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CONFESSION DOES NOT BECOME IRRELEVANT DUE TO DECEPTION

Dictum

My Lords, the law is trite that a confession otherwise relevant does not become irrelevant merely because it was made under a promise of secrecy, or in consequence of a deception practiced on the defendant for the purpose of obtaining it, or when he was drunk, or because it was made in answer to questions which he needed to have answered, whatever may have been the form of these questions, or because he was not warned that he was not bound to make such statement and the evidence of it might be given.

– J.I. Okoro JSC. Berende v. FRN (2021)

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CONFESSION ALONE CAN GROUND CONVICTION

Furthermore, it is also the law that the confessional statement of an accused person alone is sufficient to ground a conviction. A confession alone, properly proved, is enough to ground a conviction, even without corroboration. Thus, an uncorroborated confessional statement of an accused person can be acted upon, without more. Nonetheless, it is advisable to look for some evidence outside the confessional statement which makes it probable that the confession is true.

– Sankey JCA. Abdul v. State (2021)

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TRIAL-WITHIN-TRIAL IS TO DETERMINE VOLUNTARINESS OF CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT

I must emphasise that the function of a court in trial within trial is narrowed down to determining solely the question of voluntariness of the statement in issue and not on whether or not the statement is that of the accused person or improperly recorded. It boils down to the proposition that there is no way an accused person who has not acknowledged his alleged confessional statement sought to be tendered by the prosecution in a trial within trial can come round to object to its voluntariness. The absence of his locus to otherwise so contend is indisputable.

– Chukwuma-Eneh JSC. Ibeme v. State (2013)

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DENIAL OF CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT DOES NOT MAKE THE CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT INADMISSIBLE

Against this background, it is important to note that the Appellant, in the course of his evidence-in-chief before the lower Court, retracted from the said Exhibits A and A1, thus prompting the lower Court into deciding that the entire evidence of the Appellant was at that stage unreliable and therefore discountenanced same; but the settled position of the law is that a retraction of a confession does not ipso facto render the confession inadmissible. See the old case of R. v. JOHN AGAGARIGA ITULE (1961) 1 ANLR 402 (FSC) where the Supreme Court per BRETT, Ag CJF held thus; “A confession does not become inadmissible merely because the accused person denies having made it and in this respect a confession contained in a statement made to the Police by a person under arrest is not to be treated different from any other confession. The fact that the Appellant took the earliest opportunity to deny having made the statement may lend weight to his denial. See R v. SAPELE and ANOR (1952) 2 FSC 74 but it is not in itself a reason for ignoring the statement.” … It would be further recalled that the Appellant took the earliest opportunity when the statement was offered in evidence to deny having made it. But the position remains in law, that a mere denial without more, even at the earliest opportunity, cannot, on the bare facts of the case, lend any iota of weight to the denial. Apart from the fact that the denial is a bare statement bereft of any supporting facts, it is by and large, standing only on the ipsi dexit of the Appellant. To make matters rather worse and as revealed by the printed records in this case, the said statements were not even challenged on grounds of involuntariness and the learned trial Court in its Ruling on the objection raised by the Appellant rightly declined the invitation to conduct a trial within trial. Against this backdrop, the question of the voluntariness of the statements, not having been raised or challenged at the trial, this Court therefore holds that the prosecution proved affirmatively that Exhibits A and A1 were voluntary confessional statements of the Appellant. Regardless of this position, the usual thing in all criminal trials is that the burden of proving affirmatively beyond doubt that the confession was made voluntarily is always on the prosecution, which this prosecution succeeded in doing as expected in this case. See the cases of JOSHUA ADEKANBI v. A-G WESTERN NIGERIA (1961) All NLR 47; R v. MATON PRIESTLY (1966) 50 CR APP. R 183 at 188; ISIAKA AUTA v. THE STATE (1975) NNLR 60 at 65 SC on the issue.

— F.O. Oho, JCA. Nasiru v State (2016) – CA/S/78C/2015

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FAILURE TO USE VIDEO RECORDING DURING RECORDING CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT

The use of the imperative word “shall” in the provision underscores its mandatory nature. The mischief sought to be curbed by the law includes such unsavory situations as where an alleged confession is extracted by torture and duress imposed on a defendant which led to the confession, to avoid miscarriage of justice and to reduce to the barest minimum the incidents of retractions and time consumed by trial within trial proceedings. Section 9(3) ACJL is a mandatory procedural law against infractions on the constitutional rights of a defendant as enshrined in Section 35(2) of the CFRN (as altered). Any purported confessional statement recorded in breach of the said provision is of no effect. It is impotent and worthless. See JOSEPH ZHIYA v. THE PEOPLE OF LAGOS STATE (2016) LPELR – 40562 Pp. 28-29 Paras G-B, ISMAILA FATOKI v. THE STATE- unreported judgment of the Court of Appeal in Appeal No. CA/L/1125/2011 delivered on 11/12/2015, FABIAN MATHEW v. THE STATE – unreported judgment of the Court of Appeal in Appeal No. CA/L/1126/2011 delivered on 11/12/2015, KINGSLEY AKHABUE v. THE STATE – unreported judgment of the Court of Appeal in Appeal No. CA/L/1056/2011 delivered on 11/12/2015, AGBANIMU v. FRN (2018) LPELR – 43924 (CA) Pp. 11-12 Paras E-A, ENECHE v. PEOPLE OF LAGOS STATE (2018) LPELR – 45826 (CA) Pp. 27-28 which are persuasive precedents of the Court of Appeal.

— H.M. Ogunwumiju, JSC. Friday Charles v. The State of Lagos (SC.CR/503/2020, Friday March 31 2023)

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TRIAL-WITHIN-TRIAL APPLIES ONLY TO VOLUNTARINESS OF CONFESSION

The rule with respect to conducting a trial within a trial operates only in cases of questioning the voluntariness or otherwise of confessions. It does not operate where an accused person denies making the statement or retracts.

– Galadima, JSC. Kingsley v. State (2016)

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CO-ACCUSED INCRIMINATING CONFESSIONAL STATEMENT

On the issue of his Co-Accused’s Statement, the Appellant is right that his statement cannot be used against him. The position of the law is that the Statement of a Co-Accused Person to the Police is binding on him only see Suberu v. State (2010) 8 NWLR (Pt. 1197) 586. However, where the evidence incriminating an Accused Person comes from a Co-Accused Person, the Court is at liberty to rely on it as long as the co-accused person who gave such incriminating evidence, was tried along with that Accused Person. see Dairo v The State (2017) LPELR-43724(SC) and Micheal V. State (2008) 13 NWLR (Pt. 1104) 383.

— A.A. Augie, JSC. Usman v The State (2019) – SC.228/2016

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