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SUBJECTION OF THE RIGHT TO LIFE – EXECUTION OF THE SENTENCE OF THE COURT

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Under section 30(1) of the Constitution, therefore, the right to life, although fully guaranteed is nevertheless subject to the execution of a death sentence of a court of law in respect of a criminal offence of which one has been found guilty in Nigeria. The qualifying word, save, used in section 30(1) seems to me to be the unmistakable key to the construction of that provision. In my view it is plain that the 1979 Constitution can by no stretch of the imagination be said to have proscribed or outlawed the death penalty. On the contrary, section 30(1) of the Constitution permits it in the clearest possible terms, so long as it is inflicted pursuant to the sentence of a court of law in Nigeria in a criminal offence. In other words, section 30(1) of the Constitution recognises the death penalty as a form of punishment but only on the condition that it is in execution of the sentence of a court of law in a criminal offence of which an accused person has been found guilty in Nigeria. The plain meaning of this section of the Constitution cannot be derogated from in the absence of any ambiguity whatsoever. It simply guarantees and protects the right to life. But it also recognises deprivation of life so long as it is pursuant to the execution of the sentence of a court in a criminal offence of which the accused has been found guilty in Nigeria.

— Iguh JSC. Onuoha v State (1998) – SC. 24/1996

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human rights

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS SUIT CANNOT BE FILED JOINTLY

The earlier position of this Court is that fundamental rights accrue to citizens individually and by lumping the applications together, the Respondents rendered their application incompetent.

— J.O.K. Oyewole, JCA. Udo v Robson (2018) – CA/C/302/2013

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MERE LETTER OF INVITATION FROM EFCC DOES NOT CONSTITUTE ABUSE OF LAW/FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT

Upon a critical consideration of the entirety of the submission of Learned counsel in this case vis-a-vis the facts and circumstances of the case, I hold the view that there is no doubt that a mere letter of invitation from the 3rd Respondent to the 1st and 2nd Respondents did not constitute abuse of the process of law, and/or breach of fundamental right.

— S.D. Bage JSC. Diamond Bank Plc V. H.R.H. Eze (Dr) Peter Opara & Ors. (SC.375/2012, 9 March 2018)

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NATURE OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE NIGERIAN CONSTITUTION

Human rights are part of the common heritage of all mankind without discrimination on grounds of race, sex, religion, and association, etc. See Section 38 and 42 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended). These rights common to mankind have a long history. Fundamental Rights are rights which stand above the ordinary laws of the land. They are in fact antecedent to the political society itself. Fundamental rights have been described as the minimum living standard for civilized humanity. The fundamental rights have been enshrined in the Constitution so that the rights could be inalienable and immutable to the extent of the non-immutability of the Constitution.

– Uwani Musa Abba Aji, JSC. Lagos State Govt. v. Abdul Kareem (2022) – SC.910/2016

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A FAMILY AS A UNIT CANNOT COMMENCE FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS APPLICATION

In the case of OKECHUKWU v ETUKOKWU (1998) 8 NWLR 23 (2018) LPELR 45183 (CA) PART 562, PAGE 511, it was held amongst others per Niki Tobi, JCA (as he then was) that: “As I indicated above, the Umunwanne family is the centre of the whole matter. A family as a unit cannot commence an action on infringement or contravention of Fundamental Rights. To be specific, no Nigeria family or any foreign family has the locus to commence action under Chapter IV of the Constitution or by virtue of the 1979 Rules. The provisions of Chapter 4 cover individuals and not a group or collection of individuals. The expression ‘every individual’, ‘every person’, ‘any person’, ‘every citizen’ are so clear that a family unit is never anticipated or contemplated”.

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FHC & HIGH COURT HAVE CONCURRENT JURISDICTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES

A community reading of Section 46 of the 1999 Constitution and Order 1(2) of the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules would reveal undisputedly that both the Federal High Court and the High Court of a State have concurrent jurisdiction on matters of breach or likely breach of any of the fundamental rights enshrined in Chapter IV of the Constitution. This has been the consistent position of this Court upheld in an avalanche of cases, some of which are Grace Jack v. University of Agriculture, Makurdi (2004) 17 NSCQR 90 at 100; (2004) 5 NWLR (Pt. 865) 208; Olutola v. University of Ilorin (2004) 18 NWLR (Pt. 905) 416, Ogugu v. The State (1994) 9 NWLR (Pt. 366) 1.

– J.I. Okoro JSC. Ihim v. Maduagwu (2021)

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ALLEGATION OF BREACH OF RIGHT TO LIFE DOES NOT MEAN ACTUAL LOSS OF LIFE

Para. 53: “The rights to life, health and dignity are intertwined such that a violation of one can lead to the violation of the other. It follows that the enjoyment of a healthy life is dependent on the ability to afford good medical services which in turn is dependent on the financial security sufficient for maintenance of good health. Payment of pension implicates the ability of pensioners to enjoy these guarantees. The allegation of the violation of the right to life does not necessarily entail the actual loss of life or merely physical act of breathing, neither does it connote mere animal existence or continued drudgery through life. It has a wider meaning which includes right to live with human dignity, right to livelihood, right to health and many more. Consequently, the refusal to pay retirement benefits can occasion the violation of the right to health and thus a violation of the right to life. Of course the dignity of a person is implicated if due to lack of means traceable to denial of pension, the person becomes a relic of the society falling from his/her ordinary standard in life with the likelihood of becoming a beggar.”

— Boley v Liberia & Ors. (2019) – ECW/CCJ/JUD/24/19

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