Both in his pleadings and evidence the plaintiff concentrated so much on his allegations of bad faith, hatred, malice etc; but all these are of no consequence in determining whether or not his contract of employment was lawfully terminated by the defendant, considering that no reason was given for the termination.
– Ogundare, JSC. Chukwumah v. SPDC (1993)
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As can be seen, the definition of worker under section 91(1) is restrictive given the persons exempted in terms of paragraphs (a) to (f) of the definition. The point is that section 91(1) defines a worker only for the purposes of the Labour Act; as such, not all employees are workers for purposes of the Labour Act. The category of persons under paragraphs (a) to (f) of the definition of a worker may thus be employees but not workers for purposes of the Labour Act. Section 91(1) of the Labour Act defines a worker by reference to an employer i.e. as one who entered into or works under a contract with an employer. So, who is an employer? The same section 91(1) defines an “employer” to mean “any person who has entered into a contract of employment to employ any other person as a worker either for himself or for the service of any other person, and includes the agent, manager or factor of the first-mentioned person and the personal representatives of a deceased employer”. The common denominator in the definition of a worker and an employer is the contract of employment. A “contract of employment” is thus defined by same section 91(1) to mean “any agreement, whether oral or written, express or implied, whereby one person agrees to employ another as a worker and that other personagrees to serve the employer as a worker”.
— B.B. Kanyip, J. Olatunji v UBER (2018) – NICN/LA/546/2017
When the employing authority wants to remove its servant on grounds permitted by Statute, then as Lord Campbell, C. J., observed in Exparte Ramshay (1852) 18 Q.B. 173 at p.190 “the principles of eternal justice” will dictate that the servant cannot be lawfully dismissed without first telling him what is alleged against him and hearing his defence or explanation. Even where the servant had, aliunde, personal knowledge of the offence or reason for his removal that was held to be no substitute for hearing the officer’s explanation:- Reg v. Smith (1844) 5 Q.B. 614.
— A. Oputa, JSC. Olaniyan & Ors. v. University of Lagos (1985) – SC.53/1985
In Vitarelli v. Seaton 359 US. 335, the Supreme Court of the United States of America granted a declaration in the case of a civil servant even in a case involving State Security, because the proper procedure was not adopted. An analysis of the decided cases leads to the conclusions that an action for reinstatement is only possible where there is a unilateral repudiation of the contract of service by the Master (the Employer) which has not been accepted by the (employee) Servant. See Denmark Productions Ltd. v. Bascobol Productions Ltd. (1961) 3 All E.R. 583. In that situation the contract is still in existence having not been discharged by the acceptance of the repudiation. It is therefore not the same as where the contract has been discharged and the dismissed employee is entitled only to damages.
— A.G. Karibe-Whyte, JSC. Olaniyan & Ors. v. University of Lagos (1985) – SC.53/1985
The contract of service comes to an end after the unilateral repudiation only if the employee accepts the repudiation expressly or by implication. – See Gunton v. Richmond-upon-Thames London Borough Council (1981) AC. at p. 464 and Decro-Wall International S.A. v. Practitioners in Marketing Ltd. (1971) 1 WLR. at pp. 369-370 per Salmon L. J.
— A.G. Karibe-Whyte, JSC. Olaniyan & Ors. v. University of Lagos (1985) – SC.53/1985
Statutory employment has been explained to mean an employment in which the procedure for employment and discipline are governed by statute. See Nigeria Institute of International Affairs v Mrs. T.O. Ayanfalu (2007) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1018) p. 246. In addition to the above, it is the position of the law that it is not all persons employed by a statutory body or government agency that is in a statutory flavored employment. Uwa JCA, explained this in Federal Medical Centre, Ido-Ekiti & Ors. v Isaac Olukayode Olajide (2011) LPELR-4150 (CA), when he held thus: “In agreement with the submissions of learned counsel to the 1st set of appellants to the effect that for an employment to be held to have statutory flavour the following conditions must be met: 1) The employer must be a body set up by statute. 2) The establishing statute must make express provisions regulating the employment of the staff of the category of the employee concerned. In a plethora of legal authorities in recent times, the Apex Court has given a clear distinction between employment with statutory flavour and other employment. In employments covered by statute, procedures for employment and discipline (including dismissal) of an employee are clearly spelt out, whereas any other employment outside the statute is governed by terms under which parties agreed to be master and servant.”
— Adewemimo J. Afariogun v FUTA (2020) – NICN/AK/41/2017
It is clear from the facts which are not disputed in this appeal, that respondents unilaterally repudiated the contract with the appellants in the letter of termination dated 31st December, 1980. They were in my opinion trying to evade or avoid compliance with the conditions in para. 15 and the procedure in s.17(1). Hill v. CA. Parsons & Co. Ltd. (supra) will definitely apply to such a case as this one. Similarly each of the appellants refused to accept the repudiation, and in letter written the same day clearly so stated. – Exh. P. 16, P.19. In their claim they actually asked for a declaration that the contract was still in existence and that they were still occupying their respective positions in the 1st respondent University. I have no doubts in my mind that this is a situation where it is appropriate for the application of the rule of specific performance. The law has arrived at the stage where the principle should be adopted that the right to a job is analogous to right to property. Accordingly, where a man is entitled to a particular job, I cannot conceive of any juridical or logical reason against the view that where the termination of appointment is invalid and consequently alters nothing as reinstatement of the employee barring legal obstacles intervening between the period of purported dismissal and the date of judgment is the only just remedy. Normally damages are rarely adequate remedies for wrongful dismissal, and where the act relied upon for the dismissal is a contravention of an enabling statutory provision, I have no hesitation in restoring the judgment of the learned trial judge.
— A.G. Karibe-Whyte, JSC. Olaniyan & Ors. v. University of Lagos (1985) – SC.53/1985
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