEST DECLARES THE INTENTION OF THE LEGISLATORS

It is a cardinal rule of the construction of statutes that statutes should be construed according to the intention expressed in the statutes themselves. If the words of the statutes are themselves precise and unambiguous, then, no more is necessary than to expound the words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words of the statutes do alone, in such a case, best declare the intention of the lawmaker – See Ahmad v. Kassim (1958) SCNLR 58; (1958) 1 NSCC II; Capper v. Baldwin (1965) 2Q.B. 53 at p. 61; Cargo ex Argos, (1873) L.R. 5 P.C.134 at p. 153. In the case of Barnes v. Jarvis. (1953) 1 W.L.R. 649.

— Uwais, CJN. Ibrahim v Barde (1996) – SC.74/1995

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ENTIRE PROVISIONS OF THE STATUTE MUST BE READ TOGETHER TO DETERMINE INTENTION OF THE LEGISLATURE

The law is settled that in order to discover the real intention of the legislature, the entire provisions of statute must be read together as a whole. No section of a statute should be read and construed in isolation. If the entire provisions of the FIA are read together, it becomes clear that before a request for access to information relating to personal information of an individual in the custody of a public official or public institution can be granted, the applicant must show to the institution or the Court where an applicant approaches the Court for a review of decision of a public institution to deny access to personal information in its custody, the existence of any of the conditions or situations stated under Section 14(2) and (3) of the Act.

— M.O. Bolaji-Yusuff, JCA. CCB v Nwankwo (2018) – CA/E/141/2017

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STATUTE SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED THAT IT DEFEATS ITS PURPOSE

The settled position of the law is that provisions of a statute must not be constructed in a way as would defeat the intendment of the statute and the desire of the legislature. The court should not interpret the provisions of the statute to defeat the obvious end it was meant to serve otherwise it will entail injustice. Where the words of the statute are plain and unambiguous the literal interpretation should be followed.

— Ige JCA. Agbi V. FRN (CA/A/873C/2019, 25 March 2020)

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PERSON WHO INTERPRETED A STATEMENT MUST TENDER IT IN COURT

It is settled that the person or officer who interpreted a statement must tender it in Court so that if necessary, the interpreter can be cross examined on whether the interpreted statement is the correct interpretation of the original words as spoken by the Defendant.

– H.M. Ogunwumiju, JSC. State v. Ibrahim (2021) – SC.200/2016

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COURT WILL CONSIDER ALL DOCUMENTS BEFORE IT WHOLLY

It is settled that in the consideration of an agreement where there are series of correspondences between the Parties, it is the duty of the Court to consider all the correspondences in order to decipher what they are saying with regards to the arrangement see Udeagu V. Benue Cement Co. Plc. (2006) 2 NWLR (Pt. 965) 600.

— A.A. Augie, JSC. Berger v Toki Rainbow (2019) – SC.332/2009

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