WHAT MAKES A DECISION PERVERSE

COURT OF COORDINATE JURISDICTION CANNOT SET ASIDE ANOTHER COORDINATE COURT DECISION

It needs be reiterated that a Court after the dismissal of a suit before it lacks the competence to delve into the matter any longer. The fact that the Court is being presided over by another judge of the same jurisdiction as the judge that dismissed Suit No. HOY/7/97 does not make any difference. The Court lacks the jurisdiction to re-phrase the judgment, of a Court of co-ordinate and competent jurisdiction.

– M. Peter-Odili JSC. Adegbanke v. Ojelabi (2021)

WHEN THE SUPREME COURT WILL DEPART FROM HIS EARLIER DECISION

As departure from a decision of a court or overruling a decision of a court is a very major judicial exercise, which if done often will ruin or jeopardise the stable rules of judicial precedent, and particularly the rules of stare decisis, courts of law, even the highest court of the land, will not yield to the invitation of counsel just for the asking, in the sense that the case sought to be overruled is not in favour of the party. In asking for a case to be overruled, the party should take into account or consideration, the totality of the decision, meaning that the ratio decidendi must be considered along with the facts of the case. The party should also make a distinction, if any, in the case between a ratio decidendi and an obiter dictum. If a party’s worry is an obiter dictum, a court of law will not depart from its earlier judgment or overrule it because obiter does not ipso facto have or possess any force in the judgment. And when I say this I am not ignorant of the law that obiter dictum of this Court followed by this Court in certain instances could ripen into a ratio decidendi by frequent adoption.

— Niki Tobi, JSC. Buhari v. INEC (2008) – SC 51/2008

COURT MUST CONFINE ITS DECISION TO THE PARTIES AND CLAIMS

The law is settled that a Court can only exercise its jurisdiction or power over parties before it and strictly in respect of the case between them upon issues raised and reliefs sought. It cannot do so concerning, and to the extent it may affect persons who are not parties before it and must resist the temptation to make pronouncement to that end. The Court must confine its decision to the parties and their claims. See Ojogbue v Nnubia (1972) 1 ALL NLR (Pt.2) 226; Ochonma v Unosi (1965) NMLR 321; Labide v Regd. Trustee Cherubim & Seraphim (2003) FWLR (Pt. 142) 89 at 105 Paragraphs G-H; Intercontractors (Nig) Ltd v UAC of (Nig) Ltd (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt. 76) 303; Green v Green (1987) NWLR (Pt 61) 481.

— P.A. Galumje, JSC. Huebner v Aeronautical Ind. Eng. (2017) – SC.198/2006

DELIBERATE DECISION TAKING BY COUNSEL FOR CLIENT IS BINDING

Supreme Court made this very clear in Akanbi v Alao (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt.108) 143, Per Eso JSC as follows: – “I think it would be extending Ibodo v Enarofia case beyond reason if every considered or assumed considered professional decision of a counsel which has gone wrong should qualify as ground of appeal. We did say once, and I am still of the firm view that the conduct of a case lies wholly with counsel. The rule really should be “caveat client”. If you choose a counsel, you should permit him, once seised of the case to conduct the case in the manner of his professional ability. Indeed that is part of the independence of the Bar. If there is lapse in his office, his clerk forgetting to file some papers, he forgetting the date of hearing or such like procedural errors, of course the client should not be made to suffer. If however, he takes a deliberate decision and loses thereby, then, it is his privilege to lose and that will constitute a right for the client for utilization as a ground of appeal. For, if it were not so, the profession would be in jeopardy”.