SUPREME COURT CANNOT HEAR APPEALS DIRECTLY FROM THE HIGH COURT

CONDITIONS FOR THE EXERCISE OF SECTION 22 OF THE SUPREME COURT ACT

In determining whether the conditions surrounding an appeal before the Supreme court are conducive to the exercise of its general power under section 22 of the Supreme Court act as if the proceedings had been instituted and prosecuted before it as a court of first instance, the court will consider the followings: (a) The Availability before it of all the necessary materials on which to consider the request of the party. (b) The length of time between the disposal of the action in the court below and the hearing of the appeal at the Supreme Court. (c) The interest of justice to eliminate further delay in the hearing of the matter and minimize the hardship of the party.

– Tobi JSC. Odedo v. INEC (2008)

SUPREME COURT SHOULD INFREQUENTLY USE ITS POWERS DONATED IN SECTION 22

[W]e decided to hear counsel on both sides on the point, even though it was a point which could have been properly raised under a respondents’ notice. This course is of course permitted by the Rules (see, for example, Order 8 rule 3(6) of the Supreme Court Rules, 1985). Besides, our consideration of the point is necessary for the determination of the real question in controversy in the appeal within the meaning of Section 22 of the Supreme Court Act. Indeed it is envisaged by the subsidiary issue framed for the appellants in their brief. But let me emphasize that although such powers, no doubt, exist, they are such that this court does not want to make a habit of drawing therefrom constantly so that it does not give the wrong impression that it is taking sides in matters in controversy before it. A respondent’s counsel should always make his own decision and file a respondent’s notice whenever necessary, otherwise he may find that he cannot advance a certain line of argument. I am invoking the power in this case because it is necessary for my decision in the case and has been raised by the subsidiary issue and was fully argued.

— P. Nnaemeka-Agu JSC. Gbaniyi Osafile v. Paul Odi (SC 149/1987, 4th day of May 1990)

SUPREME COURT HAS THE POWER TO OVERRULE ITSELF

My simple answer is that it is not part of the jurisdiction or duties of this Court to go on looking for imaginary conflicts. We are final not because we are infallible; rather we are infallible because we are final. Justices of this Court are human-beings, capable of erring. It will certainly be short sighted arrogance not to accept this obvious truth. It is also true that this Court can do inestimable good through its wise decisions. Similarly, the Court can do incalculable harm through its mistakes. When therefore it appears to learned counsel that any decision of this Court has been given per incuriam, such counsel should have the boldness and courage to ask that such a decision be over-ruled. This Court has the power to over-rule itself (and has done so in the past) for it gladly accepts that it is far better to admit an error than to persevere in error. Learned counsel has not asked us to over-rule either Skenconsult or Ezomo supra. If that was what was wanted, the Briefs should have said so specifically and the Chief Justice of the Federation would have gladly empanelled a Full Court.

– Oputa, JSC. Adegoke v. Adesanya (1989)

MORE AUTHORITIES WILL NOT MAKE THE COURT DEPART FROM HIS EARLIER STANCE

It seems to me that the authority could justify the stance taken by Chief Williams in the presentation of his arguments when he seemed, with respect, to have presented the same arguments as he did in the Ifezue case, but now with more authorities and emphasis. However I am of the clear view that for this Court to depart from its decision in a previous case, the arguments must bring some fresh elements not just more authorities which had not been adverted to in the earlier proceedings, or that there have been new developments, even in the socio-economic or political stance of the country, especially when the matter under consideration is a matter that is provided for by the Constitution, to warrant the Court to change its earlier stand. In this case, I have gone through the profound submissions of Chief Williams and it seems to me, with utmost respect, that all the learned senior advocate has succeeded in doing is to re-argue the Ifezue case with more authorities on the same points as earlier canvassed or at least to regard the present case as an appeal over the Ifezue case. I do not think that would be sufficient to persuade me to reconsider my earlier stand in the Ifezue case.

— Eso, JSC. Odi v Osafile (1985) – SC.144/1983

SUPREME COURT CANNOT THROUGH SECTION 22 OF ITS ACT DO WHAT THE TRIAL CANNOT DO

One of the most recent cases decided by this court is the case of Towowomo v Ajayi (unreported) Appeal No. SC/CV/152/2022 delivered on 27/1/2023 wherein this court stated as follows: “In the circumstances of this case, this court cannot activate section 22 of the Supreme Court Act 2004 since the 180 days provided by the Constitution to determine the Appellant’s claim at the trial court has lapsed since 1st January, 2023. The originating summons was filed on 5/7/22 and expired on 1/1/23 at the Federal High Court. This appeal was taken on 2/1/23 and there is no opportunity for the contentious issue offacts in controversy in this appeal to be sent back to the trial court. See Ezenwankwo v APGA & ors (2022) LPELR 57884 (SC). The issue of the merit of the allegations of false information was not tried by the two lower courts and cannot be tried by this court pursuant to section 22 of the Supreme Court Act. This court cannot do what the trial court is no longer 32 constitutionally permitted to do by virtue of section 285 of the Constitution.”