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SERVICE OF EMPLOYMENT GOVERNED BY CONTRACT

Dictum

The second class of cases will cover the ordinary master and servant relationship governed by a written contract not subject to any statutory restrictions or limitations. Here the duty of the court will be to construe and apply the terms, conditions and provisions of the contract.

— A. Oputa, JSC. Olaniyan & Ors. v. University of Lagos (1985) – SC.53/1985

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STATUTORY FLAVOUR EMPLOYMENT

An employment with statutory flavour is one governed by statute wherein the procedures for employment and dismissal of an employee are clearly spelt out. In such a situation, the employment cannot be terminated other than in the way and manner prescribed by that statute and any other manner of termination inconsistent with the statute is null and void and of no effect. The contract is determinable not by the parties, but only by statutory preconditions governing its determination.

– Muhammad JCA. Osumah v. EBS (2004)

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STATUTORY EMPLOYMENT IS GOVERNED BY STATUTE

A statutory employment is as a matter of course governed by statute and so also is the procedure for employment and discipline provided for in the statute. See Nigeria Institute of International Affairs v Mrs. T.O. Ayanfalu (SUPRA). — Adewemimo J. Afariogun v FUTA (2020) – NICN/AK/41/2017

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THE EMPLOYEE HAS BURDEN TO PLACE TERMS AND CONDITIONS THAT WAS BREACHED BY EMPLOYER

The law is settled that in the determination of employment rights, it is the employee who complains that his employment contract has been breached that has the burden to place before the Court the terms and conditions of his employment that provide for his rights and obligations, see Okoebor v Police Council [2003] 12 NWLR (Pt 834) 444, Okomu Oil Palm Co v Iserhienrhien [2001] 6 NWLR (Pt. 710) 660 at 673, Idoniboye-Obe v. NNPC [2003] 2 NWLR (Pt. 805) 589 at 630. In furtherance of this the Claimant has placed before the Court his offer of employment (exhibit C1), staff handbook (exhibit C2), letter of promotion (exhibit C3), suspension letter (exhibit C7) letter of invitation to disciplinary committee (exhibit C8), letter of termination (exhibit C9), statement of account (exhibit C10), CBN operational guidelines for delisting (exhibit C11), and other service documents.

— O.A. Obaseki-Osaghae, J. Ejiro Peter Amratefa v. Access Bank (NICN/ABJ/106/2022, November 2, 2023)

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WHERE TERMINATION CONTRAVENES STATUTORY PROVISION OR CONTRACT, PARTY WILL BE REINSTATED

It is clear from the facts which are not disputed in this appeal, that respondents unilaterally repudiated the contract with the appellants in the letter of termination dated 31st December, 1980. They were in my opinion trying to evade or avoid compliance with the conditions in para. 15 and the procedure in s.17(1). Hill v. CA. Parsons & Co. Ltd. (supra) will definitely apply to such a case as this one. Similarly each of the appellants refused to accept the repudiation, and in letter written the same day clearly so stated. – Exh. P. 16, P.19. In their claim they actually asked for a declaration that the contract was still in existence and that they were still occupying their respective positions in the 1st respondent University. I have no doubts in my mind that this is a situation where it is appropriate for the application of the rule of specific performance. The law has arrived at the stage where the principle should be adopted that the right to a job is analogous to right to property. Accordingly, where a man is entitled to a particular job, I cannot conceive of any juridical or logical reason against the view that where the termination of appointment is invalid and consequently alters nothing as reinstatement of the employee barring legal obstacles intervening between the period of purported dismissal and the date of judgment is the only just remedy. Normally damages are rarely adequate remedies for wrongful dismissal, and where the act relied upon for the dismissal is a contravention of an enabling statutory provision, I have no hesitation in restoring the judgment of the learned trial judge.

— A.G. Karibe-Whyte, JSC. Olaniyan & Ors. v. University of Lagos (1985) – SC.53/1985

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FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYMENT ARE NOT AT PLEASURE OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

I will hasten to say that it will be a contradiction in terms for a citizen of a Republic, such as Nigeria, to hold his office at the pleasure of the Crown. Which Crown We have no Crown here and public Servants in the established and pensionable cadre of the Federal Government Service are not regarded as employed at the pleasure of the Federal Government. This point was first made in Bashir Alade Shitta-Bey v. The Federal Public Service Commission (1981) 1 SC. 40 at pp. 57/58.

— A. Oputa, JSC. Olaniyan & Ors. v. University of Lagos (1985) – SC.53/1985

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WHERE OFFICER HOLDS HIS OFFICE “AT PLEASURE”

Where an officer holds his office “at pleasure,” like was the case in Brown v. Dagenham Urban District Council (1929) 1 K.B. 737 at p.742 he can be dismissed at will in complete disregard of any purported contract whether verbal, or written or even under seal, because such contract will be incompatible with his status and therefore destitute of legal value. Thus Servants of the Crown, civil as well as military, except in special cases, where it is otherwise provided by law, hold their office only during the pleasure of the Crown and can be dismissed at any time in spite of a contract for a period of Service:- Dunn v. Reginam (1896)1 Q.B. 116. In fact the employing authority will lack the power, the vires to “enter into a contract” inconsistent with the wording of the Statute which gave it power in the public interest to remove the Servant at its pleasure:- Nicholson v. Whitstable Urban District Council (1925) 89 J. P. Newsp 480 at p.508. An officer holding his office at pleasure has also no right to be heard before he is removed because there need not be anything against him to warrant his removal. If there is nothing against him, no reason need be given for there is nothing to defend since he held his office durante bene placito: See Reg v. Dartington School Governors (1844) 6 Q.B.682.

— A. Oputa, JSC. Olaniyan & Ors. v. University of Lagos (1985) – SC.53/1985

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