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DELIBERATE DECISION TAKING BY COUNSEL FOR CLIENT IS BINDING

Dictum

Supreme Court made this very clear in Akanbi v Alao (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt.108) 143, Per Eso JSC as follows: – “I think it would be extending Ibodo v Enarofia case beyond reason if every considered or assumed considered professional decision of a counsel which has gone wrong should qualify as ground of appeal. We did say once, and I am still of the firm view that the conduct of a case lies wholly with counsel. The rule really should be “caveat client”. If you choose a counsel, you should permit him, once seised of the case to conduct the case in the manner of his professional ability. Indeed that is part of the independence of the Bar. If there is lapse in his office, his clerk forgetting to file some papers, he forgetting the date of hearing or such like procedural errors, of course the client should not be made to suffer. If however, he takes a deliberate decision and loses thereby, then, it is his privilege to lose and that will constitute a right for the client for utilization as a ground of appeal. For, if it were not so, the profession would be in jeopardy”.

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FINDING NOT APPEALED IS BINDING ON PARTY

It is settled law, however, that a finding of a court or tribunal not appealed against is deemed accepted by the party against whom the finding was made in the instant case, the appellants. However, if the appellants had sought and obtained the leave of the courts to appeal against the findings of facts or mixed law and facts or to raise fresh issues not raised in the court below, it would have been sufficient to sustain ground 1 of the grounds of appeal. Since no such leave was sought and obtained the affected ground is doomed to be struck out for being incompetent.

– WS Onnoghen, JSC. Calabar CC v. Ekpo (2008)

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A COURT OF RECORDS HAS THE INHERENT POWERS TO SET ASIDE ITS DECISION WHERE

The Supreme Court, and any other superior court of record, possesses inherent power to set aside its judgment in appropriate cases. Such circumstances include: a. When the judgment is obtained by fraud or deceit b. When the judgment is a nullity and a person affected by the order is entitled ex debito justitiae to have it set aside. c. When the court was misled into giving judgment under the mistaken belief that the parties had consented to it. d. Where judgment was given in the absence of jurisdiction. e. Where the procedure adopted was such as to deprive the decision or judgment of the character of a legitimate adjudication. See: Adegoke Motors Ltd. v. Adesanya (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt.109) 250; A.D.H. Ltd. v. Amalgamated Trustees Ltd, (2007) ALL FWLR (Pt.392) 1781 @ 1840 C – F; Alao v. A.C.B. Ltd. (2000) FWLR (Pt. 11) 1858; (2000) 9 NWLR (Pt.672) 264; Igwe v. Kalu (2002) 14 NWLR (Pt.787) 435; Madukolu v. Nkemdilim (1962) SCNLR 341; Obimonure v. Erinosho (1966) All NLR 245.

— K.M.O. Kekere-Ekun JSC. Citec v. Francis (SC.116/2011, 21 February 2014)

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DECISION OF A COURT OF LAW OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION IS TO BE OBEYED

The true position of the law is that an order of a court whether it is to preserve the status quo or an executory order as such as the instant interim order to restore the name of the 1st respondent in the list of candidates for the aforesaid election clearly being an interim order with a mandatory character cannot be determined simply by looking at the form of the application or cause (from which it is generated) in order conclusively to say whether it is final or interlocutory but has further to be scrutinized from the view point of its intrinsic nature that is to say the nature of the order itself vis-a-vis the rights of the parties in the suit. It is furthermore my view that whether or not the instant order is final or interlocutory does not affect it being all the same a decision of a court of competent jurisdiction to be obeyed.

— C.M. Chukwuma-Eneh, JSC. Kubor v. Dickson (2012) – SC.369/2012

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APPELLATE COURT IS CONCERNED ABOUT THE RIGHTNESS OF A DECISION, NOT REASONS

This makes one remind himself that what an appellate Court is concerned with should at all times be the rightness or wrongness of the decision and not necessarily the reasons for the conclusion or decision. This is so because, once the decision is right it would be upheld at the higher level irrespective of the fact that a wrong reason was given for that decision. See Dickson Arisa v The State (1988) 7 SCNJ 760 at 84; Akpene v Barclays Bank (1977) 1 SC 57; Osakwe v Governor of Imo State (1991) 5 NWLR (Pt.191) 318 at 333-334; Anekwe v Nweke (2014) All FWLR (Pt.739) 1154 at 1175; Amadi v Nwosu (1992) 5 NWLR (Pt. 241) 275;Nitel Ltd v Ikpi (2007) 8 NWLR (Pt.1035) 96 at 109 -110.

— M.U. Peter-Odili, JSC. MTN v. Corporate (2019) – SC.674/2014

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WHAT IS A DECISION ON MERIT?

TOMTEC NIGERIA LIMITED VS FEDERAL HOUSING AUTHORITY (2009) 12 SCNJ 190 AT 201 -202 where this Court held “A decision on merit is one rendered after argument and investigation and a determination as to which of the parties is in the right as distinguished from a judgment or decision rendered upon some preliminary or formal part or by default and without trial”.

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AN APPELLATE COURT IS ONLY INTERESTED IN THE CORRECTNESS OF THE DECISION, NOT THE REASON BY WHICH IT WAS REACHED

It is apposite to state here that it has been established by sufficient authority that an appellate Court is only interested in the correctness of a judgment/ruling or conclusion reached and not with the correctness of the reason by which the Court arrived at its decision, unless it has occasioned a miscarriage of justice, Taiwo and Ors v Sowemimo [1982] 5 SC 60, 74-75; Ibuluya v Dikibo [2011] 3 WRN 1, 23; Agbeje v Ajibola [2002] 2 NWLR (pt. 750) 127; Hillary Farms Ltd. v MV Mahtra[2007] 14 NWLR (pt. 1054) 210.

— C.C. Nweze, JSC. Uzoho v NCP (SC.141/2007, Friday, May 13, 2022)

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