Can this evidence pass for its content of oral agreement of a yearly tenancy to vitiate the termination of the lease in 1980? Can the bare ipse dixit of a witness of the existence of oral evidence turn around in his favour in the face of clear documentary evidence to the contrary? I have a few more questions to ask but I can stop here.
– Tobi JSC. Odutola v. Papersack (2007)
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It is an established principle of law, that the contents of a document are binding on the party who being of full capacity appends his signature to it. He cannot thereafter resile from it or choose an alternative course. – Augie JSC. Bank v. TEE (2003)
It is trite that a document speaks for itself. – Onnoghen JCA. Union Bank v. Akinrinmade (1999)
It is pertinent to note that a signature on a document identifies the document as an act of a particular person and without a signature, the document cannot pass as the act of such unnamed person, and it is therefore totally useless. See N.N.P.C. V. ROVEN SHIPING LTD (2019) 9 NWLR (prt.1676) 67 at 83 and TSALIBAWA V. HABIBA (1991)2 NWLR (prt 174) 461.
— M.L. Shuaibu, JCA. FBN v Benlion (2021) – CA/C/31/2016
Now, here is a man dragging another person to Court over what at best are mere discrepancies in names when he himself is a victim of some discrepancies in his name on Exhibit P2 without any legal consequences whatsoever. Was he also guilty of forgery by the differences in the spelling of his surname in Exhibits P1 and P2 as admitted by him and confirmed by the Court below? Perhaps not. In my finding, these are things which are bound to occur from time to time in human affairs and so long as no criminal intention is imputed and attributed or attributable to them they remain mere trifles tolerated by the society as mere discrepancies. It amounts to no crime of forgery and or false statement at all merely on account of such mere discrepancies. These are mere discrepancies that should not ipso facto without more invoke and ignite grave allegations capable of disqualifying a candidate in law from aspiring to ‘serve his people’. Curiously though as an aside now and no more considering issue three having concluded my consideration of issue three, as I was reading the appellate briefs of counsel, I came across the name of the learned counsel for the 1st Respondent written and signed as ‘J. I. Odibeli Esq,’ then I saw his NBA Seal in the name of ‘Ibezimako Joseph Odibeli, which translates to ‘I. J. Odibelei’ and not ‘J.I. Odibeli.’
– B.A. Georgewill, JCA. Ganiyu v. Oshoakpemhe & Ors. (2021) – CA/B/12A/2021
The law is elementary that a trial Judge has the right to expunge from the record a document which he wrongly or wrongfully admitted. He can do so suo motu at the point of writing judgment. He needs no prompting from any of the parties, although a party is free to call his attention to the document at the stage of address. Where a trial Judge is wrong in expunging a document, the appellate process will correct it and so an argument that the Judge ought to have expunged the document suo motu at the stage of writing judgment, will not avail the party wronged. After all, it is better for a Judge to expunge suo motu a document which is clearly inadmissible under the Evidence Act than allow it to be on the record to give headache to the appellate court. As the appellate court has the competence to expunge it from the record, why not the trial Judge?
– Niki Tobi, JSC. Brossette v. Ilemobola (2007)
Long v. Millar (1879) 4 CPD 450, said Russel, J., in Stokes v. Whicher (1920) 1 Ch 411, 418, comes to this; that, if you can spell out of the document a reference in it to some other transaction, you are at liberty to give evidence as to what that other transaction is, and, if that other transaction contains all the terms in writing, then you get a sufficient memorandum within the statute by reading the two together.’
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