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THE SUPREME COURT HAS THE POWER TO OVERRULE ITSELF

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Adegoke Motors Ltd v. Dr. Adesanya & Anor (1986) 3 NWLR (Pt. 109) 250 at 274; (1989) 5 SCNJ 80, inter alia, thus; “We are final not because we are infallible; rather we are infallible because we are final, Justices of this Court are human beings, capable of erring. It will certainly be short-sighted arrogance not to accept this obvious truth. It is also true that this Court can do inestimable good through its wise decisions. Similarly, the Court can do incalculable harm through its mistakes. When therefore it appears to learned Counsel that any decision of this Court has been given per incuriam, such Counsel should have the boldness and courage to ask that such decision shall be over-ruled. This Court has the power to overrule itself (and has done so in the past) for it gladly accepts that it is far better to admit an error than to preserve an error.”

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SUPREME COURT HAS THE POWER TO OVERRULE ITSELF

My simple answer is that it is not part of the jurisdiction or duties of this Court to go on looking for imaginary conflicts. We are final not because we are infallible; rather we are infallible because we are final. Justices of this Court are human-beings, capable of erring. It will certainly be short sighted arrogance not to accept this obvious truth. It is also true that this Court can do inestimable good through its wise decisions. Similarly, the Court can do incalculable harm through its mistakes. When therefore it appears to learned counsel that any decision of this Court has been given per incuriam, such counsel should have the boldness and courage to ask that such a decision be over-ruled. This Court has the power to over-rule itself (and has done so in the past) for it gladly accepts that it is far better to admit an error than to persevere in error. Learned counsel has not asked us to over-rule either Skenconsult or Ezomo supra. If that was what was wanted, the Briefs should have said so specifically and the Chief Justice of the Federation would have gladly empanelled a Full Court.

– Oputa, JSC. Adegoke v. Adesanya (1989)

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EXERCISING SECTION 22 OF THE SUPREME COURT ACT – A CONDITION IS THAT THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD ALSO BE ABLE TO ADJUDICATE

Now, if this court is to consider the merit of the suit, it will only be able to do so by invoking its power to step into the shoes of the trial court under Section 22 of the Supreme Court Act. For this court to invoke and exercise its powers under Section 22 of the Supreme Court Act, one of the conditions that must be fulfilled is that the court below or the trial court, as the case may be, must have the power or jurisdiction to adjudicate over the matter. In other words, under Section 22 of the Supreme Court Act, this court cannot make order or exercise the power that the trial court or the lower court cannot make or exercise. See DANLADI V. UDI (2022) 9 NWLR (PT. 1834) 185; EBEBI V. OZOBO (2022) 1 NWLR (PT. 1810) 165; IDIAGBON V. A.P.C. (2019) 18 NWLR (PT. 1703) 102; ARDO V. INEC (2017) 13 NWLR (PT. 1583) 450; ADAMU V. STATE (2017) 10 NWLR (PT. 1574) 463 … While this court is conferred with wide powers by Section 22 of the Supreme Court Act, the powers can only be exercised within the confines of the competence of the trial court or the lower court. Once the power of the court has ceased, the power of this court under Section 22 of the Supreme Court Act also automatically ceases. Hence, this court has no power to delve into the merits of the appeal. A similar issue came up for determination in two recent decisions of this court, and it was held that this court cannot exercise its jurisdiction under Section 22 of the Supreme Court Act once the trial court or the lower court as the case may be has lost its own jurisdiction. See SAMUEL V. APC & ORS (2023) LPELR – 59831 (SC); EZENWANKWO v. APGA & ORS (2022) LPELR 57884 (SC).

