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‘STARE DECISIS’ IS TO STAND BY THINGS DECIDED

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This appeal illustrates the fundamental importance of the principle of stare decisis in our jurisprudence. “Stare decisis” is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition, at Page 1443 thus: “to stand by things decided. The doctrine of precedent under which it is necessary for a Court to follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again in litigation. ….. “The rule of adherence to judicial precedent finds its expression in the doctrine of stare decisis. The doctrine is simply that, when a point or principle of law has been once officially decided or settled by the ruling of a competent Court in a case in which it is directly and necessarily involved, it will no longer be considered as open to examination or to a new ruling by the same tribunal, or by those which are bound to follow its adjudication, unless it be for urgent reasons and in exceptional cases. ….” It is settled law that for the doctrine to apply, the facts of the two cases must be the same or similar. The adherence to precedent provides for certainty of the law. See: Adegoke Motors Ltd. v. Adesanya (1989) 3 NWLR (Pt. 109) 250; Mailantarki v. Tongo (2017) 5 – 6 SC (Pt. II) 132; University of Lagos v. Olaniyan (1985) LPELR – 3419 (SC) @ 26 C – F.

— K.M.O. Kekere-Ekun, JSC. State v. Andrew Yanga (SC.712/2018, 15 Jan 2021)

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A CASE PRECEDENT PROPERLY DISTINGUISHED CANNOT APPLY IN PRESENT CASE

Where the reliance on a precedent case is challenged in a proceedings on the basis that the facts are distinguishable from those of the present case, the court must determine if the facts of the two cases are the same or not. It cannot gloss over that issue and proceed to simply rely on the precedent case on the ground only that the law applied in that case is the same law that is sought to be invoked or applied in the precedent case. A law can be applied in various factual situations. So upon a challenge that the factual situation in which a law was applied in a previous case is different from the factual situation in a present case and therefore cannot apply to it, it becomes necessary to determine the factual basis for the application of that law in the precedent case so as to determine if the precedent case applies to the present case. If the factual basis of the application of the law in the precedent case is different from those in the present case, then the precedent is successfully distinguished from the present case and cannot apply to it on the relevant point.

— Emmanuel Akomaye Agim, JSC. Lagos State Govt. v. Abdul Kareem (2022) – SC.910/2016

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CASES SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN TO APPLY WHERE THE FACTS ARE DIFFERENT

It is an age-old principle that it is the facts and circumstances of each case that determines judicial authorities that Counsel ought to cite in support of their argument Adegoke Motors v. Adesanya (1989) 3 NWLR (109) 250, S.A.P. Ltd v. Min., Petroleum Resources (2018) 6 NWLR (Pt. 1616) 391. This principle is time-tested to the extent that it has assumed a sacred and inviolable status. In Siry v. Pilot (1625) Popham 166, a 398 years old case, Crewe, CJ, enthused that “in our law every case hath its stand or fall from a particular reason or circumstance”. 342 years ago, Sir F. Pemberton reiterated the principle in L.C.J, Fitzharris’ case (1681) 8 How. Tr. 280 that “every case stands upon its own bottom”, and in Fisher v. Prince (1763) 3 Burr. 1364, Lord Mansfield, who spoke 260 years ago, very aptly held in that case that “the reason and spirit of cases make law; not the letter of particular precedents”. In Nigeria, Oputa, JSC embossed the following evergreen restatement of the law when he stated in Okafor V. Nnaife (1987) 4 NWLR (Pt.64) 129 that: “Justice and fairness demand that the ratio of any case should not be pulled in by the hair of the head and made willy nilly to apply to cases where the surrounding circumstances are different”.

— A.A. Augie, JSC. PDP v INEC (2023) – SC/CV/501/2023

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THERE ARE TIMES WHEN DEPARTURE FROM PRECEDENT IS IN THE INTEREST OF THE LAW

✓ In Bucknor Maclean v. Inlaks Limited (1980) 8-11 S.C. 1, the decisions overruled were clearly shown to become vehicles of injustice and this Court could not allow such state of affairs to continue and my late learned brother, Idigbe, J.S.C. fully gave expression to this when reading the lead judgment at page 25, he said. “I share the view of Lord Morris in Conway v. Rimmer that “though precedent is an indispensable foundation on which to decide what is the law, there may be times when a departure from precedent is in the interest of justice and the proper development of the law.” . . . I see no more justification for perpetuating recent error than for retaining any uncorrected error in much older decisions of this court.”

