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DEROGATION FROM THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF A CITIZEN MUST BE SHOWN TO BE IN PUBLIC INTEREST

Dictum

Competent authorities or Government must justify derogation from the fundamental rights of citizens by showing facts suggesting that the act or policy complained of is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. It must be shown that the derogation is in the interest of public safety, public order, public morality or public health, or that the policy or action is for the purpose of protecting the rights and freedom of other persons as required by section 45 (1) (a) and (b) of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended).

– Tijjani Abubakar, JSC. Lagos State Govt. v. Abdul Kareem (2022) – SC.910/2016

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PURPORT OF SECTION 34 OF CFRN – RIGHT TO DIGNITY

The purport of Section 34(1)(a) of the Constitution is that no one should be inflicted with intense pain on his body or mind nor subjected to physical or mental cruelty so severe that it endangers his life or health. Anything amounting to brutalization is synonymous to torture or inhuman treatment and is actionable under the claim for Fundamental Human Rights as provided for by the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended). KALU V. THE STATE (1998) 13 NNLR (PT. 583) @ 531.

— U. Onyemenam, JCA. Iheme v Chief of Defence Staff (2018) – CA/J/264/2017

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FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT HAS SPECIAL ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES

Fundamental right enforcement has a special procedure enthroned under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 to facilitate the exercise of one’s right as dispensed under Chapter IV of the Constitution. The rights themselves are the basic and fundamental human rights which inhere in every human being. These rights are in place because of the elevated nature of human beings above other creatures occupying the earth.

— S.J. Adah, JCA. Udo v Robson (2018) – CA/C/302/2013

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MERE LETTER OF INVITATION FROM EFCC DOES NOT CONSTITUTE ABUSE OF LAW/FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT

Upon a critical consideration of the entirety of the submission of Learned counsel in this case vis-a-vis the facts and circumstances of the case, I hold the view that there is no doubt that a mere letter of invitation from the 3rd Respondent to the 1st and 2nd Respondents did not constitute abuse of the process of law, and/or breach of fundamental right.

— S.D. Bage JSC. Diamond Bank Plc V. H.R.H. Eze (Dr) Peter Opara & Ors. (SC.375/2012, 9 March 2018)

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FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS SUIT CANNOT BE FILED JOINTLY

The earlier position of this Court is that fundamental rights accrue to citizens individually and by lumping the applications together, the Respondents rendered their application incompetent.

— J.O.K. Oyewole, JCA. Udo v Robson (2018) – CA/C/302/2013

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MERE ALLEGATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION TRIGGERS THE COURT JURISDICTION

Para. 27: “This Court has held in many of its flourishing jurisprudence that mere allegation of violation of human rights is sufficient to trigger the jurisdiction of this Court and the Court will assume jurisdiction without necessarily examining the veracity of the allegation. In Kareem Meissa Wade v. Republic of Senegal, ECW/CCJ/JUD/19/13, at pg. 259 Para. 95 (3), this court held that: “Nevertheless, that simply invoking human rights violation in a case suffices to establish the jurisdiction of the Court over that case.” Similarly, In BAKARE SARRE V MALI (2011) CCJELR pg. 57, the court stressed that: “Once human rights violations which involves international or community obligations of a member state is alleged, it will exercise its jurisdiction over the case.” This position is further supported by the decision of the Court in SERAP V. FRN & 4 ORS, (2014) ECW/CCJ/JUD/16/14 where this court held that: “the mere allegation that there has been a violation of human rights in the territory of a member state is sufficient prima facie to justify the jurisdiction of this court on the dispute, surely without any prejudice to the substance and merits of the complaint which has to be determined only after the parties have been given the opportunity to present their case, with full guarantees of fair trial.” See also the case of His Excellency Vice-President Alhaji Samuel Sam-Sumana v. Republic of Sierra Leone.-SUIT NO: ECW/CCJ/APP/38/16 and JUD NO: ECW/CCJ/JUD/19/17 (At page 14 of the judgment) and Mamadou Tandja (2010) CCJELR pg. 109 & Bakare Sarre & 28 Ors v. Mali (2011) (CCJELR) pg. 57.”

— Boley v Liberia & Ors. (2019) – ECW/CCJ/JUD/24/19

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ARTICLE 19 – 24 AFRICAN CHARTER ARE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE RATHER THAN INDIVIDUAL

Para. 24: In Kemi Penheiro SAN V. Republic of Ghana, ECW/CCJ/JUD/11/12 (2012) (unreported), where the Applicant alleged the violation of Articles 20 and 22 of the African Charter, the Court stressed that it is opinio juris communis that the rights referred to in Articles 19-24 of the African Charter are rights of (all) “peoples” in contrast to the rights of “every individual”, “every human being”, or “every citizen” proclaimed in Article 2-17.

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