It is pertinent to note that a signature on a document identifies the document as an act of a particular person and without a signature, the document cannot pass as the act of such unnamed person, and it is therefore totally useless. See N.N.P.C. V. ROVEN SHIPING LTD (2019) 9 NWLR (prt.1676) 67 at 83 and TSALIBAWA V. HABIBA (1991)2 NWLR (prt 174) 461.
— M.L. Shuaibu, JCA. FBN v Benlion (2021) – CA/C/31/2016
SHARE ON
Now, here is a man dragging another person to Court over what at best are mere discrepancies in names when he himself is a victim of some discrepancies in his name on Exhibit P2 without any legal consequences whatsoever. Was he also guilty of forgery by the differences in the spelling of his surname in Exhibits P1 and P2 as admitted by him and confirmed by the Court below? Perhaps not. In my finding, these are things which are bound to occur from time to time in human affairs and so long as no criminal intention is imputed and attributed or attributable to them they remain mere trifles tolerated by the society as mere discrepancies. It amounts to no crime of forgery and or false statement at all merely on account of such mere discrepancies. These are mere discrepancies that should not ipso facto without more invoke and ignite grave allegations capable of disqualifying a candidate in law from aspiring to ‘serve his people’. Curiously though as an aside now and no more considering issue three having concluded my consideration of issue three, as I was reading the appellate briefs of counsel, I came across the name of the learned counsel for the 1st Respondent written and signed as ‘J. I. Odibeli Esq,’ then I saw his NBA Seal in the name of ‘Ibezimako Joseph Odibeli, which translates to ‘I. J. Odibelei’ and not ‘J.I. Odibeli.’
– B.A. Georgewill, JCA. Ganiyu v. Oshoakpemhe & Ors. (2021) – CA/B/12A/2021
In ETOKHANA v. NDIC & ANOR. (2016) LPELR-CA/K/212/2013, “In addition to this, the law is that a document cannot be rejected on the ground that it was not stamped, for, as held in the case of Prince Will Eyo Asuquo & Ors. V. Mrs. Grace Godfrey Eyo & Anor. (2013) LPELR-20199 (CA) per Tur, JCA, ‘the purpose of the requirement of stamping is to ensure that Government does not lose revenue thereby’. Lack of stamping, His Lordship held, does not render the document inadmissible.” Per ADEFOPE-OKOJIE, J.C.A. (P. 41, Paras. A-C)
In resolving this issue, it is necessary to have recourse to section 83(3) of the Evidence Act, 2011, provides thus: “Nothing in this section shall render admissible as evidence any statement made by a person interested at a time when proceedings were pending or anticipated involving a dispute as to any fact which the statement might tend to establish” The import of this section, is that before a document could be rejected as inadmissible, it must not only be made when litigation was pending or anticipated, but the person making it must be interested. It is not in dispute, from the dictates of the letters and their annexure updated membership lists, that exhibits P163 and P163(a) were made and dated the 28 th day of April, 2023 and June 9, 2023 and were submitted and received by the 1 st Respondent on the 3 rd day of May, 2023 and 6 th of July 2023 respectively. Both Exhibits P163(b) and 2R20(x), (which as said by this tribunal are the same, as one is an extract of the other), are not dated nor signed. The position of the law generally speaking, in relation to documents prepared in anticipation of impending litigation, is that such documents are not admissible in evidence, although there are exceptions to this general rule. See the cases of ANISU VS OSAYOMI (2008) 15 NWLR (PT. 110) PAGE 246 AT 275, ABDULLAHI VS HASHIDU (1999) 4 NWLR (PT. 600) 638 AT 645, ANYANWU VS UZOWUAKA (2009) 13 NWLR (PT. 1159) 445 AT 476. The exception to this general rule, excludes documents made in anticipation of litigation, by a person who is not personally interested in the outcome of the litigation. The operative words, as far as the exceptions are concerned, are “persons not personally interested in the outcome of the litigation”. In other words, it relates only to a situation, where such a person relying on such documents, has no personal interest in the matter, as against mere interest in an official capacity. In the instant case, the exceptions do not apply here. This is because the maker of exhibit P163, P163(a) and exhibit 2R20X is the 3rd Respondent, who is a party in this Election petition and clearly has exhibited her interest in the ultimate result of the proceedings for the simple reason that the temptation to protect her interest is clearly overwhelming. See the following cases: ALIYU VS ADEWUYI (1996) 4 NWLR (PT. 442) 284, GBADAMOSI VS KANO TRAVELS LTD (2000) 8 NWLR (PT. 608) 243, GAMJI NIG. COMP. LTD VS NIG. AGIP OIL. COMP. LTD (2018) LPELR- 49215 (CA).
— A. Osadebay, J. APC v INEC & Ors. (EPT/KN/GOV/01/2023, 20th Day of September, 2023)
Timmins v. Moreland Street Property Co. Ltd. (1958) Ch. 110 which shows the relaxation of the earlier rules and that there need not be a specific or express reference from one document to the other document in order to constitute a memorandum required under the Statute of Frauds as is sufficient if by necessary implication there should be reference from one to the other. Jenkins L.J., (as he then was), said at page 130: “The rule has no doubt been considerably relaxed since Peirce v. Corf LR. 9 QB. 210 was decided in 1874, but I think it is still indispensably necessary, in order to justify the reading of documents together for this purpose, that there should be a document signed by the party to be charged, which, while not containing in itself all the necessary ingredients of the required memorandum, does contain some reference, express or implied, to some other document or transaction. Where any such reference can be spelt out of a document so signed, then parol evidence may be given to identify the other document referred to, or, as the case may be, to explain the other transaction, and to identify any document relating to it. If by this process a document is brought to light which contains in writing all the terms of the bargain so far as not contained in the document signed by the party to be charged, then the two documents can be read together so as to constitute a sufficient memorandum for the purpose of Section 40.”
I have seen in recent times counsel forcing into cases the principles of fair hearing even when they are so distant from the case. The principles of fair hearing will not be invoked in favour of a party where the trial Judge correctly expunges an exhibit earlier admitted. It is only when the document is wrongly or wrongfully expunged from the record that a party can be heard to canvass to an appellate court that he was denied fair hearing. – Niki Tobi, JSC. Brossette v. Ilemobola (2007)
The simple and straightforward answer to this argument is that the issue of dumping of documents on court, which expression in any case suggests that the documents so dumped are already in evidence before the court, only goes to the weight to be attached to the documents by the court. On this reasoning, this ground of the objection is rejected and overruled.
— H.S. Tsammani, JCA. Atiku v PDP (CA/PEPC/05/2023, 6th of September, 2023)
Click the icons to like, follow, and join JPoetry