The earlier position of this Court is that fundamental rights accrue to citizens individually and by lumping the applications together, the Respondents rendered their application incompetent.
— J.O.K. Oyewole, JCA. Udo v Robson (2018) – CA/C/302/2013
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A community reading of Section 46 of the 1999 Constitution and Order 1(2) of the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules would reveal undisputedly that both the Federal High Court and the High Court of a State have concurrent jurisdiction on matters of breach or likely breach of any of the fundamental rights enshrined in Chapter IV of the Constitution. This has been the consistent position of this Court upheld in an avalanche of cases, some of which are Grace Jack v. University of Agriculture, Makurdi (2004) 17 NSCQR 90 at 100; (2004) 5 NWLR (Pt. 865) 208; Olutola v. University of Ilorin (2004) 18 NWLR (Pt. 905) 416, Ogugu v. The State (1994) 9 NWLR (Pt. 366) 1.
– J.I. Okoro JSC. Ihim v. Maduagwu (2021)
The Respondent admitted that he intended to escape when he was been beaten by the police. Investigation by the police does not include beating. Therefore if the respondent intended to escape from such brutality which constituted violation of his fundamental right, he committed no wrong.
— P.A. Galinje, JSC. State v Masiga (2017) – SC
It is also settled law that for an action to be properly brought under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009, (as was done by the Applicants at the trial Court), it must relate to infringement of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Chapter IV of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). See: UNIVERSITY OF ILORIN and ORS v. IDOWU OLUWADARE (2006) 14 NWLR (Pt.100) 751; ACHEBE v. NWOSU (2003) 7 NWLR (Pt. 818) 103; ADEYANJU v. WAEC (2002) 13 NWLR (Pt.785) 479; and DIRECTOR, SSS v. AGBAKOBA (1999) 3 NWLR (Pt. 595) 314. In other words, for an action to be cognizable under the fundamental rights procedure, the infringement of any of the rights under Chapter IV of CFRN, 1999 must be the primary wrong forming the basis of the claim.
— A.B. Mohammed, JCA. ITDRLI v NIMC (2021) – CA/IB/291/2020
It is also settled law that for a matter to be instituted under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979 to enforce the constitutionally guaranteed rights under Chapter IV of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended, the enforcement of such right(s) must be the main/substantive claim before the Court – not ancillary.
— Onnoghen, CJN. Nwachukwu v Nwachukwu (2018) – SC.601/2013
Anyone whose “Chapter IV Rights” have been, are being or likely to be contravened has unfettered access to a High Court for redress “High Court” is defined in Section 46(3) of the 1999 Constitution (the 1979) Constitution had the same Provisions to mean “the Federal High Court” or “the High Court of a State”.
– Ngwuta JSC. Ihim v. Maduagwu (2021)
Para. 24: “Self-determination on its own denotes the legal right of a people to decide their own destiny in the international order. Under the United Nations Charter and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, self-determination is protected as a right of “all peoples.” It refers to the rights of people indigenous to an area to determine their destiny. Indigenous peoples’ rights are collective rights. In other words, they are vested in indigenous persons that organize themselves as peoples. With the adoption of the UN Declaration on the right of indigenous people, the international community clearly affirms that indigenous peoples require recognition of their collective rights as peoples to enable them to enjoy human rights.”
— Osaghae v Nigeria (2017) – ECW/CCJ/JUD/03/17
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