Having regard to the provisions of section 132(1) of the Evidence Act, oral evidence cannot be admitted to contradict, alter, add to or vary a contract or document unless such evidence falls within any of the matters that may be proved by such oral evidence by virtue of the provisos thereto. The provisos only permit evidence which will not be inconsistent with the terms of the relevant contract or document.
– Uwaifo JSC. Fortune v. Pegasus (2004)
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The argument of the claimants that to adopt UTAS will promote inefficiency and discrimination in the public service of Nigeria has not been shown by any evidence other than the submission of the learned senior counsel to the claimants. No matter how brilliantly crafted an address of counsel is, it neither constitutes, nor can it take the place of evidence. See APC v. Sheriff & ors [2023] LPELR-59953(SC). And a a bare statement from the Bar by a counsel has no force of legal evidence. See Maduabuchi Onwuta v. The State of Lagos [2022] LPELR-57962(SC).
— B.B. Kanyip, J. FG v. ASUU (2023) – NICN/ABJ/270/2022
And, apart from this, there is a long line of authorities establishing that competency is not a matter of age but of understanding and that if a child understands the nature of an oath, the provisions in question are completely out of place. See Reg. v. Perkins (1840) 9 C. & P. 395 (or 173 E.R.884); also R. v. Michael Moscovitch (1924) 18 CAR 37. – Coker JSC. Okoye v. State (1972)
The general rule is that where the parties have embodied the terms of their contract in a written document, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to add to, vary, subtract from or contradict the terms of the written instrument.
– Adio, JSC. UBN v. Ozigi (1994)
By Section 83(3) of the Evidence Act 2011, documents are inadmissible in Court where the maker is an interested person and had made the documents when the proceedings are pending or anticipated.
– Yahaya, JCA. Petroleum Resources v. SPDC (2021)
It is trite that where evidence tendered by a party to any proceedings was not challenged or put in issue by the other party who had the opportunity to do so, it is always open to the court seised of the matter to act on such unchallenged evidence before it. See Isaac Omoregbe V Daniel Lawani (1980) 3-4 S.C. 108 at 117; Odulaja V Haddad (1973) 11 S.C. 357; Nigerian Maritime Services Ltd. V Alhaji Bello Afolabi (1978) 2 S.C. 79 at 81; Adel Boshali V Allied Commercial Exporters Ltd. (1961) All NLR 917; (1961) 2 SCNLR 322.
— Iguh, JSC. Yesufu v. Kupper Intl. (1996) – SC.302/1989
It is correct, as submitted, that Section 126(a)-(d) of the Evidence Act, 2011 provides inter alia that “oral evidence must, in all cases whatever, be direct”. The rationale for the rule can be said to be: (1) The unreliability of the original maker of the statement who is not in Court and not cross-examined; (2) The depreciation of the truth arising from repetition; (3) Opportunities for fraud; (4) The tendency of such evidence to lead to prolonged inquiries and proceedings; (5) Hearsay evidence tends to encourage the substitution of weaker evidence for stronger evidence.
— J.H. Sankey, JCA. Brila Energy Ltd. v. FRN (2018) – CA/L/658CA/2017
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