✓ In Golak Nath v. State of Punjab Air (1967) S.C. 1643, Subba R. CJ. (on behalf of himself, Shah, Sikri, Shelat and Vaidialingam, JJ. said at page 1670: “A final appeal is made to us that we shall not take a different view as the decision in Sankari Prasads case (1952) SCR 89-AIR 1951 S.C. 458 held the field for many years. While ordinarily this court will be reluctant to reverse its previous decisions, it is its duty in the constitutional field to correct itself as early for otherwise the future progress of the country and the happiness of the people will be at stake. As we are convinced that the decision in Sankari Prasad’s case 1952 SCR 89-(AIR 1951 S.C. 458) is wrong it is pre-eminently a typical case where the court should overrule it.

✓ Instances of this are to be found in the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. In Planny v. Ferguson (1896) 163 V.S. 537, the Court, in a segregation case, held that once, in public facilities accommodation was separate but equal it was constitutional to compel segregation of races in the use thereof. In Brown v. Topeka (1954) 347 V.S. 483, that is sixty years later, the court gave a decision in direct opposition to its view in Planny v. Ferguson. Times had changed and the court’s view was that attitude must change with them.

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CONDITION FOR WHICH A DECISION CAN BE USED AS A PRECEDENCE IN ANOTHER CASE

The principles laid down in the cases cited by the lower Court will be applicable to the instant case only where the accented facts of this matter are the same as the facts that induced the decision in those cases, due regard being had to the statutes and the Rules of Court governing the different Courts. Also, since, facts are the arrowhead and fountainhead of the law, the decision in a case is intricately related to the facts that induced that decision.

– PER J.H. Sankey, J.C.A. Gonimi v. Surundi (2022) – CA/G/7/2022

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STARE DECISIS ON SIMILAR FACTS

It is settled that Courts, including this Court are bound by the earlier decisions of the apex Court on same or similar facts determined on the basis of same or similar legislations in their subsequent determination of cases in respect of same or similar facts and on the basis of same or similar legislations. See ATOLAGBE & ANOR V. AWUNI & ORS (1997) LPELR – 593 (SC) and DR. UMAR V. ADMIRAL MURTALA NYAKO & ORS (2014) LPELR – 22878 (SC).

– M.D. Muhammad JSC. Odey v. Alaga (2021) – SC.9/2021

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[DS] IT IS EMBARRASSING FOR A LOWER COURT TO SET ASIDE A DECISION OF A HIGHER COURT

It is also not in dispute that following the order of 19 th March, 09 which had been carried out, the respondents appealed to this court against the grant of same and followed up with an application for an injunction restraining the receiver appointed from acting in that office. It is when this application and the appeal were in existence that the respondents orally applied to have the Court of Appeal order of 19/3/09 discharged. Thus when this order was discharged on 1/7/09 it completely rendered ineffective and nugatory the motion and the appeal pending before the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. This situation, with tremendous respect to the learned senior counsel to the respondents’ is extremely embarrassing to our judicial system and the order of seniority of the court of record in Nigeria. In the first place, the trial court is bound by the orders of the Court of Appeal and I therefore wonder where the trial court conjured its jurisdiction to discharge the higher court’s order, not being a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction without any reference to the higher court. This is to dis-organise the constitutionally well arranged seniority of courts Hierarchy of courts and staire decises brushed aside. My Lords, a trial court may not be satisfied with the orders or findings of the Court of Appeal, there is nothing it can do about it, its constitutional and judicial role is either to obey or enforce that order, any act or process challenging the said order would have to be referred to the Court of Appeal any act to the contrary would amount to a breach of the constitutional provisions of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The same applies to the Court of Appeal where the Supreme Court’s order is in question. By granting the order of discharge not made by it but by a higher court the trial court has in effect knocked off the substratum or lis of the appeal against the grant of that order now pending before this court.

— Mutaka-Coomassie, JSC. Shinning Star Nig. Ltd. v. AKS Steel Nigeria Ltd. (2011) – SC. 101/2010

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