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TENANCY AT WILL COMMENCES AFTER YEARLY TENANCY IF NO RENEWAL

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I hold the considered view that from the moment a year’s rent became due and payable by the respondent but remained unpaid, the yearly tenancy, if any, created by the conduct of the parties thereto came to an end by effluxion of time and the respondent thereby became a tenant at will of the 1st appellant by continuing in possession of the property. In law we describe the respondent at that stage as holding over the property and in that capacity it became a tenant at will.

– Onnoghen JSC. Odutola v. Papersack (2007)

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landlord & tenant

TENANCY AT SUFFERANCE & STATUTORY TENANCY

A tenant who enters upon premises by reason of a contract with the landlord is a contractual tenant. Such a tenant holds an estate which is subject to the terms and conditions of the grant. Once that tenancy comes to an end by effluxion of time or otherwise and the tenant holds over without the will or agreement of the landlord, he becomes a tenant-at-sufferance. This is strictly a common law concept. But sometimes there is a statute which gives security of tenure to such a tenant after his contractual tenancy has expired. Where such a statute exists he now holds the premises no longer as a contractual tenant because there no longer exists a contract between him and the landlord. But he nonetheless retains possession by virtue of the provisions of the statute and is entitled to all the benefits and is subject to all the terms and conditions of the original tenancy.

– Nnaemeka-Agu, JSC. Petroleum v. Owodunni (1991)

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TENANT HAS EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION OF LAND GIVEN TO HIM BY A FAMILY

I find myself unable to accept that a tenant given a parcel of land and put in possession by a family to farm has no exclusive possession of the land for the duration of his grant. The idea of giving out farmland in parcels and putting allottees or tenants in possession of their respect parcels is to give them exclusive possession to their respective parcels of land notwithstanding any easement that may be available. Without revocation of the grant, the use to which the land was put by consent, i.e. farming, cannot be disturbed without attracting liability in damages for trespass. The action filed by the plaintiffs/respondents by itself is eloquent testimony to the fact that no one is allowed to disturb the possession of land given to the tenant by the family. Also if a tenant’s possession is disturbed, our 1963 Constitution and the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979 as the laws of the land give him a right to sue for redress.

– Obaseki, JSC. Ekpan v. Agunu (1986)

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PREMISES HAVE NO DEFINITE DEFINITION FROM THE AUTHORITIES CITED

Let us first examine the meaning of the term “premises”. From the many learned legal works cited to us by appellant’s counsel Corpus Juris Secondum (supra), Jowitts Dictionary of English Law( supra) and Strouds Judicial Dictionary of English Law (supra), it appears that the term premises’ has a fluid or flexible meaning without a static connotation. It sometimes means bare land and sometimes land with buildings thereon, its meaning at any given. time would be determined according to what the parties so decide, as may be ascertained from the document executed by the parties. On the other hand, from the authorities cited by the respondents Ponsford v. H.M.S. Aerosols, Doe d. Hemming v. Willetes (supra), Cuff v. J & F Store Property Co. Ltd (supra) and Turner v. York Motors Property Ltd the term premises’ under the Recovery of Premises Law, Cap 118, Law of Lagos States, is used in the two senses of buildings with its grounds or appurtenances or simply as land without any building thereon. It may be noted that what can be distilled from the authorities of decided cases cited to us, including a welter of definitions in lexicons is that the term premises’ may connote bare land or the land with the buildings thereon, depending on what the parties intend it to connote, having regard to the circumstances of the case. In the final analysis, there is no doubt whatsoever that the meaning or the definition of the term “premises” is fraught with difficulties and whether it is intended to convey a precise or specific meaning will continue to exercise the courts because the situation in each case will unquestionably depend on the facts of the case thereof.

— Achike, JSC. Unilife v. Adeshigbin (2001) 4 NWLR (Pt.704) 609

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LICENCEE VERSUS A TENANT; EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION GIVES TENANCY PRIMA FACIE

Errington v. Errington and Anor. (1952) 1 All E.R. 149. At page 154 line D. Denning, L.J. stated that:- “The difference between a tenancy and a licence is, therefore, that in a tenancy an interest passes in the land, whereas in a licence it does not. In distinguishing between them, a crucial test has sometimes been supposed to be whether the occupier has exclusive possession or not. If he was let into exclusive possession, he was said be a tenant, albeit only a tenant at will: See Doe D. Tomes v. Chamberlain (4), Lynes v. Snaith (2); whereas if he had not exclusive possession he was only a licensee; Peakin v. Peakin (5) This test has, however, often given rise to misgivings because it may not correspond to realities.” And at p. 155 Denning went further to state:- “The result of all these cases is that, although a person who is let into exclusive possession is, prima facie, to be considered to be a tenant, nevertheless he will not be held to be so if the circumstances negative any intention to create a tenancy. Words alone may not suffice. Parties cannot turn a tenancy into a licence merely by calling it one. But if the circumstances and the conduct of the parties show that all that was intended was that the occupier should be granted a personal privilege with no interest in the land, he will be held only to be a licensee.”

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COVENANT TO PAY RENT IS INDEPENDENT OF LANDLORD’S DUTY TO REPAIR

Oke v. Salako (1972) 11 CCHCJ 88, wherein Kassim, J., held – “…A tenant’s covenant to pay rent is independent of the landlord’s covenant to repair the premises; the tenant is not discharged from his obligation to pay rent merely because his landlord is unwilling to fulfill his obligation.”

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TENANCY IS A BILATERAL CONDUCT BETWEEN PARTIES

An act of a new tenancy is conscious and specific one which must be a subject of bilateral conduct on the part of the landlord and tenant. As a matter of law, the parties must clearly and unequivocally express their willingness to enter into the new tenancy at the termination of the old one. As a specific act emanating from the landlord and the tenant, it cannot be a subject of guess or speculation. An agreement or contract is a bilateral affair which needs the ad idem of the parties. Therefore where parties are not ad idem, the court will find as a matter of law that an agreement or contract was not duly made between the parties.

– Tobi JSC. Odutola v. Papersack (2007)

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