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DEMEANOUR OF WITNESSES IN THE EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE

Dictum

The trial Judge should take into consideration the demeanour of witnesses in the evaluation of evidence. Demeanour, which is outward or overt behaviour or manner of a witness, is the exclusive domain of the trial Judge. It includes all open habits and mannerisms of the witness. These ooze out from the body of the witness spontaneously and not tutored. Some of such body movements include a spontaneous positive or negative reaction to a question; shouting at a particular moment or the opposite action of a pretentious mum conduct; movement of part of the body, particularly the hands and the sudden change in the face arising either from anger or happiness, the latter resulting in either a smile or laughter. Another is a sudden remorse on the part of the witness, usually exhibited by refusal to look at the Judge or Counsel, or others in the court, but a sudden drop of the face in the witness box. There are quite a number of behaviours in the determination of demeanour which cannot be exhausted. I can stop with the above as the major conducts of witnesses. I should complete the picture by saying that as appellate judges are deprived of watching the demeanour of witnesses, trial Judges owe the administration of justice a big duty to arrive at the correct conclusion. Of course appellate Judges are not completely hopeless or helpless. They can watch the evaluation of demeanour by the Judge in the cold records.

— Niki Tobi, JSC. Buhari v. INEC (2008) – SC 51/2008

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WHO IS A TAINTED WITNESS?

However, and for whatever it is worth, the law is settled that a tainted witness is a person who is either an accomplice or who on the evidence may be regarded as having some purpose of his/her own to serve – see R vs Enahoro (1964) NMLR 65; Ifejirika vs The State (1999) 3 NWLR (pt. 593) 59; Ogunlana vs The State (1995) 5 NWLR (Pt. 395) 266.

— W.S.N. Onnoghen, JSC. Moses v State [2006] – S.C.308/2002

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DEMEANOUR OF WITNESSES VIS-A-VIS DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

An appellate court should not ordinarily substitute its own views of fact for those of the trial court. See: Ebba v. Ogodo (1974) 1 SCNLR 372; Balogun v. Agboola (1974) 1 All NLR (pt. 2) 66. Ascription of probative value to the evidence of witnesses is pre-eminently the business of the trial court which saw and heard the witnesses. An appeal court will not lightly interfere with same unless for compelling reasons. But where evidence has nothing to do with the demeanour of witnesses or relates to interpretation to be placed on documents tendered before the court, an appellate court will be in a good position to act accordingly. See: Ebba v. Ogodo (supra); Ogbechie Onochie (1998) 1 NWLR (Pt.470) 370. An appellate court will not interfere with findings of fact except where wrongly applied to the circumstance of the case or vital documents tendered were jettisoned or conclusion arrived at was patently perverse or wrong, See: Nwosu v. Board of Customs & Excise (1988) 5 NWLR (Pt. 93) 225; Nneji v. Chukwu (1996) 10 NWLR (pt. 378) 265. And where there is conflict in the evidence of witnesses, documentary evidence will serve as a hanger on which the truth shall be resolved. Documents tendered as exhibits are very vital as they do not embark on falsehood like some mortal beings. See: Olujinle v. Adeagbo (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt.75) 238.

— J.A. Fabiyi, JSC. BFI v. Bureau PE (2012) – SC.12/2008

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PROSECUTION HAS DISCRETION TO CALL ITS IMPORTANT WITNESSES

It is trite law that there is no rule which imposes an obligation on the prosecution to call a host of witnesses; all the prosecution need do is to call enough material witnesses to prove its case, and in so doing it has a discretion in the matter. See: Samuel Adaje v. The State (1979) 6-9 SC 18 at 28. Bako Bahor v. Yaburi NA Police (1970) NMLR 107 at 112; E.O. Okonofua & Anor v. The State (1981) 6-7 SC 1 at 18. See also section 179(1) of the Evidence Act. What is more it is the law that if a witness is not called by the prosecution, the defence is at liberty to do so. —

Onu JSC. Oguonzee v State (1998) – SC.131/97

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RELATIONSHIP BY BLOOD CANNOT DISQUALIFY A WITNESS AS BEING A TAINTED WITNESS

The fact that he (PW 4) is a brother to the deceased with but more, cannot in my view make or turn him into a tainted or biased witness. He was not shown to have been an accomplice in the commission of the offence nor that he had any interest or purpose of his own to serve as such witness. Relationship by blood without any more cannot tantamount to a disqualification from being a prosecution witness, and I am not aware of any of our laws which provide as such. Consequently, the evidence of PW 4 in my view requires no corroboration. Ishola v. The State (1978) 9 & 10 SC81; Onafowokan v. The State (1986) 2 NWLR (Pt. 23) 496; Arehia & Anor v. The State (1982) 4SC7 8; Hausa v. The State (1992) 1 NWLR (Pc 219) 600.

— Kutigi, JSC. Oguonzee v State (1998) – SC.131/97

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IT IS WITNESS WHO IS TO EXPLAIN INCONSISTENCY, NOT COUNSEL

A line of decisions of this court, including Onubogu v. The State (1974) 9 SC.1 at p.20; Ateji v. The State (1976) 2 SC 79 at pp. 83 – 84; Boy Muka v. The State (1976) 9-10 SC 193 at p.205, has held that in such a situation there is a failure to prove the criminal allegation beyond reasonable doubt. The person to explain the inconsistency is a witness(es) called by the party in whose case there are inconsistencies or contradictions, and not the counsel from the Bar. Afterall, a bare statement from the Bar has no force of legal evidence. The law is settled that the courts do not accept argument of counsel as substitute for evidence.

— Eko, JSC. Anyanwu v. PDP (2020) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1710) 134

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RELATIONSHIP OF WITNESS TO VICTIM IS IRRELEVANT

Where the evidence of such a witness is otherwise credible and sufficiently of probative value to the charge, the fact of his relationship to the victim or that he has other personal interest of his own to serve is by itself not sufficient to reject his evidence. In law, causes are not lost on the basis that the witness/s is/are members of the same family, association or community. Even where the Court fails or omits to caution or warn itself on evidence that is true in fact and sufficient to ground a charge, the failure or omission would not weaken the validity of such evidence or be fatal to a conviction.

– M.L. Garba JCA. Odogwu v. Vivian (2009) – CA/PH/345/05

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