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GOVERNOR CANNOT REMOVE JUDICIAL OFFICER WITHOUT RECOURSE TO NJC

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In other words, on the interpretation and application of the provisions of Section 153(1)(i); 271(1); 292(1)(a)(ii) and paragraph 21 of Part 1 of the Third Schedule to the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, the Governor of Kwara State and the House of Assembly of Kwara State cannot remove the Chief Judge of Kwara State from office without recourse to and input or participation of the National Judicial Council. That is to say for the purpose of emphasis, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, does not give the Governor of Kwara State acting in conjunction with the House of Assembly of Kwara State absolute power to remove the Chief Judge of the State from his/her office or appointment before the age of retirement without the recommendation of the National Judicial Council.

– Mahmud, JSC. Elelu-Habeeb v. A.G Federation (2012)

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A JUDGE IS A HUMAN BEING

In the course of writing a judgment, a Judge analyses sequence of events as they recur and in the process makes some observations and comments. After all he is a human being who is bound by feelings and to express such feelings is not forbidden, as long as he is careful as not to be swayed by it. In other words, a Judge cannot be put in a straight jacket and expected to be so restricted without the liberty to put his thoughts into writing.

– Mukhtar JSC. Nwankwo v. Ecumenical (2007)

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DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS OF A JUDGE IS NOT A STATE GOVERNMENT AFFAIR

In the present case therefore which principally involves the procedure for initiating and conducting disciplinary proceedings against a Chief Judge of a State where the National Judicial Council which had been given a role in the appointment and exercise of disciplinary control over judicial officers of the Appellant’s rank under the Constitution, it is not correct as argued by the Respondents that the entire matter in the case was a State Government affair.

– Mahmud, JSC. Elelu-Habeeb v. A.G Federation (2012)

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DUTY OF JUDGE TO INTERPRETE THE LAW

I agree that a judge should be firm and pungent in the interpretation of the law but such should be short of a judge being a legislator. This is because it is the duty of the legislature to make the law and it is the assigned duty of the judge to interpret the law as it is; not as it ought to be. That will be flouting the rule of division of labour as set out by the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. The provisions of sections 2(1) and 24 of the Act as reproduced above remain the law and shall continue to be so until when same is repealed or amended. For now, I see nothing amiss about the law.

— J.A. Fabiyi, JSC. FBN v. Maiwada (2012) – SC.269/2005

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SIGNING OF ORIGINATING SUMMONS BY A JUDGE – FORM 2

It is clear from the provisions of the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, 1979 that nowhere in the body of the Rules is it provided that whenever an originating summons is being taken out it must be signed by a Judge of the High Court to which the originating summons relates. The Rules are silent on such a provision. However, the form of the originating summons which is prescribed in the Appendix to the Rules as Form 2 implies that the originating summons would be signed by a Judge. But nowhere is it provided that it is mandatory for a Judge to sign the originating summons. That notwithstanding, a close examination of Form 2 will reveal that directives are being given to a prospective defendant in an action to do certain things. Some of the directions read as follows – “Let the defendant, within 14 days (or if the summons is to be served out of the jurisdiction, insert here the time for appearance fixed by the order giving leave to issue the summons and serve it out of the jurisdiction) after service of this summons on him, inclusive of the day of service, cause an appearance to be entered to this summons, which is issued on the application of the plaintiff…” “If the defendant does not enter an appearance, such judgment may be given or order made or in relation to him as the court may think just and expedient. The defendant may enter an appearance in person or by a solicitor by handing in the appropriate forms, duly completed, at the Federal High Court at or in the High Court of……..State sitting.” Surely, neither the plaintiff nor his counsel would be expected to issue these directives to the defendant, for the defendant who is at loggerheads with the plaintiff could ignore such directives and to no consequence, since neither the plaintiff nor his counsel could have any power to carryout or enforce the sanctions contained in the directions. It is only a Judge that is conferred with such coercive powers. It, therefore, follows that the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules, contemplate that an originating summons issued in the form of Form 2 thereof would be signed by a Judge. What would be the effect if any person other than a Judge signs the originating summons need not bother us here in view of what I intend to state anon.

— Uwais, JSC. Saude v. Abdullahi (1989) – SC.197/1987

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JUDGES SHOULD RESTRICT COMMENTS TO ONLY ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT

We need to point it out from the onset and there is no disputing this age-long legal position that, no Court has the powers to veer into questions or issues not placed before it. The primary objective of a Court is to confine itself to the hearing and determination in an appeal of issues raised in the grounds of appeal and issues formulated therefrom and in the case of a Court of first instance like the trial Court in the instant matter, only the issues presented by the parties in a suit for the Courts resolution. The Court is therefore legally forbidden from transgressing into issues not presented before it. See the case of: Agbor V. The Polytechnic, Calabar (2009) LPELR 8690 (CA). However, this is not to say that Judges cannot express themselves by way of making passing remarks commonly referred to in legal parlance as obiter dicta. Our Law Reports are replete with comments, opinions or remarks and such expressions that Judges are known to make in the course of the delivery of their decisions, but these remarks and opinions do not usually address the core issues that are central to the determination of the case that the Court was called upon to decide, that is, the ratio decidendi of that case. That is why remarks made by way of obiter dicta are not appealable and if per chance an appeal is lodged against an order dictum, that appeal is necessarily irregular and must be struck out, as not being the decision of the Court in the case.

— O.F. Omoleye JCA. Amaechi V. The Governor of Rivers State & Ors. (CA/PH/342/2015, 8 May 2017)

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APPELLATE COURT INTERFERENCE WITH TRIAL COURTS DISCRETION

It needs to be emphasised here that an appellate Court will usually not interfere with an exercise of discretion in its quest to obtain substantial justice except where it is satisfied that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or illegally or without due regard to all necessary consideration having regard to the circumstances of the particular case. – Nweze JSC. Abdullahi v. Adetutu (2019)

Even then, it is well – established that an appellate Court will not, in principle, interfere with the exercise of discretion by the trial Court unless that discretion is shown to have been exercised upon wrong principles or that the exercise was tainted with some illegality or substantial irregularity. – Nweze JSC. Abdullahi v. Adetutu (2019)

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