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PRINCIPAL RELIEF MUST BE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN ORDER TO COME UNDER FREP RULES

Dictum

The position of the law is that for a claim to qualify as falling under fundamental rights, it must be clear that the principal relief sought is for the enforcement or for securing the enforcement of a fundamental right and not, from the nature of the claim, to redress a grievance that is ancillary to the principal relief which itself is not ipso facto a claim for the enforcement of fundamental right. Thus, where the alleged breach of a fundamental right is ancillary or incidental to the substantive claim of the ordinary civil or common law nature, it will be incompetent to constitute the claim as one for the enforcement of a fundamental right: See Federal Republic of Nigeria & Anor v. Ifegwu (2003) 15 NWI.R (Pt. 842) 113, at 180; Tukor v. Government of Taraba State (1997) 6 NWLR (Pt. 510) 549; and Sea Trucks (Nig) Ltd v. Anigboro (2001) 2 NWLR) Pt. 696) 159.

– S.A. Akintan, JSC. Abdulhamid v Akar & Anor. (2006) – S.C. 240/2001

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MAKING NYSC FEMALE CORPS COMPLY WITH TROUSER WEARING, DESPITE OBJECTION, IS BREACH OF RIGHTS TO RELIGION

The NYSC has been forcing their female members to dress on trousers contrary to their religious right encapsulated under section 38 of the 1999 Constitution. It must firmly assert here that these female corps members were solely and singularly trained and financed by their parents and brought up in their respective religious beliefs that some have never worn trousers in their lives. To make them comply with the compulsory trouser-wearing of all NYSC corps members is a violation of their rights to freedom of religion. In the same light, to compel school students or undergraduates or pupils to dress in a manner contrary to their religious beliefs is to violate their fundamental rights. This applies even where the institution is private or government owned.

– Uwani Musa Abba Aji, JSC. Lagos State Govt. v. Abdul Kareem (2022) – SC.910/2016

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MERE LETTER OF INVITATION FROM EFCC DOES NOT CONSTITUTE ABUSE OF LAW/FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT

Upon a critical consideration of the entirety of the submission of Learned counsel in this case vis-a-vis the facts and circumstances of the case, I hold the view that there is no doubt that a mere letter of invitation from the 3rd Respondent to the 1st and 2nd Respondents did not constitute abuse of the process of law, and/or breach of fundamental right.

— S.D. Bage JSC. Diamond Bank Plc V. H.R.H. Eze (Dr) Peter Opara & Ors. (SC.375/2012, 9 March 2018)

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TO USE THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS RULES, THE MAIN CLAIM MUST BE ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

It is also settled law that for a matter to be instituted under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979 to enforce the constitutionally guaranteed rights under Chapter IV of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended, the enforcement of such right(s) must be the main/substantive claim before the Court – not ancillary.

— Onnoghen, CJN. Nwachukwu v Nwachukwu (2018) – SC.601/2013

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FHC & HIGH COURT HAVE CONCURRENT JURISDICTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES

A community reading of Section 46 of the 1999 Constitution and Order 1(2) of the Fundamental Rights Enforcement Procedure Rules would reveal undisputedly that both the Federal High Court and the High Court of a State have concurrent jurisdiction on matters of breach or likely breach of any of the fundamental rights enshrined in Chapter IV of the Constitution. This has been the consistent position of this Court upheld in an avalanche of cases, some of which are Grace Jack v. University of Agriculture, Makurdi (2004) 17 NSCQR 90 at 100; (2004) 5 NWLR (Pt. 865) 208; Olutola v. University of Ilorin (2004) 18 NWLR (Pt. 905) 416, Ogugu v. The State (1994) 9 NWLR (Pt. 366) 1.

– J.I. Okoro JSC. Ihim v. Maduagwu (2021)

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ONLY FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS CAN COME THROUGH THE FUNDAMENTAL PROCEDURE RULES

It is also settled law that for an action to be properly brought under the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 2009, (as was done by the Applicants at the trial Court), it must relate to infringement of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Chapter IV of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). See: UNIVERSITY OF ILORIN and ORS v. IDOWU OLUWADARE (2006) 14 NWLR (Pt.100) 751; ACHEBE v. NWOSU (2003) 7 NWLR (Pt. 818) 103; ADEYANJU v. WAEC (2002) 13 NWLR (Pt.785) 479; and DIRECTOR, SSS v. AGBAKOBA (1999) 3 NWLR (Pt. 595) 314. In other words, for an action to be cognizable under the fundamental rights procedure, the infringement of any of the rights under Chapter IV of CFRN, 1999 must be the primary wrong forming the basis of the claim.

— A.B. Mohammed, JCA. ITDRLI v NIMC (2021) – CA/IB/291/2020

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BREACH OF CHAPTER IV RIGHTS CAN COME BEFORE THE FHC OR HIGH COURT

Anyone whose “Chapter IV Rights” have been, are being or likely to be contravened has unfettered access to a High Court for redress “High Court” is defined in Section 46(3) of the 1999 Constitution (the 1979) Constitution had the same Provisions to mean “the Federal High Court” or “the High Court of a State”.

– Ngwuta JSC. Ihim v. Maduagwu (2021)

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