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ACTS OF POSSESSION IN PROOF OF TITLE TO LAND

Dictum

Also in Duru v. Onwumelu (2001) 18 NWLR (Pt. 746) 672 at 696—697, H—D per Uwaifo JSC: ‘Now, by relying on acts of possession in proof of title to the land in question, the plaintiffs as a community inevitably put in issue the totality of the numerous acts of possession and ownership they claim to have been enjoyed by them, the positive nature of those acts and the long period over which the said acts have spanned so that the circumstance as a whole will be seen to have come within the principle long laid down in Ekpo v. Ita (1932) 11 N.L.R. 68. Simply put in relation to this case where, as already said, the plaintiffs base their right to a declaration of title to the land on the fact of long possession, the principle is that they must prove acts of ownership and possession of the land in dispute over a sufficient length of time, numerous and positive enough to warrant the inference that they are exclusive owners. In my view, it will not do if merely there are numerous acts, since these might qualify, on the part of an intrusive party, as acts of trespass. There is the requirement that the acts ought to extend over a sufficient or appreciable period of time and must be positive. To be positive, the acts ought to be such that can be verified upon strong evidence, such as, old structures and settlements, well-beaten roads or paths, economic crops or trees tending visibly to be long-lived, old farms and huts, community shrines which have long been in existence, and to which the plaintiffs as a community can satisfactorily lay claim etc.’

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REQUIREMENTS BEFORE DOCUMENT OF TITLE IS ADMITTED AS SUFFICIENT PROOF

Mere production of a deed of conveyance or document of title does not automatically entitle a party to a claim in declaration, before the production of document of title is admitted as sufficient proof of ownership, the court must satisfy itself that:- (a) The document is genuine or valid (b) It has been duly executed, stamped and registered. (c) The grantor has the authority and capacity to make the grant. (d) That the grantor has in fact what he proposes to grant. (e) That the grant has the effect claimed by the holder of the instrument. Ayorinde v. Kuforiji (2007) 4 NWLR, Pt.1024, Pg. 341, Dosunmu v. Dada (2002) 13 NWLR Pt. 783, Pg. 1 Romaine v. Romaine (1992), 4 NWLR Pt. 238 Pg. 650, Kyri v Alkali (2001) FWLR, Pt 60, Pg. 1481 Dabor v. Abdullahi (2005) 29 WRM 11 SC 7 NWLR Pt. 923, Pg. 181.

— O.O. Adekeye, JSC. Agboola v UBA (2011) – SC.86/2003

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HAD TITLE TO LAND BEFORE COMING OF THE LAND USE ACT IS CONSIDERED HOLDER

A person or Community that had title to a parcel of land before the coming into force of the Land Use Act, 1978 is deemed to be a holder of a right of occupancy, statutory right of occupancy or customary right of occupancy, depending on the status of the land – whether it is in urban area or in non-urban area. See Section 34(2), (3) and (6) and Section 36(2), (3) and (4) of the Land Use Act.

— Wali JSC. Onwuka & Ors. V. Ediala & Anor. (SC.18/1987, 20 January 1989)

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PARTY MUST AS WELL ESTABLISH THE TITLE OF WHO HE TRACES TO

It is well settled that once a party pleads and traces his root of title in an action involving title to land to a particular person or source, and this averment, as in the present case, is disputed or challenged, that party, to succeed, as a plaintiff in the suit must not only establish his own title to such land, he must also satisfy the court on the validity of the title of that particular person or source from whom he claims to have derived his title. See Mogaji v. Cadbury Nigeria Ltd. (1985) 7 SC 59, (1985) 2 NWLR (pt.7) 393 at 431; Elias v. Omo-Bare (1982) 5 SC 25 at 37 – 38.

— Iguh, JSC. Olohunde v. Adeyoju (2000) – SC.15/1995

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APPELLANT NEED NOT PROVE ALL FIVE WAYS FOR PROVING OWNERSHIP OF LAND

In an action for declaration of title to land, as in the instant case, a plaintiff need not prove all the five ways. Where the plaintiff’s case is based on traditional evidence of ownership as the legal basis of his claim, his duty is limited to proving such traditional title and no more. On the other hand, if a plaintiff’s claim relies on conveyance as the legal basisof ownership , his duty is simply to produce the documents of title or the title deeds. The same thing applies where he claims through any of the other remaining three ways.

— Onnoghen JSC. Aigbobahi & Ors. v. Aifuwa, Osabuohien & Ors. (SC. 194/2001, 3 Feb 2006)

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OWNER OF LAND AND INTRUDER CANNOT BE IN POSSESSION AT THE SAME TIME; BETTER TITLE SUCCEEDS

The plaintiff and the 1st defendant say that they are in possession. The position however is that an owner of land and a person intruding on that land without his consent cannot both be in possession of the land at the same time. Possession resides in the claimant that establishes a better title. See Pius Amakor v. Benedict Obiefuna (1974) 3 SC 67 at 82; Ogunbiyi v. Adewunmi (1988) 5 NWLR (Pt.93) 215.

— Katsina-Alu JSC. Engineer Bayo Akinterinwa & Anor V. Cornelius Oladunjoye (SC.98/94, 7 April 2000)

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DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ‘OCCUPATION’ & ‘POSSESSION’ IN LAND LAW, AND THAT WHICH CAN LEAD TO PRESUMPTION OF OWNERSHIP

But the real problem of such cases is that quite often, as in this case, there is tendency to confuse possession with mere occupation. ‘Occupation’ as used in relation to land entails mere physical control of the land in the time being. It is a matter of fact. Such a control may have originated from permission from the true owner; it may have been by stealth; or it may be a tortuous trespass. Possession of land, on the other hand, may, sometimes entail or even coincide with occupation of it; but is not necessarily always synonymous or coterminous with it. A man, such as a landlord who collects rents from his tenants, may be in legal possession of the land even though he does not set his feet on it. This is why distinction is often made between de facto possession, which is mere occupation and de jure possession which entails possession animo possidendi with that amount of occupation, control or even, sometimes, the right to occupy at will is sufficient to exclude other persons from interfering. See Lasisi Akanni Buraimoh v. Rebecca Ayinke Bamgbose (1989) 3 A N.W.L.R. (Pt. 109) 352 at p. 361. Within the meaning of this concept of possession, a man ordinarily living in Maiduguri may be in possession of a vacant house in Lagos if he is in possession of the keys. But in my opinion, that possession admission of which is capable of raising a presumption of ownership of land under section 145 of the Evidence Act must be that which amounts to de jure exclusive possession not mere occupation.” (Italics for emphasis)

— Edozie JSC. Cosm As Ezukwu v. Peter Ukachukwu Jude Ukachukwu (SC. 160/2000, 2 July 2004)

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