The settled position of the law is that provisions of a statute must not be constructed in a way as would defeat the intendment of the statute and the desire of the legislature. The court should not interpret the provisions of the statute to defeat the obvious end it was meant to serve otherwise it will entail injustice. Where the words of the statute are plain and unambiguous the literal interpretation should be followed.
— Ige JCA. Agbi V. FRN (CA/A/873C/2019, 25 March 2020)
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Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes 12th Ed. page 116. The statement of the law reads: “Few principles of statutory interpretation are applied as frequently as the presumption against alterations in the common law. It is presumed that the legislature does not intend to make any change in the existing law beyond that which is expressly stated in or followed by necessary implication from the language of the statute in question. It is thought to be in
the highest degree improbable that Parliament would depart from the general system of law
without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness and to give any such effect to general words merely because this would be their widest, usual, natural or literal meaning would be to place on them a construction other than that which Parliament must be supposed to have intended. If the arguments on a question of interpretation are fairly evenly balanced, that interpretation should be chosen which involves the least alteration of the existing law.”
– Cited in Abioye v. Yakubu (1991) – SC.169/1987
Generally, where the words of a statute are plain, clear and unambiguous, the Court should give them their literal meaning. So the golden or literal rule of interpretation of statutes or even a Constitution, is to give the words used therein, their ordinary and plain meaning without importation. The Court should construe the words of a statute, to save it and so avoid making a mockery of the statute, to defeat its manifest intent.
– Yahaya, JCA. Petroleum Resources v. SPDC (2021)
Megarry J in Clerk Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners (1973) 2 All E.R.513 at 520: “The phrase ‘subject to’ is a simple provision which merely subjects the provisions of the subject subsection to the provisions of the master subsections. Where there is no clash, the phrase does nothing; if there is collision the phrase shows what is to prevail.”
The law is trite that where there is a specific legislation on a matter, the general principle of law must give way and cannot override the specific provisions of law on the subject. See Orubu v. INEC (1988) 12 SCN) 256 at 349, Unity Bank Plc. v. Kay Plastic Nig. Limited & anor (2011) LPELR 8839 (CA).
– T. Akomolafe-Wilson, JCA. Onnoghen v. FRN (2019) – CA/A/44C/2019
It is a fundamental and cardinal principle of interpretation of statutes that where in its ordinary meaning a provision is clear and unambiguous, effect should be given to it without resorting to external aid. See A.-G., Federation v. A.-G., Abia State & Ors. (No.2) (2002) 6 NWLR (Pt. 764) 542 at 794 paras. B – C per Uwais CJN; A-G., Bendel State v. A.-G., Federation (1983) 1 SCNLR 239.
— M. Peter-Odili, JCA. CAC v. Ayedun (2005) – CA/A/152/2004
It is a Statutory provision which is clear and unambiguous. In such a situation, the duty of the court, is to give effect to the ordinary plain meaning of the words without resorting to any external aid. See the case of Chief Joseph A. Okotie-Eboh v. Chief James Ehiowo Manager & ors. (2004) 12 SCNJ 139. So, the question of Common Law, or Evidence Act, with respect, is therefore, of no moment.
— Ogbuagu, JSC. Grosvenor v Halaloui (2009) – SC.373/2002
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