The question whether or not a witness is an accomplice is one of law not of fact and if, as here, the learned trial Judge erred in regarding P.W.(18) as an accomplice (to the crime of conspiracy) it is certainly open to an appellate court (and in this instance, the Federal Court of Appeal) to reverse the erroneous view of the learned trial Judge.
— Idigbe, JSC. Ishola v State (1978) – SC.8/1977
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The first point that needs be emphasised is that the presumption under section 149(d) of the Evidence Act will only apply against whom it is sought that it should operate where that party has infact withheld the particular piece of evidence in issue and if he did not call any evidence on the point. It only applies when the party does not call any evidence on the issue in controversy and not because he fails to call a particular witness. See: Bello v. Kassim (1969) NSCC 228 at 233; Okunzua v. Amosu (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt. 248) 416 at 435. The section deals with the failure to call evidence on the issue in controversy and not because he fails to call a particular witness. See: Bello v. Kassim (1969) NSCC 228 at 233; Okunzua v. Amosu (1992) 6 NWLR (Pt. 248) 416 at 435. The section deals with the failure to call evidence and not the failure to call a particular witness as a party is not bound to call a particular witness if he thinks he can prove his case otherwise. See: Francis Odili v. The State (1977) 4 SC 1 at 8; Alonge v. inspector-General of Police (1959) SCNLR 516; (1959) 4 FSC 203 etc. Mere failure to produce the evidence in issue would not necessarily amount to withholding such evidence. See: Ganiyu Tewogbade v. Arasi Akande (1968) (Pt. 2) NMLR 404 at 408. So, in Francis Odili v. The State supra, learned defence counsel’s submission was that only one of the two Rev. Sisters robbed with violence was called to identify and to testify against the appellant and that the second Rev. Sister and the two night guards who were present during the robbery should have been called as witnesses particularly as the appellant’s defence was that of alibi. This court as already pointed out dismissed this contention as misconceived as the prosecution was not required to call a host of witnesses to prove a particular issue.
— Iguh, JSC. Oguonzee v State (1998) – SC.131/97
An appellate court should not ordinarily substitute its own views of fact for those of the trial court. See: Ebba v. Ogodo (1974) 1 SCNLR 372; Balogun v. Agboola (1974) 1 All NLR (pt. 2) 66. Ascription of probative value to the evidence of witnesses is pre-eminently the business of the trial court which saw and heard the witnesses. An appeal court will not lightly interfere with same unless for compelling reasons. But where evidence has nothing to do with the demeanour of witnesses or relates to interpretation to be placed on documents tendered before the court, an appellate court will be in a good position to act accordingly. See: Ebba v. Ogodo (supra); Ogbechie Onochie (1998) 1 NWLR (Pt.470) 370. An appellate court will not interfere with findings of fact except where wrongly applied to the circumstance of the case or vital documents tendered were jettisoned or conclusion arrived at was patently perverse or wrong, See: Nwosu v. Board of Customs & Excise (1988) 5 NWLR (Pt. 93) 225; Nneji v. Chukwu (1996) 10 NWLR (pt. 378) 265. And where there is conflict in the evidence of witnesses, documentary evidence will serve as a hanger on which the truth shall be resolved. Documents tendered as exhibits are very vital as they do not embark on falsehood like some mortal beings. See: Olujinle v. Adeagbo (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt.75) 238.
— J.A. Fabiyi, JSC. BFI v. Bureau PE (2012) – SC.12/2008
It is trite law that where there is conflict in the opinions of experts, it is the duty of the court to come to a conclusion in the case by resolving such a conflict and can do so by rejecting the opinion of one or the other such experts. See John Wilberforce Bamiro v. S.C.O.A. (1941) 7 WACA 150; R v. Godo (1975), 61 Cr App R.131; Ozigbo v. Police (1976) 1 NMLR 273, Laws and Practice Relating to Evidence in Nigeria by Aguda at p.115 Article 9-05.
— Edozie, JCA. British American v. Ekeoma & Anor. (1994) – CA/E/60/88
Accordingly, in arriving at a conviction in criminal cases, the court is concerned with whether or not there is sufficient credible evidence of probative value and not the number of witnesses called on an issue. See: Commissioner of Police v. Daniel Kwashie (1953) 14 WACA 319. Where a single witness called by the prosecution is neither an accomplice nor a tainted witness, a court of law is entitled to convict mainly on his credible evidence where his testimony did not by law require corroboration. Once the court is satisfied with the cogency, high quality and credibility of the evidence of a witness and accepts it, conviction based on such evidence should not be interfered with unless such evidence by law requires corroboration. So, in the Daniel Kwashie case, the learned magistrate convicted the appellant on the evidence of one witness. On appeal to the High Court, the learned Judge found that although, corroboration was not required by law, a court was generally reluctant to convict on the evidence of a single witness and proceeded to allow the appeal. On further appeal to the West African Court of Appeal, the appellate judge was reversed and his decision was set aside on the ground that there was sufficient evidence before the learned magistrate on which he based his conviction. It was further held that since the learned magistrate believed the witness and there was no imputation that the sole witness was an accomplice or a tainted witness, it was an error to reverse his decision and the conviction was restored.
— Iguh, JSC. Oguonzee v State (1998) – SC.131/97
The Petitioners have tried to argue that the said witnesses are witnesses of this Court. With respect, this argument is misconceived, because the subpoenas in respect of those witnesses were issued upon the request of the Petitioners. The applications for the issuance of the subpoenas were duly filed at the Registry of this Court by the Petitioners’ Counsel and the requisite fees, including filing fees and service fees as assessed were duly paid by them, before this Court approved and issued the subpoenas. Therefore, those witnesses are the Petitioners’ witnesses and not witnesses of this Court. Indeed, the procedure for calling of witnesses by the Court is by summons as stipulated in Paragraph 42(1) of the 1st Schedule to the Electoral Act, 2022. By the provisions of that Paragraph, “the tribunal or court may summon a person as a witness who appears to the tribunal or court to have been concerned in the election.” It is clear from the to provision of that paragraph that it is a person summoned by the Court suo motu in exercise of its powers under Paragraph 42(1) that is a witness of the Court and not person subpoenaed at the request of a party to the case.
— H.S. Tsammani, JCA. Peter Obi & Anor. v INEC & Ors. (2023) – CA/PEPC/03/2023
This court has stated in a legion of cases that where the evidence of an accused person is the only witness of an event, any other evidence given by another person not being an eye witness to that particular event will be hearsay or speculative. I commend the decision of this court in Ahmed v. State (1999) 7 NWLR (Pt. 612) 641 at 675 Belgore, JSC while allowing the appeal stated as follows: “In a situation where only the evidence of the accused person as to the actual stabbing is the only eye-witness account, he is either believed or there is no other evidence to believe.” Also in Bassey v. State (2019) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1103) 160 at page 166, para. F, Abba Aji, JSC while allowing the appeal stated as follows: “the testimony of appellant appears to me very striking and believable since there was no eye witness to the crime except the story of the appellant herein. His evidence seems consistent and correlated.”
Enobong v. The State (2022) – SC/CR/249/2020
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