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THE SUPREME COURT IS BOUND BY PRECEDENT

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This Court is bound by precedent when the facts of the previous decisions have similar material facts with the case before the Court. See DALHATU v. TURAKI (2003) 15 NWLR Pt. 843 Pg. 310, NOBIS-ELENDU v. INEC & ORS (2015) LPELR-25127 (SC), DR. UMAR ARDO V. ADMIRAL MURTALA NYAKO & ORS (2014) LPELR-22878 (SC),NIGERIA AGIP OIL COMPANY LTD v. CHIEF GIFT NKWEKE (2016) LPELR 26060 (SC) and most importantly, the pronouncement of MUHAMMAD, JSC in the case of NWABUEZE v. THE PEOPLE OF LAGOS STATE (2018) LPELR-44113 (SC) where his Lordship held thus: “It is therefore settled that a Court … is bound by its own or the ratio decidendi of a higher Court in an earlier case, if the issues of fact and the legislation the Court considers subsequently are same or similar … where the lower Court, as in the instant case, holds itself bound by the decision… on the same or similar facts, Appellant’s grudge against the lower Court’s decision cannot therefore, be taken seriously…”

— H.M. Ogunwumiju, JSC. UBA v Triedent Consulting Ltd. (SC.CV/405/2013, July 07, 2023)

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PREREQUISITE FOR CITING A CASE AS AN AUTHORITY

“The law is trite that a case is only an authority for what it decides, and nothing more. Thus, a case cited as an authority must be considered and utilized in light of its own peculiar facts and circumstances.”

PER J.H. Sankey, J.C.A. Gonimi v. Surundi (2022) – CA/G/7/2022

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THE CASE OF UCHE NWOSU DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS

So, for the decision of this Court in Uche Nwosu’s case to apply mutatis mutandis, the fourth Respondent, who the Appellant contends has offended the law, would need to have contested two Primary Elections, emerged winners of both, and had his name forwarded by both Parties as their respective candidates for the 2023 General Election. Did he purchase a second nomination form to warrant stepping into the Appellant’s shoes in Uche Nwosu V. APP (supra), and thus, invite the same pronouncement thereat on himself? No; the fourth Respondent was not required to buy any nomination form. He was the second Respondent [APC]’s candidate at the election into the Office of Senator representing the Borno Central Senatorial District. But before the election could hold, he was nominated as the third Respondent’s associate, who is to occupy the office of Vice-President. The fourth Respondent did not buy a nomination form for the said office, and most importantly, did not contest any primary election in order to emerge as APC’s Vice-Presidential candidate. Given these acute dissimilarities, can the facts of the two cases be the same? Can such a scenario come within the parameters of Section 35 of the said Act? I think not; this cannot be the intention of the lawmaker as that will lead to absurdity. It is the law that statutes should be given their natural meaning, except to do so will lead to absurdity Toriola V. Williams (1982) 7 SC 27/46, Nonye V. Anyichie (2005) 2 NWLR (Pt. 910) 623, (2005) 1 SCNJ 306 at 316.

— A.A. Augie, JSC. PDP v INEC (2023) – SC/CV/501/2023

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LOWER COURT IS BOUND BY THE DECISION OF HIGHER COURTS

Dalhatu Vs Turaki & Ors. (2003) LPELR – 917(SC) @ 41 – 43 C – F, thus: “The doctrine of Judicial precedent otherwise known as stare decisis is not alien to our Jurisprudence. It is a well settled principle of Judicial policy which must be strictly adhered to by all lower courts. While such lower courts may depart from their own decisions reached per incuriam, they cannot refuse to be bound by decisions of higher courts even if those decisions were reached per incuriam. The implication is that a lower court is bound by the decision of a higher court even where that decision was given erroneously.”

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THE RULE AND THE PRINCIPLE – STARE DECISIS

Per Oputa, JSC. in Chief Gani Fawehinmi v Nigerian Bar Association & ors. (No.2) (1989) 2 N.W.L.R. (Pt.105) 558 at page 650. “Our law is the law of the practitioner rather than the law of the philosopher. Decisions have drawn their inspiration and their strength from the very facts which framed the issues for decision. Once made, these decisions control future judgments of the Courts in like or similar cases. The facts of two cases must either be the same or at least similar before the decision in the earlier case can be used in a later case, and even there, merely as a guide – What the earlier decision establishes is only a principle, not a rule. Rules operate in an all or nothing dimension. Principles do not. They merely incline decisions one way or the other. They form a principium or a starting point. Where one ultimately lands from that starting point will largely depend on the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case in hand.”

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STARE DECISIS ON SIMILAR FACTS

It is settled that Courts, including this Court are bound by the earlier decisions of the apex Court on same or similar facts determined on the basis of same or similar legislations in their subsequent determination of cases in respect of same or similar facts and on the basis of same or similar legislations. See ATOLAGBE & ANOR V. AWUNI & ORS (1997) LPELR – 593 (SC) and DR. UMAR V. ADMIRAL MURTALA NYAKO & ORS (2014) LPELR – 22878 (SC).

– M.D. Muhammad JSC. Odey v. Alaga (2021) – SC.9/2021

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THERE ARE TIMES WHEN DEPARTURE FROM PRECEDENT IS IN THE INTEREST OF THE LAW

✓ In Bucknor Maclean v. Inlaks Limited (1980) 8-11 S.C. 1, the decisions overruled were clearly shown to become vehicles of injustice and this Court could not allow such state of affairs to continue and my late learned brother, Idigbe, J.S.C. fully gave expression to this when reading the lead judgment at page 25, he said. “I share the view of Lord Morris in Conway v. Rimmer that “though precedent is an indispensable foundation on which to decide what is the law, there may be times when a departure from precedent is in the interest of justice and the proper development of the law.” . . . I see no more justification for perpetuating recent error than for retaining any uncorrected error in much older decisions of this court.”

✓ In Golak Nath v. State of Punjab Air (1967) S.C. 1643, Subba R. CJ. (on behalf of himself, Shah, Sikri, Shelat and Vaidialingam, JJ. said at page 1670: “A final appeal is made to us that we shall not take a different view as the decision in Sankari Prasads case (1952) SCR 89-AIR 1951 S.C. 458 held the field for many years. While ordinarily this court will be reluctant to reverse its previous decisions, it is its duty in the constitutional field to correct itself as early for otherwise the future progress of the country and the happiness of the people will be at stake. As we are convinced that the decision in Sankari Prasad’s case 1952 SCR 89-(AIR 1951 S.C. 458) is wrong it is pre-eminently a typical case where the court should overrule it.

✓ Instances of this are to be found in the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. In Planny v. Ferguson (1896) 163 V.S. 537, the Court, in a segregation case, held that once, in public facilities accommodation was separate but equal it was constitutional to compel segregation of races in the use thereof. In Brown v. Topeka (1954) 347 V.S. 483, that is sixty years later, the court gave a decision in direct opposition to its view in Planny v. Ferguson. Times had changed and the court’s view was that attitude must change with them.

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