But the real problem of such cases is that quite often, as in this case, there is tendency to confuse possession with mere occupation. ‘Occupation’ as used in relation to land entails mere physical control of the land in the time being. It is a matter of fact. Such a control may have originated from permission from the true owner; it may have been by stealth; or it may be a tortuous trespass. Possession of land, on the other hand, may, sometimes entail or even coincide with occupation of it; but is not necessarily always synonymous or coterminous with it. A man, such as a landlord who collects rents from his tenants, may be in legal possession of the land even though he does not set his feet on it. This is why distinction is often made between de facto possession, which is mere occupation and de jure possession which entails possession animo possidendi with that amount of occupation, control or even, sometimes, the right to occupy at will is sufficient to exclude other persons from interfering. See Lasisi Akanni Buraimoh v. Rebecca Ayinke Bamgbose (1989) 3 A N.W.L.R. (Pt. 109) 352 at p. 361. Within the meaning of this concept of possession, a man ordinarily living in Maiduguri may be in possession of a vacant house in Lagos if he is in possession of the keys. But in my opinion, that possession admission of which is capable of raising a presumption of ownership of land under section 145 of the Evidence Act must be that which amounts to de jure exclusive possession not mere occupation.” (Italics for emphasis)
— Edozie JSC. Cosm As Ezukwu v. Peter Ukachukwu Jude Ukachukwu (SC. 160/2000, 2 July 2004)