From the foregoing judicial decisions, it is clear that in election petition litigation, whether the witnesses which a party intends to call are ordinary or expert witnesses and whether they are willing or subpoenaed witnesses, their witness depositions must be filed along with petition before such witnesses will be competent to testify before the tribunal or court.
— H.S. Tsammani, JCA. Peter Obi & Anor. v INEC & Ors. (2023) – CA/PEPC/03/2023
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Accordingly, in arriving at a conviction in criminal cases, the court is concerned with whether or not there is sufficient credible evidence of probative value and not the number of witnesses called on an issue. See: Commissioner of Police v. Daniel Kwashie (1953) 14 WACA 319. Where a single witness called by the prosecution is neither an accomplice nor a tainted witness, a court of law is entitled to convict mainly on his credible evidence where his testimony did not by law require corroboration. Once the court is satisfied with the cogency, high quality and credibility of the evidence of a witness and accepts it, conviction based on such evidence should not be interfered with unless such evidence by law requires corroboration. So, in the Daniel Kwashie case, the learned magistrate convicted the appellant on the evidence of one witness. On appeal to the High Court, the learned Judge found that although, corroboration was not required by law, a court was generally reluctant to convict on the evidence of a single witness and proceeded to allow the appeal. On further appeal to the West African Court of Appeal, the appellate judge was reversed and his decision was set aside on the ground that there was sufficient evidence before the learned magistrate on which he based his conviction. It was further held that since the learned magistrate believed the witness and there was no imputation that the sole witness was an accomplice or a tainted witness, it was an error to reverse his decision and the conviction was restored.
— Iguh, JSC. Oguonzee v State (1998) – SC.131/97
The trial Judge should take into consideration the demeanour of witnesses in the evaluation of evidence. Demeanour, which is outward or overt behaviour or manner of a witness, is the exclusive domain of the trial Judge. It includes all open habits and mannerisms of the witness. These ooze out from the body of the witness spontaneously and not tutored. Some of such body movements include a spontaneous positive or negative reaction to a question; shouting at a particular moment or the opposite action of a pretentious mum conduct; movement of part of the body, particularly the hands and the sudden change in the face arising either from anger or happiness, the latter resulting in either a smile or laughter. Another is a sudden remorse on the part of the witness, usually exhibited by refusal to look at the Judge or Counsel, or others in the court, but a sudden drop of the face in the witness box. There are quite a number of behaviours in the determination of demeanour which cannot be exhausted. I can stop with the above as the major conducts of witnesses. I should complete the picture by saying that as appellate judges are deprived of watching the demeanour of witnesses, trial Judges owe the administration of justice a big duty to arrive at the correct conclusion. Of course appellate Judges are not completely hopeless or helpless. They can watch the evaluation of demeanour by the Judge in the cold records.
— Niki Tobi, JSC. Buhari v. INEC (2008) – SC 51/2008
Onubogu and Anor v. The State (1974) 9 S.C. 1, 20: the Supreme Court opined that where in a criminal case, one witness called by the prosecution’ contradicts another prosecution witness on a material point, the prosecution ought to lay some foundation, such as showing that a witness was hostile, before they can ask the court to reject the testimony of one witness in preference for the evidence of the discredited witness. It is not competent for the prosecution to discredit one and accredit the other.
Where the evidence of such a witness is otherwise credible and sufficiently of probative value to the charge, the fact of his relationship to the victim or that he has other personal interest of his own to serve is by itself not sufficient to reject his evidence. In law, causes are not lost on the basis that the witness/s is/are members of the same family, association or community. Even where the Court fails or omits to caution or warn itself on evidence that is true in fact and sufficient to ground a charge, the failure or omission would not weaken the validity of such evidence or be fatal to a conviction.
– M.L. Garba JCA. Odogwu v. Vivian (2009) – CA/PH/345/05
No law says a relation could not give evidence of what he knew, simply because he is related to the party in whose favour he is to give the evidence.All that is necessary, in such situation, is for the Court to warn itself of the danger of the likelihood of partisanship – see Idowu v. The State (2011) LPELR-3597 (CA) 69-70, D-B.
— O.O. Arowosegbe, J. Danjuma v Royal Salt Ltd. & Anor. (2020)
There is no doubt that the defence is not to determine how many witnesses the prosecution will call to testify in Court. The State is at liberty to call only one witness or as many as it desires as long as the testimony of a sole witness is sufficient to establish the ingredients to the charge. See; Bayo Adelumola Vs. The State (1988) NWLR (pt.73)683; (1988) LPELR 119 (SC).
— O. Ariwoola, JSC. Galadima v. State (2017) – SC.70/2013
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