— A. Jauro, JSC. PDP v INEC (2023) – SC/CV/501/2023

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THERE WILL BE NO REFERENCE TO THE SUPREME COURT WHEN THERE IS A CASE LAW ON THE POINT

With this principal issue resolved in favour of the appellant, the motion filed herein for reference to the Supreme Court becomes irrelevant. This is because from the argument of all learned counsel to the parties, reference to the Supreme Court can only be made by the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court under section 295(3) of the 1999 Constitution, if there have been no guidance from the apex court on the point. This is not the position in the instant case where this point sought to be referred to the Supreme Court – the application of immunity by the principal officers named in S.308 of the 1999 Constitution in election petition matters – had been resolved by the Supreme Court in the Obih v. Mbakwe and Unongo v. Aper Aku set of cases cited by the appellants counsel supra. In the light of these authorities, I hold that this is not a point for reference for clarification to the Supreme Court as the apex court had done the necessary clarification. In consequence application dated 17/12/03 and filed on 18/12/03 is hereby dismissed.

— M.A. Okunola, JCA. AD v. Fayose (2004) – CA/IL/EP/GOV/1/2004

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SUPREME COURT CANNOT THROUGH SECTION 22 OF ITS ACT DO WHAT THE TRIAL CANNOT DO

One of the most recent cases decided by this court is the case of Towowomo v Ajayi (unreported) Appeal No. SC/CV/152/2022 delivered on 27/1/2023 wherein this court stated as follows: “In the circumstances of this case, this court cannot activate section 22 of the Supreme Court Act 2004 since the 180 days provided by the Constitution to determine the Appellant’s claim at the trial court has lapsed since 1st January, 2023. The originating summons was filed on 5/7/22 and expired on 1/1/23 at the Federal High Court. This appeal was taken on 2/1/23 and there is no opportunity for the contentious issue offacts in controversy in this appeal to be sent back to the trial court. See Ezenwankwo v APGA & ors (2022) LPELR 57884 (SC). The issue of the merit of the allegations of false information was not tried by the two lower courts and cannot be tried by this court pursuant to section 22 of the Supreme Court Act. This court cannot do what the trial court is no longer 32 constitutionally permitted to do by virtue of section 285 of the Constitution.”

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OBITER DICTA OF THE ULTIMATE COURT ON IMPORTANT POINTS ARE BINDING ON LOWER COURT

Although this opinion was given in a criminal appeal, it has been followed and applied by the Court of Appeal in many civil appeals against interlocutory decisions. See for an example Akinsola Dawodu & Anor. v. F. O. Ologundundu & Ors. (1986) 4 N.W.L.R. 104, at p.112. For, it has been held by the House of Lords in England that although what is ordinarily binding in a case is the ratio decidendi and not the obiter dictum; yet an obiter dictum by the ultimate court on an important point of law is one which is binding on and followed by all the lower courts: see W.B. Anderson & Sons Ltd. & Ors. v. Rhodes (Liverpool) Ltd. & Ors. (1967) 2 All E.R. 850. After all, a good deal of the important pronouncements of the Supreme Court in the famous case of Bronik Motors Ltd. & Anor. v. Wema Bank Ltd. (1983) 1 S.C. N.L.R. 296 was obiter. Yet it was binding on the Court of Appeal and all other courts lower down in the judicial hierarchy until the law was changed in Akinsanya v. U.B.A. Ltd. (1986) 4 N.W.L.R. 273.

— Nnaemeka-Agu JSC. Bennett Ifediorah & Ors. V. Ben Ume & Ors. (1988)

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MORE AUTHORITIES WILL NOT MAKE THE COURT DEPART FROM HIS EARLIER STANCE

It seems to me that the authority could justify the stance taken by Chief Williams in the presentation of his arguments when he seemed, with respect, to have presented the same arguments as he did in the Ifezue case, but now with more authorities and emphasis. However I am of the clear view that for this Court to depart from its decision in a previous case, the arguments must bring some fresh elements not just more authorities which had not been adverted to in the earlier proceedings, or that there have been new developments, even in the socio-economic or political stance of the country, especially when the matter under consideration is a matter that is provided for by the Constitution, to warrant the Court to change its earlier stand. In this case, I have gone through the profound submissions of Chief Williams and it seems to me, with utmost respect, that all the learned senior advocate has succeeded in doing is to re-argue the Ifezue case with more authorities on the same points as earlier canvassed or at least to regard the present case as an appeal over the Ifezue case. I do not think that would be sufficient to persuade me to reconsider my earlier stand in the Ifezue case.

— Eso, JSC. Odi v Osafile (1985) – SC.144/1983

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