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DOCUMENTS ARE TO BE GIVEN THEIR NATURAL MEANING

Dictum

The first rule about the construction of documents enjoins that the simple natural meaning of words be ascribed to them unless this is impossible, and the defendant is severely precluded from giving oral evidence to disparage the clear expressions already reduced by her or for her into writing. We have come to the conclusion in this respect also that the learned trial judge had not given the document exhibit 1 its natural and ordinary meaning and that on a close reading and study of that document it is manifest that the defendant states in exhibit 1 that the amount of 600 was the purchase price of the land which she had contracted to sell to the plaintiff.

– Coker, JSC. Rosenje v. Bakare (1973)

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DEFINITION OF “SECONDMENT”

The term secondment is mostly used in the public service which is not the case in the instant suit. That notwithstanding, the Black’s Law Dictionary at page 1555 defines ‘secondment’ as “a period of time that a worker spends away from his or her usual job”. The court in the case of ALHAJI HAMZA DALHATU v. ATTORNEY GENERAL, KATSINA STATE & ORS (2007) LPELR-8460(CA) also reckoned the meaning of secondment as used in the Public service rules when it stated that: “SECTION 6 – TRANSFERS AND SECONDMENT 02601 – TRANSFER is the permanent release of an officer from one service to another or from one class to another within the same service. SECONDEMENT means the temporary release of an officer to the service of another Government or Body for a specified period.” Per ARIWOOLA, J.C.A. (P.34, paras. A-B).

— Z.M. Bashir, J. Gbaraka v Zenith Securities & Anor. (2020) – NICN/PHC/45/2018

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“MAY” MEANS MANDATORY WHERE A DUTY IS IMPOSED

UDE V. NWARA & ANOR. (1993) JELR 43303 (SC): “I agree with Chief Umeadi that although section 28(1) of the Law states that the lessor “may enter a suit”, “may” should be construed as mandatory i.e. as meaning “shall” or “must”. I believe that it is now the invariable practice of the courts to interpret “may” as mandatory whenever it is used to impose a duty upon a public functionary the benefit of which enures to a private citizen.”

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WORDS AND PHRASES ARE TO BE GIVEN THEIR ORDINARY MEANING

Under the literal rule of interpretation of statute, words and phrases in enactments are to be given their ordinary, original or grammatical meanings even if it will create hardship, inconvenience or injustice to the parties in so far as it will not result to absurdity. See, B.A.J (NIG) LTD. v. OGUNSEYE (2010) 4 NWLR (1184) 343, AMAECHI v. INEC (2007) 9 NWLR (PT. 1080) 504, UWAGBA v. FRN (2009) 15 NWLR (P. 1163) 91, OWENA BANK v. STOCK EXCHANGE (1997) 7 SCNJ 160.

— A.O. Obaseki-Adejumo, JCA. FRSC v Ehikaam (2023) – CA/AS/276/2019

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THE WORD “MAY” SYNONYMOUS WITH “SHALL”

In Ushie v. Agbalu (2013) JELR 51127 (CA), the court relied on: Iyoho v. Effiong where the Supreme Court per A. M. Mukthar, JSC (as she then was) said: “Although the word ‘may’ is used in the provision, it does not necessarily mean that it means permissible. ‘May’ in ‘Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition, page 1000, has been defined inter alia as ‘loosely, is required to; shall; must…In dozens of cases, courts have held may to be synonymous with shall or must, usually in an effort to effectuate legislative intent.”

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INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 82 CFRN 1999

It appears rather from the resolution, exhibit A, and the proceedings of the house, exhibit C, that the purposes is the decision of the house to show resentment for the respondent’s affront in daring to publish something about highly placed legislators rather than a plan for the investigation of the members for abuse. This should not be. The essence of section 82(2) of the Constitution is invalid (sic). No power exists under the section for general investigation nor for the aggrandizement of the house. So, the [respondents] were not entitled to have invited the [appellant] in the first instance.

– Oguntade, JCA. El-Rufai v. House of Representatives (2003)

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