It is important in the construction of a provision to read the statute as a whole. Such a method of construction enables an interpretation which brings into focus related sections which are complementary.
– Karibi-whyte JSC. Idehen v. Idehen (1991) – SC. 271/1989
SHARE ON
To hold that the governor is immune in such proceedings is to go counter to the spirit and intent of our Constitution. This standpoint is better appreciated when one envisages a situation where a person is sworn in as a governor, but is later discovered to be a person of questionable character who won the election with doubtful papers, if he is immune, it would mean that an election tribunal provided for under the Constitution, will not be able to question his election and do something about it through the judicial process. In other words, the Constitution would have acted in vain in setting up election Tribunals. That cannot be so. The Constitution is the highest law of the land, and its interpretation must accord with the letter and spirit of the Constitution to reflect the intention of the framers, particularly in a democracy such as ours where election matters have taken on the hue of a do or die affair. It is in the light of this that I uphold the submissions of the appellant that election petitions being a special proceedings, a governor or any occupant of that office mentioned in section 308 of the 1999 Constitution does not enjoy immunity when it comes to an election petition, which seeks for the determination of his election.
— A. Augie, JCA. AD v. Fayose (2004) – CA/IL/EP/GOV/1/2004
Thus, in the interpretation of the Constitution, the principles upon which the Constitution was established rather than the direct operation or literal meaning of the words used, measure the purpose and scope of its provisions. See: GLOBAL EXCELLENCE COMMUNICATIONS LTD v DONALD DUKE (2007) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1059) 22 at 41 – 41 (SC); (2007) LPELR-1323 (SC) at pages 18 19; A.G. OF BENDEL STATE v A.G. FEDERATION (1982) 3 NCLR 1;SARAKI v FRN (2016) 3 NWLR (Pt. 1500) 531; SKYE BANK PLC v IWU (2017) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1590) 124; SHELIM v GOBANG (2009) All FWLR (Pt. 496) 1866 at 1878 (SC).
— H.S. Tsammani, JCA. Peter Obi & Anor. v INEC & Ors. (2023) – CA/PEPC/03/2023
Firstly, the position of section 22 of the Act, is undoubtedly, that a holder of a right of occupancy, may enter into an agreement or contract, with a view to alienating his said right of occupancy. In entering into such an agreement or contract, he does not need the consent of the Governor. He merely operates within the first leg/stage of a “transfer on sale of an estate in land” which leg/stage ends with the formation of a binding contract for a sale constituting an estate contract at best. However, when he comes to embark on the next leg/stage of alienating or transferring his right of occupancy which is done or effected, by a conveyance or deed, which culminates in the vesting of the said right in the particular “purchaser”, he must obtain the consent of the Governor in order to make the transaction valid. If he fails to do so, then the transaction, is null and void under Section 22 of the Act.
– Ogbuagu, JSC. Brossette v. Ilemobola (2007)
Courts of law, in interpreting the Constitution or a statute have no jurisdiction to read into the Constitution or statute what the legislators did not provide for, and a fortiori read out of the Constitution or statute what is provided for by the legislators. In either way, the courts are abandoning their constitutional functions and straying into those of the Legislature by interfering or interloping with them. As that will make nonsense of the separation of powers provided for in sections 4 and 6 of the Constitution, courts of law will not do such a thing, whatever is the pressure by Counsel.
— Niki Tobi, JSC. Buhari v. INEC (2008) – SC 51/2008
It is settled law that where the words of a statute or Constitution are clear and unambiguous, they call for no interpretation, the duty of the court in such a circumstance being to apply the words as used by the legislature.
– WS Onnoghen, JSC. Calabar CC v. Ekpo (2008)
The learned trial Judge considered the somewhat exclusive character of the occupation of the petrol station by the respondent and gave weight to some expressions used in the agreement as words indicating that a tenancy as distinct from a licence is the subject matter of the agreement. I have not the slightest doubt he was right in considering these expressions: he was right in considering the character of the occupation; but it appears to me it was his duty to do more than this. It was also his duty to consider the conduct of the parties as well as their intention, particularly when such intention is ascertainable from the document or agreement as a whole.
– Ademola, CJF. Mobil v. Johnson (1961)
Click the icons to like, follow, and join JPoetry