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A JUDGE IS TO EXAMINE CASES BEFORE HIM WITH DUE CARE, AND MAY RAISE ANY DEFECT IN A SUIT

Dictum

This issue reminds of the dictum of this Court in Sodipo v Lemminkainem OY and Anor[1986] 1 NWLR (pt. 15) 220, According to the Court: “A Judge exists to determine disputes and examine with due care and microscopic senses all matters before him in his pursuit of justice.” This dictum, to my mind, is a complete answer to the criticism by the appellants to the way and manner the learned trial Judge resolved the preliminary objection. In the first place, the question of no “live issue” found in the suit, was not raised by any of the parties in arguing the preliminary objection. A trial Judge, however, is within his rights to properly inform himself of a defect in a suit, either with or without external intervention, because it touches directly on the competence of the suit and hence the jurisdiction to entertain it as such. Thus, the established principle that the issue of jurisdiction can be raised at any stage of the proceedings, at the instance of either the parties or by the Court suo motu, Amale v. Sokoto Local Govt and Ors. [2012] 1 SC (pt. IV) 45; Odiase v. Agho [1972] 1 All NLR (pt.1) 170; Petrojessica Entreprises Ltd v. Leventis Technical Co. Ltd, [1992] 2 NWLR (pt. 244) 675. Where however, the issue of jurisdiction is raised, it should be examined in all ramifications. It should not be compartmentalized and subjected to piecemeal examination and treatment, Oloba v Akereja [1988] 3 NWLR (pt. 84) 508. The very many faces of jurisdiction should come under the searchlight and be pronounced upon, notwithstanding that it might not have been brought to the attention of the Court.

— C.C. Nweze, JSC. Uzoho v NCP (SC.141/2007, Friday, May 13, 2022)

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A JUDGE SHOULD BE SOBER

It has always been my considered view that sobriety should be the first watch-word for anyone who, per chance, finds himself in the exalted position of a judge. A judicial officer should not be talkative or loquacious. Indeed, he should not be boisterous. He should be polite to witnesses and lawyers who appear before him. Above all, a judge should not be biased under any guise. It needs no further gain-saying that Auta J. should watch his steps in the discharge of his judicial functions. My Learned brother has said it all. I also allow the appeal and abide by all consequential orders including that relating to costs in the lead judgment.

— John Afolabi Fabiyi, JSC. Nnamdi Eriobuna & Ors. V. Ikechukwu Obiorah (CA/E/77/99, 24 May 1999)

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A JUDGE IS EXPECTED TO BE STRAIGHTFORWARD IN HIS JUDICIAL EXERCISE

A Judge by the nature of his position and professional calling is expected to be straightforward, upright, diligent, consistent and open in whatever he does in court and in any other place of human interaction and human endeavour that he happens to find himself. This is because his character as a Judge is public property. He is the cynosure of the entire adjudication in the court, and like caesar’s wife of Ancient Rome, he is expected to live above board and above suspicion, and he must live above board and above suspicion, if the judicial process should not experience any reverse or suffer any detriment. A Judge should know that by the nature of his judicial functions, he is persistently and consistently on trial for any improper conduct immediately before, during and immediately after the trial of a case. In Bakare v. Apena and others (1986) 4 NWLR (pt. 33) 1, Obaseki, JSC said that “a trial Judge ought to know that he is on trial for any improper conduct during the trial of a case before him and immediately thereafter”. By his judicial functions, a Judge is expected to hold the balance in the litigation process and he must be overtly seen as holding the balance evenly.

— Niki Tobi, JCA. Nnamdi Eriobuna & Ors. V. Ikechukwu Obiorah (CA/E/77/99, 24 May 1999)

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PROCESS FOR REMOVAL OF A CHIEF JUDGE BY A STATE GOVERNOR

It is not difficult to see that for the effective exercise of the powers of removal of a Chief Judge of a State by the Governor and House of Assembly, the first port of call by the Governor on his journey to remove a Chief Judge of the State shall be the National Judicial Council which is equipped with the personnel and resources to investigate the inability of the Chief Judge to discharge the functions of his office the subject of disciplinary action of removal through the Committees of the Council and where the infirmity of the mind or body is involved the services of a medical board to examine and submit appropriate report on the Chief Judge to be affected could also avail the Council in the process of investigation.

– Mahmud, JSC. Elelu-Habeeb v. A.G Federation (2012)

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JUDGES SHOULD RESTRICT COMMENTS TO ONLY ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT

We need to point it out from the onset and there is no disputing this age-long legal position that, no Court has the powers to veer into questions or issues not placed before it. The primary objective of a Court is to confine itself to the hearing and determination in an appeal of issues raised in the grounds of appeal and issues formulated therefrom and in the case of a Court of first instance like the trial Court in the instant matter, only the issues presented by the parties in a suit for the Courts resolution. The Court is therefore legally forbidden from transgressing into issues not presented before it. See the case of: Agbor V. The Polytechnic, Calabar (2009) LPELR 8690 (CA). However, this is not to say that Judges cannot express themselves by way of making passing remarks commonly referred to in legal parlance as obiter dicta. Our Law Reports are replete with comments, opinions or remarks and such expressions that Judges are known to make in the course of the delivery of their decisions, but these remarks and opinions do not usually address the core issues that are central to the determination of the case that the Court was called upon to decide, that is, the ratio decidendi of that case. That is why remarks made by way of obiter dicta are not appealable and if per chance an appeal is lodged against an order dictum, that appeal is necessarily irregular and must be struck out, as not being the decision of the Court in the case.

— O.F. Omoleye JCA. Amaechi V. The Governor of Rivers State & Ors. (CA/PH/342/2015, 8 May 2017)

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COORDINATE JUDGES CANNOT OVERTURN ONE ANOTHER

In NWANI vs. EDE (1996) 8 NWLR (pt. 466) 332, Tobi, JCA (as he then was) stated: “It is a general principle of law that a Judge lacks the jurisdiction to overturn the decision of another Judge, even if he feels strongly that the decision is wrong. Such a judicial conduct is tantamount to presiding over the decision of the brother Judge on appeal. The Constitution does not allow such a procedure…”

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DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS OF A JUDGE IS NOT A STATE GOVERNMENT AFFAIR

In the present case therefore which principally involves the procedure for initiating and conducting disciplinary proceedings against a Chief Judge of a State where the National Judicial Council which had been given a role in the appointment and exercise of disciplinary control over judicial officers of the Appellant’s rank under the Constitution, it is not correct as argued by the Respondents that the entire matter in the case was a State Government affair.

– Mahmud, JSC. Elelu-Habeeb v. A.G Federation (2012)

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