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WHERE OFFICER HOLDS HIS OFFICE “AT PLEASURE”

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Where an officer holds his office “at pleasure,” like was the case in Brown v. Dagenham Urban District Council (1929) 1 K.B. 737 at p.742 he can be dismissed at will in complete disregard of any purported contract whether verbal, or written or even under seal, because such contract will be incompatible with his status and therefore destitute of legal value. Thus Servants of the Crown, civil as well as military, except in special cases, where it is otherwise provided by law, hold their office only during the pleasure of the Crown and can be dismissed at any time in spite of a contract for a period of Service:- Dunn v. Reginam (1896)1 Q.B. 116. In fact the employing authority will lack the power, the vires to “enter into a contract” inconsistent with the wording of the Statute which gave it power in the public interest to remove the Servant at its pleasure:- Nicholson v. Whitstable Urban District Council (1925) 89 J. P. Newsp 480 at p.508. An officer holding his office at pleasure has also no right to be heard before he is removed because there need not be anything against him to warrant his removal. If there is nothing against him, no reason need be given for there is nothing to defend since he held his office durante bene placito: See Reg v. Dartington School Governors (1844) 6 Q.B.682.

— A. Oputa, JSC. Olaniyan & Ors. v. University of Lagos (1985) – SC.53/1985

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NO EMPLOYMENT CAN BE INFERRED WITHOUT A LETTER OF EMPLOYMENT PRODUCED

In the case of Organ and Ors. v. Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas Ltd., and Anor (2013) LPELR – 20942 (SC), the Supreme Court emphatically held as follows: “The letter of employment is the bedrock on which any of the appellants can lay claim to being employees of the respondent and without the production of such a document, no employment can be inferred. The Employees’ Handbook issued by 1st Respondent is not a substitute for the letter of employment”.

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TWO INGREDIENTS TO ESTABLISH STATUTORY FLAVOUR CONTRACT

However, it should not be mistaken that once a company, corporation or government agency is set up by statute, all the employees thereof ipso facto became children of statute to the extent that their individual agreement of service with the employer automatically becomes contract with statutory flavour. Two of the vital ingredients that must coexist before a contract of employment may be said to import statutory flavour includes the following:- 1. The employer must be a body set up by statute. 2. The stabilizing statute must make express provision regulating the employment of the staff of the category of the employee concerned especially in matters of discipline. See in this regard Idoniboye-Obu v NNPC (2003) FWLR (Pt.146) 959 at 992; Salami v New Nigerian Newspaper Ltd (1999) 13 NWLR (Pt. 634) pg 315; CBN v Archibong (2001) FWLR (Pt.58) 1032 at 1056; Udemah v Nigerian Civil Corporation (1991) 13 NWLR (Pt.180) 477; Fakuade v O.A.U Complex Management Board (1993) 5 NWLR (Pt.291) 47.

— M.U. Peter-Odili, JSC. Kwara Judicial Commission v Tolani (2019) – SC.63/2010

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WORKER AND EMPLOYEE UNDER THE LABOUR ACT

As can be seen, the definition of worker under section 91(1) is restrictive given the persons exempted in terms of paragraphs (a) to (f) of the definition. The point is that section 91(1) defines a worker only for the purposes of the Labour Act; as such, not all employees are workers for purposes of the Labour Act. The category of persons under paragraphs (a) to (f) of the definition of a worker may thus be employees but not workers for purposes of the Labour Act. Section 91(1) of the Labour Act defines a worker by reference to an employer i.e. as one who entered into or works under a contract with an employer. So, who is an employer? The same section 91(1) defines an “employer” to mean “any person who has entered into a contract of employment to employ any other person as a worker either for himself or for the service of any other person, and includes the agent, manager or factor of the first-mentioned person and the personal representatives of a deceased employer”. The common denominator in the definition of a worker and an employer is the contract of employment. A “contract of employment” is thus defined by same section 91(1) to mean “any agreement, whether oral or written, express or implied, whereby one person agrees to employ another as a worker and that other personagrees to serve the employer as a worker”.

— B.B. Kanyip, J. Olatunji v UBER (2018) – NICN/LA/546/2017

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AN EMPLOYEE IS ENTITLED TO KNOW THE REASON FOR HIS DISMISSAL

The ILO Termination of Employment Convention 1982 (No 158) is yet to be ratified by Nigeria. It is however evidence of international labour standards, and international best practice in termination of employment which this Court is obligated to apply; and its recommendations that an employee is entitled to be informed of the reason for the termination of his employment. Section 7 (6) of the National Industrial Court Act 2006 empowers the Court to have due regard to good or international best practices in labour or industrial relations, and what amounts to good or international best practices in labour is a question of fact. Section 254C of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) has empowered this Court to determine whether the Claimant was terminated for a valid reason or for no reason. It is not globally acceptable in industrial relations and practice to terminate the employee’s employment without adducing any reason for doing so, see Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria v Schlumberger Anadrill Nig Ltd [2008] 11 NLLR (Pt 29) 164, Aloysius v Diamond Bank Plc [2015] 58 NLLR 52, Uzo Ejekwumadu v Blue Arrow TSW Ltd (unreported) Suit No: NICN/LA/242/2016 judgement delivered March 18, 2021. It is contrary to international labour standards and international best practices for an employer to terminate the employment of its employee without any reason or justifiable reason that is connected with the performance of the employee’s work. This is also contrary to the International Labour Organisation (ILO) decent work agenda with the four strategic objectives of the promotion of rights at work, employment, social protection, and social dialogue.

— O.A. Obaseki-Osaghae, J. Ejiro Peter Amratefa v. Access Bank (NICN/ABJ/106/2022, November 2, 2023)

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EMPLOYMENT: THERE WILL BE AN ACTION FOR REINSTATEMENT WHERE THERE IS UNILATERAL REPUDIATION

In Vitarelli v. Seaton 359 US. 335, the Supreme Court of the United States of America granted a declaration in the case of a civil servant even in a case involving State Security, because the proper procedure was not adopted. An analysis of the decided cases leads to the conclusions that an action for reinstatement is only possible where there is a unilateral repudiation of the contract of service by the Master (the Employer) which has not been accepted by the (employee) Servant. See Denmark Productions Ltd. v. Bascobol Productions Ltd. (1961) 3 All E.R. 583. In that situation the contract is still in existence having not been discharged by the acceptance of the repudiation. It is therefore not the same as where the contract has been discharged and the dismissed employee is entitled only to damages.

— A.G. Karibe-Whyte, JSC. Olaniyan & Ors. v. University of Lagos (1985) – SC.53/1985

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TERMINATION OF SERVICE – MASTER & SERVANT

The law regarding master and servant is not in doubt. There is also no doubt that the contract of master and servant is subject to both statutory and common law rules. By and large, the master can terminate the contract with his servant at any time and for any reason or for no reason at all. But if he does so in a manner not warranted by the particular contract under review, he must pay damages for breach.

— A. Oputa, JSC. Olaniyan & Ors. v. University of Lagos (1985) – SC.53/1985

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