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SUBJECTION OF THE RIGHT TO LIFE – EXECUTION OF THE SENTENCE OF THE COURT

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Under section 30(1) of the Constitution, therefore, the right to life, although fully guaranteed is nevertheless subject to the execution of a death sentence of a court of law in respect of a criminal offence of which one has been found guilty in Nigeria. The qualifying word, save, used in section 30(1) seems to me to be the unmistakable key to the construction of that provision. In my view it is plain that the 1979 Constitution can by no stretch of the imagination be said to have proscribed or outlawed the death penalty. On the contrary, section 30(1) of the Constitution permits it in the clearest possible terms, so long as it is inflicted pursuant to the sentence of a court of law in Nigeria in a criminal offence. In other words, section 30(1) of the Constitution recognises the death penalty as a form of punishment but only on the condition that it is in execution of the sentence of a court of law in a criminal offence of which an accused person has been found guilty in Nigeria. The plain meaning of this section of the Constitution cannot be derogated from in the absence of any ambiguity whatsoever. It simply guarantees and protects the right to life. But it also recognises deprivation of life so long as it is pursuant to the execution of the sentence of a court in a criminal offence of which the accused has been found guilty in Nigeria.

— Iguh JSC. Onuoha v State (1998) – SC. 24/1996

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ONLY BREACH OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS CAN BE ENFORCED THROUGH FREP

It is trite that it is only actions founded on a breach of the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution that can be enforced under the Rules. The facts relied upon by an applicant must therefore disclose a breach of his fundamental right as the basis for his claim. Where the facts relied upon discloses a breach of the fundamental right of the Applicant as the basis of the claim, there exists a redress through the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure. Where the alleged breach of right is ancillary or incidental to the main grievance or complaint, it is incompetent to proceed under the rules. See SEA TRUCKS NIGERIA LIMITED v. ANIGBORO (2001) 2 NWLR (PT. 696) 189; WEST AFRICAN EXAMINATIONS COUNCIL v. AKINKUMI (2008) 9 NWLR (PT. 1091) 151; NWACHUKWU v. NWACHUKWU (2018) 17 NWLR (PT. 1648) 357.

— F.A. Ojo, JCA. ITDRLI v NIMC (2021) – CA/IB/291/2020

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FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHT STAND ABOVE THE ORDINARY LAW OF THE LAND

I will reiterate that a fundamental right is a right guaranteed in the Nigerian Constitution. It is a right which every citizen is entitled to by reason of being a human being unless when a person suffers any of the disabilities set out in the Constitution. ODOGU V. A.G. FEDERATION (2000) 2 HRLRA 82 AT 102; FAJEMIROKUN V. COMM. BANK (NIG.) LTD. (2009) 21 WRN 1. Fundamental rights stand above the ordinary laws of the land. RANSOME KUTI V. A.G. FEDERATION (1985) 2 NWLR (PT. 6) 211. These rights are so jealously guarded that no citizen can be shut out from seeking redress when his fundamental right has been allegedly breached unless he suffers any constitutional disability like when he is sentenced to flogging or hard labour by a Court of competent jurisdiction.

— U. Onyemenam, JCA. Iheme v Chief of Defence Staff (2018) – CA/J/264/2017

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ALLEGATION OF BREACH OF RIGHT TO LIFE DOES NOT MEAN ACTUAL LOSS OF LIFE

Para. 53: “The rights to life, health and dignity are intertwined such that a violation of one can lead to the violation of the other. It follows that the enjoyment of a healthy life is dependent on the ability to afford good medical services which in turn is dependent on the financial security sufficient for maintenance of good health. Payment of pension implicates the ability of pensioners to enjoy these guarantees. The allegation of the violation of the right to life does not necessarily entail the actual loss of life or merely physical act of breathing, neither does it connote mere animal existence or continued drudgery through life. It has a wider meaning which includes right to live with human dignity, right to livelihood, right to health and many more. Consequently, the refusal to pay retirement benefits can occasion the violation of the right to health and thus a violation of the right to life. Of course the dignity of a person is implicated if due to lack of means traceable to denial of pension, the person becomes a relic of the society falling from his/her ordinary standard in life with the likelihood of becoming a beggar.”

— Boley v Liberia & Ors. (2019) – ECW/CCJ/JUD/24/19

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MERE ALLEGATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION TRIGGERS THE COURT JURISDICTION

Para. 27: “This Court has held in many of its flourishing jurisprudence that mere allegation of violation of human rights is sufficient to trigger the jurisdiction of this Court and the Court will assume jurisdiction without necessarily examining the veracity of the allegation. In Kareem Meissa Wade v. Republic of Senegal, ECW/CCJ/JUD/19/13, at pg. 259 Para. 95 (3), this court held that: “Nevertheless, that simply invoking human rights violation in a case suffices to establish the jurisdiction of the Court over that case.” Similarly, In BAKARE SARRE V MALI (2011) CCJELR pg. 57, the court stressed that: “Once human rights violations which involves international or community obligations of a member state is alleged, it will exercise its jurisdiction over the case.” This position is further supported by the decision of the Court in SERAP V. FRN & 4 ORS, (2014) ECW/CCJ/JUD/16/14 where this court held that: “the mere allegation that there has been a violation of human rights in the territory of a member state is sufficient prima facie to justify the jurisdiction of this court on the dispute, surely without any prejudice to the substance and merits of the complaint which has to be determined only after the parties have been given the opportunity to present their case, with full guarantees of fair trial.” See also the case of His Excellency Vice-President Alhaji Samuel Sam-Sumana v. Republic of Sierra Leone.-SUIT NO: ECW/CCJ/APP/38/16 and JUD NO: ECW/CCJ/JUD/19/17 (At page 14 of the judgment) and Mamadou Tandja (2010) CCJELR pg. 109 & Bakare Sarre & 28 Ors v. Mali (2011) (CCJELR) pg. 57.”

— Boley v Liberia & Ors. (2019) – ECW/CCJ/JUD/24/19

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SELF-DETERMINATION IS THE RIGHT OF PEOPLE TO DETERMINE THEIR DESTINY

Para. 24: “Self-determination on its own denotes the legal right of a people to decide their own destiny in the international order. Under the United Nations Charter and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, self-determination is protected as a right of “all peoples.” It refers to the rights of people indigenous to an area to determine their destiny. Indigenous peoples’ rights are collective rights. In other words, they are vested in indigenous persons that organize themselves as peoples. With the adoption of the UN Declaration on the right of indigenous people, the international community clearly affirms that indigenous peoples require recognition of their collective rights as peoples to enable them to enjoy human rights.”

— Osaghae v Nigeria (2017) – ECW/CCJ/JUD/03/17

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MERE LETTER OF INVITATION FROM EFCC DOES NOT CONSTITUTE ABUSE OF LAW/FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT

Upon a critical consideration of the entirety of the submission of Learned counsel in this case vis-a-vis the facts and circumstances of the case, I hold the view that there is no doubt that a mere letter of invitation from the 3rd Respondent to the 1st and 2nd Respondents did not constitute abuse of the process of law, and/or breach of fundamental right.

— S.D. Bage JSC. Diamond Bank Plc V. H.R.H. Eze (Dr) Peter Opara & Ors. (SC.375/2012, 9 March 2018)

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