It is settled that Courts, including this Court are bound by the earlier decisions of the apex Court on same or similar facts determined on the basis of same or similar legislations in their subsequent determination of cases in respect of same or similar facts and on the basis of same or similar legislations. See ATOLAGBE & ANOR V. AWUNI & ORS (1997) LPELR – 593 (SC) and DR. UMAR V. ADMIRAL MURTALA NYAKO & ORS (2014) LPELR – 22878 (SC).
– M.D. Muhammad JSC. Odey v. Alaga (2021) – SC.9/2021
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Where the reliance on a precedent case is challenged in a proceedings on the basis that the facts are distinguishable from those of the present case, the court must determine if the facts of the two cases are the same or not. It cannot gloss over that issue and proceed to simply rely on the precedent case on the ground only that the law applied in that case is the same law that is sought to be invoked or applied in the precedent case. A law can be applied in various factual situations. So upon a challenge that the factual situation in which a law was applied in a previous case is different from the factual situation in a present case and therefore cannot apply to it, it becomes necessary to determine the factual basis for the application of that law in the precedent case so as to determine if the precedent case applies to the present case. If the factual basis of the application of the law in the precedent case is different from those in the present case, then the precedent is successfully distinguished from the present case and cannot apply to it on the relevant point.
— Emmanuel Akomaye Agim, JSC. Lagos State Govt. v. Abdul Kareem (2022) – SC.910/2016
This appeal illustrates the fundamental importance of the principle of stare decisis in our jurisprudence. “Stare decisis” is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition, at Page 1443 thus: “to stand by things decided. The doctrine of precedent under which it is necessary for a Court to follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again in litigation. ….. “The rule of adherence to judicial precedent finds its expression in the doctrine of stare decisis. The doctrine is simply that, when a point or principle of law has been once officially decided or settled by the ruling of a competent Court in a case in which it is directly and necessarily involved, it will no longer be considered as open to examination or to a new ruling by the same tribunal, or by those which are bound to follow its adjudication, unless it be for urgent reasons and in exceptional cases. ….” It is settled law that for the doctrine to apply, the facts of the two cases must be the same or similar. The adherence to precedent provides for certainty of the law. See: Adegoke Motors Ltd. v. Adesanya (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 109) 250; Mailantarki v. Tongo (2017) 5 – 6 SC (Pt. II) 132; University of Lagos v. Olaniyan (1985) LPELR – 3419 (SC) @ 26 C – F.
— K.M.O. Kekere-Ekun, JSC. State v. Andrew Yanga (SC.712/2018, 15 Jan 2021)
As far back as 1898 the House of Lords finally agreed to be bound, and decided that it was bound, by its own decisions (see London Street Tramways v. London County Council (1898) A.C. 375). This has been the position for almost a century until 1966 when it had to qualify its stand by the following statement made by Lord Gardner, L.C. on behalf of the House (i.e. on behalf of himself and The Lords of Appeal in Ordinary): “Their Lordships regard the use of precedent as an indispensable foundation upon which to decide what is the law and its application to individual cases. It provides at least some degree of certainty upon which individuals can rely in the conduct of their affairs, as well as a basis for orderly development of legal rules. Their Lordship nevertheless recognise that too rigid adherence to precedent may lead to injustice in a particular case and also unduly restrict the proper development of the law. They propose therefore to modify their present practice and, while treating former decisions of this House as normally binding, to depart from a previous decision when it appears right to do so. In this connection they will bear in mind the danger of disturbing retrospectively the basis on which contracts, settlements of property and fiscal arrangements have been entered into and also the special need for certainty as to the criminal law. . .” see (1966) AIIE.R. 77.
The principles laid down in the cases cited by the lower Court will be applicable to the instant case only where the accented facts of this matter are the same as the facts that induced the decision in those cases, due regard being had to the statutes and the Rules of Court governing the different Courts. Also, since, facts are the arrowhead and fountainhead of the law, the decision in a case is intricately related to the facts that induced that decision.
– PER J.H. Sankey, J.C.A. Gonimi v. Surundi (2022) – CA/G/7/2022
It is trite law that cases are authorities for what they decide such, that it is not helpful to flog authorities where the facts and circumstances of cases are different. See PDP VS INEC (2018) LPELR-44373 (SC) AND OLLEY VS TUNJI (2015) 10 NWLR (PT. 1362) 374.
— A. Osadebay, J. APC v INEC & Ors. (EPT/KN/GOV/01/2023, 20th Day of September, 2023)
What is the argument on the other side? Only this: that no case has been found in which it has been done before. That argument does not appeal to me in the least. If we never do anything which has not been done before, we shall never get anywhere. The law will stand still whilst the rest of the world goes on: and that will be bad for both. – Packer v Packer [1954] P 15 at 22
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