It is trite in law, that there is no evidence stronger than a person’s own admission or confession. The confessional statement made by an accused person is potent evidence in the hand of a prosecutor for proving a charge. It is the best and safest evidence on which to convict.
– M. Peter-Odili, JSC. Enabeli v. State (2021)
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In a plethora of decisions, this court has held that a confessional statement constitutes evidence against the maker alone and cannot be used as evidence against a co-accused unless the co-accused adopts it by word or conduct. The rationale for this is clear – noone can confess to a crime on behalf of another. See: Ajaegbo v. The State (2018) LPELR – 44531 (SC) @ 44 – 45 C – D; (2018) 11 NWLR (Pt. 1631) 484; Kasa v. The State (1994) 5 NWLR (Pt. 344) 269 @ 288; Jimoh v. The State (2014) 10 NWLR (Pt. 1414) 105 @ 139. It is therefore an incorrect statement of the law to state that the court can rely on the extra-judicial confession of an accused against his co-accused, to ground a conviction against him so long as it incriminates him.
— Kekere-Ekun, JSC. Enobong v. The State (2022) – SC/CR/249/2020
It is indeed the law that an accused person’s statement should, as much as possible, be taken down in the exact words of the accused person. Where the statement is thereafter translated into English by another person, the interpreter must be called as a witness in order for the statement in English to be admissible in evidence. Where that interpreter is not called, the statement in English will be regarded as hearsay evidence and will therefore be inadmissible
– Eyop v. State (2018) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1615) 273 (SC) per Sanusi, J.S.C.
My Lords, the position of the law as it stands today is that the signed retracted confessional statement Exh. 7A taken in vernacular is admissible in evidence. What matters is the probative value to be attached to it.
– H.M. Ogunwumiju, JSC. State v. Ibrahim (2021) – SC.200/2016
Against this background, it is important to note that the Appellant, in the course of his evidence-in-chief before the lower Court, retracted from the said Exhibits A and A1, thus prompting the lower Court into deciding that the entire evidence of the Appellant was at that stage unreliable and therefore discountenanced same; but the settled position of the law is that a retraction of a confession does not ipso facto render the confession inadmissible. See the old case of R. v. JOHN AGAGARIGA ITULE (1961) 1 ANLR 402 (FSC) where the Supreme Court per BRETT, Ag CJF held thus; “A confession does not become inadmissible merely because the accused person denies having made it and in this respect a confession contained in a statement made to the Police by a person under arrest is not to be treated different from any other confession. The fact that the Appellant took the earliest opportunity to deny having made the statement may lend weight to his denial. See R v. SAPELE and ANOR (1952) 2 FSC 74 but it is not in itself a reason for ignoring the statement.” … It would be further recalled that the Appellant took the earliest opportunity when the statement was offered in evidence to deny having made it. But the position remains in law, that a mere denial without more, even at the earliest opportunity, cannot, on the bare facts of the case, lend any iota of weight to the denial. Apart from the fact that the denial is a bare statement bereft of any supporting facts, it is by and large, standing only on the ipsi dexit of the Appellant. To make matters rather worse and as revealed by the printed records in this case, the said statements were not even challenged on grounds of involuntariness and the learned trial Court in its Ruling on the objection raised by the Appellant rightly declined the invitation to conduct a trial within trial. Against this backdrop, the question of the voluntariness of the statements, not having been raised or challenged at the trial, this Court therefore holds that the prosecution proved affirmatively that Exhibits A and A1 were voluntary confessional statements of the Appellant. Regardless of this position, the usual thing in all criminal trials is that the burden of proving affirmatively beyond doubt that the confession was made voluntarily is always on the prosecution, which this prosecution succeeded in doing as expected in this case. See the cases of JOSHUA ADEKANBI v. A-G WESTERN NIGERIA (1961) All NLR 47; R v. MATON PRIESTLY (1966) 50 CR APP. R 183 at 188; ISIAKA AUTA v. THE STATE (1975) NNLR 60 at 65 SC on the issue.
— F.O. Oho, JCA. Nasiru v State (2016) – CA/S/78C/2015
When a trial Court is confronted with a statement made by an accused person which is confessional, there are two situations that may arise. The accused person may object to the admissibility of the statement on the ground that it was not voluntarily made; that it was procured by means of torture, inducement or fear. In such circumstances, it is the duty of the court to conduct what is commonly referred to as a “trial within trial” to determine if indeed the statement was voluntarily made, Where the accused person denied making the statement at all, a trial within trial is unnecessary. The Court would be at liberty to admit the statement in evidence and at the conclusion of the case determine the probative value to attach to it.
– Galadima, JSC. Kingsley v. State (2016)
My Lords, the law is trite that a confession otherwise relevant does not become irrelevant merely because it was made under a promise of secrecy, or in consequence of a deception practiced on the defendant for the purpose of obtaining it, or when he was drunk, or because it was made in answer to questions which he needed to have answered, whatever may have been the form of these questions, or because he was not warned that he was not bound to make such statement and the evidence of it might be given.
– J.I. Okoro JSC. Berende v. FRN (2021)
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