The general rule is that where the parties have embodied the terms of their contract in a written document, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to add to, vary, subtract from or contradict the terms of the written instrument.
– Adio, JSC. UBN v. Ozigi (1994)
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Evidence given by a witness in another case may be used to impeach his credit if, in the later case, he says something different; but what he said in the earlier case does not become evidence in the later case. And a judgment given in another case can, in appropriate cases, be put in a later suit, to prevent the re-opening of the same question. One hopes that the indiscriminate introduction of other proceedings into a trial will be discontinued.
— Bairamian, F.J. Owonyin v. Omotosho (1961) – F.S.C.249/1960
Before concluding on the said prayer 7 it is helpful to call to mind the observations of Oputa JSC in Obasi v. Onwuka (1987) 3 NWLR (Pt. 61 ) 364, 372 in an application to call additional evidence on appeal: “To talk therefore of assessing the rightness or wrongness of the trial court’s verdict today by evidence that will be given tomorrow is to talk in blank prose. This is the reason why appellate courts are very reluctant to admit “fresh evidence”, “new evidence” or “additional evidence” on appeal except in circumstances where the matter arose ex improviso which no human ingenuity could foresee and it is in the interest of justice that evidence of that fact be led:- R v. Dora Harris (1927) 28 Cox 432. But by and large, at least in criminal cases (and the principle should also be the same in civil cases), the courts lean against hearing fresh evidence on appeal.”
— Oguntade, JSC. UBA v BTL (SC. 301/2003, 15 April 2005)
In Comfort Asaboro v. M.G.D. Aruwaji and Anor. (1974) 4 SC 87 at 90-91 (Reprint) this court had cause to consider the principles which are to be taken into consideration in an application to call additional evidence on appeal. The court per Coker JSC said:- “The decision also evidently applied the principles which time honoured practice has established and the matters which the courts have always taken into consideration in the judicious exercise of powers to grant leave to adduce new evidence, namely:- The evidence sought to be adduced must be such as could not have been with reasonable diligence obtained for use at the trial; The evidence should be such as if admitted, it would have an important, not necessarily crucial, effect on the whole case; and the evidence must be such as apparently creditable in the sense that it is capable of being believed and it need not be incontrovertible. See for these observations Roe v. R McGregor and Sons Ltd. (1968) 1 WLR 925 where the earlier decision of the Court of Appeal in Ladd v. Marshall (1954) 3 All ER 745 was considered and applied. Strictly speaking, under our own rule, the discretion to grant leave to adduce new evidence is properly exercised for the “furtherance of justice”. The exercise must however be judicious and it is in this respect that the guidelines set out above have been followed and applied. We are not unmindful of the fact that it would be a dangerous precedent to allow a person who did not call evidence in the lower court, or who, for one reason or another, had called insufficient evidence at the trial, with comparative ease, to bring forward for the first time before this court the evidence which could and should have been adduced before the trial Judge. Such an attitude would be disastrous to the principles of seeing an end to litigation. The stand taken by the Privy Council in the case of Edie Maud Leeder v. Nnance Ellis (1953) at 52 (sic) also illustrates this point. However one looks at the problem, it seems to be generally accepted that the guiding principles have always been applied to the special facts or circumstances of each application before the Court of Appeal, and in every case the question whether or not sufficient diligence has been put into the quest for such evidence has been decided as a matter of fact.”
We, however, wish to state that, despite our conclusions above on the objections raised by Respondents to documents tendered by the petitioners, I am still minded to the evaluate evidence adduced and consider the merits of the petition. The only evidence I shall not revisit are Exhibits PBD, PBD1A, PBD1B, PBD1C, PBD1D, PBD1A, PBD2A, PBD3, PBD4, PBE1, PBE2, PBE3, PBE4, PBE5, PBE6, PBF1, PBF2, PBF3 and PBF4 relating to 2nd Respondent’s alleged non-qualification that were tendered by P.W.27, Mr. Mike Enahoro-Ebah, the said documents in our view being bereft of pleadings to sustain them as elaborately stated earlier in this judgment.
— H.S. Tsammani, JCA. Atiku v PDP (CA/PEPC/05/2023, 6th of September, 2023)
Now it is settled law that the evidence of a witness taken in an earlier proceeding is not relevant in a later trial. except for the purpose of discrediting such a witness in cross-examination and for that purpose only.
– Kawu, JSC. Ogunnaike v. Ojayemi (1987)
The power to admit new, fresh or additional evidence must always be exercised sparingly and with caution. The Court must consider whether there are special circumstances to warrant the grant of the application and whether it would be in furtherance of the justice of the case. See: Uzodinma vs Izunaso (No.2) (2011) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1275) 30 @ 55 B-C.
— K.M.O. Kekere-Ekun, JSC. Williams v Adold/Stamm (2007) – SC.404/2013
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